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Abstract 
This research investigates individual level effects of information technology 
(IT) outsourcing. The starting point is the lack of detailed research exploring 
the situation of transferred IT employees. The research problem is thus to 
examine these individuals’ new roles and work outcomes.  
The basis of this research rests on several organization and management 
theories typically applied to outsourcing separately. Some theories were 
focused primarily on cost concerns and resources concerns, while others had 
partnership concerns. Stakeholder theory recognizes the importance of bal-
ancing interests of all stakeholder groups. Agency theory recognizes that 
principal-agent relationships change as a consequence of outsourcing. And 
economic theories are addressing performance, but not individual level work 
outcome directly. These complementary perspectives are integrated into a 
framework, which subsequently was applied in empirical research.  
A combination of qualitative and quantitative research was used to explore 
and test the findings. The exploratory case studies involved six large organi-
zations and in-depth interviews with a selected number of client and vendor 
stakeholders. Combined they revealed important features influencing and 
creating successful IT outsourcing relationships, and more specifically ex-
plored individual level attitudes, behavior and performance. One important 
stakeholder group affected seriously by the outsourcing arrangement was 
recognized as the transplant group – defined as those employees who get 
transferred from client to vendor organizations, which employ them and 
offer their services back to the original employer for a service fee. The case 
studies recognized occupational stress among transplants, outsourcing ar-
rangement stressors, and indicated consequences of occupational stress. 
The confirmatory survey involved transplants of IT outsourcing. The survey 
found role stress as prevalent among transplants of IT outsourcing. In turn, 
perceived role stress was found to influence transplants’ work outcome. 
Three outsourcing arrangement stress factors — complementary core com-
petencies, client managerial persistent expectations, and relational norms — 
were found as stressors that affect the level of perceived role stress among 
transplants. 
The main contribution of this research is the development and application of 
a multiparadigmatic based research framework providing a more compre-
hensive understanding of transplants’ role stress and work outcome. Used as 
an analytic tool this framework might help managers in dealing with issues 
of role stress and among transplants of IT outsourcing.  
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1. Introduction 
Historically, much research on information technology (IT) outsourcing has 
focused on the sourcing decision itself, trying to understand “why do organi-
zations outsource?” and literature on IT outsourcing offers a variety of ex-
planations of “how do organizations outsource?” Recently, an emerging 
stream of research has focused on the outsourcing relationship. This study 
will take a look at how outsourcing affects individuals. Specifically, the fo-
cus will be to understand the situation of those employees who get trans-
ferred from client to vendor organizations as part of the IT outsourcing ar-
rangement. 
1.1 Purpose and contribution of the study 
Information technology outsourcing — the practice of transferring IT assets, 
leases, staff, and management responsibility for delivery of services from 
internal IT functions to third party vendors — has become an undeniable 
trend ever since Kodak’s 1989 landmark decision. In recent years, private 
and public sector organizations worldwide have outsourced significant por-
tions of their IT functions (Hirschheim & Lacity, 2000). Examples can be 
found in major organizations such as Scandinavian Airlines Systems, ABB, 
and Rolls-Royce. In a business perspective, outsourcing is motivated by the 
promise of strategic, financial, and technological benefits. The success of 
outsourcing, then, should be assessed in terms of attainment of these bene-
fits. In a user perspective, outsourcing success is the level of quality of of-
fered services (Lee & Kim, 1999).  
But, IT outsourcing is also about organizational, relational, and individual 
changes. As the outsourcing contract is signed there is an overnight change 
in legal relationships, personal relationships, and control mechanisms. IT 
employees formally leave their organization and get transferred to the ven-
dor organization or to the new spin-off company, which employs them and 
offers their service back to the original employer for a service fee. The status 
of these employees, relative to the original employer, changes from subordi-
nates to third-party contractors (Ho, Ang, & Straub, 2003). The people who 
get transferred have to behave as an external vendor and have to focus on 
new issues such as marketing, customer services, and offering competitive 
prices to the clients (Willcocks & Lacity, 1998). These IT employees experi-
ence radical changes in their careers. 
In reviewing IT outsourcing based research no articles were found question-
ing the transferred IT employees’ new role. Exploratory case studies recog-
nized the unique and difficult position of these employees. Interpretations of 
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relevant research and outsourcing practices motivated further research into 
individual level role stress of transferred IT employees.  
1.2 Research questions and framework 
The primary objective of this study was to examine influences of transplants’ 
individual level role stress on their work outcome. The secondary objective 
was to identify elements of IT outsourcing arrangements that influence 
transplants’ level of role stress. Specifically, two research questions arise: 
• How does transplants’ role stress in IT outsourcing affect their work 
outcome? 
• What are the predictors of transplants’ role stress in IT outsourcing? 
In this research IT outsourcing is defined as a process whereby an organiza-
tion decides to contract-out or sell the firm’s IT assets, people and/or activi-
ties to a third party supplier, who in exchange provides and manages these 
assets and services for an agreed fee over an agreed time period (Kern & 
Willcocks, 2002). This process-oriented approach to outsourcing recognizes 
key elements of exchange and the relationship between different stakeholder 
groups. 
One important stakeholder group is the transplant group, defined as those IT 
employees who get transferred from the client company to the vendor com-
pany. These employees formally leave their organization and are trans-
planted into the vendor company, which employs them and offers their ser-
vices back to the original employer for a service fee. Even though these 
transplants still provide services to the original organization, it no longer 
directly employs them (Ho et al., 2003). For the purpose of this research, the 
IT employees that get transferred are called transplants. 
The coalition of disparate corporate cultures yields appreciable levels of role 
stress for transplants in IT outsourcing. Two important facets that influence 
the level of stress are role ambiguity and conflict (Nygaard & Dahlstrom, 
2002). Role ambiguity emerges because of the paucity of relevant informa-
tion as well as the level of complexity and change. Role conflict similarly 
materializes as employees evaluate responsibilities in light of historical obli-
gations and associations with a new employer. Ambiguity and conflict might 
jeopardize efforts to achieve objectives. 
Work outcomes, as used in this research, cover transplants’ attitudes, behav-
ior and task performance. 
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1.3 Overall research design 
Even though IT outsourcing is a practical issue, it also has significant impact 
on organization and management theories. IT outsourcing is as a discipline 
based on several other concepts and disciplines, as well as the relations be-
tween them — international business, marketing, psychology, technology 
management, strategic management, project management, knowledge man-
agement, finance, economy, organizations, traditional management, political 
science and the behavioral sciences.  
Early research into the phenomenon of IT outsourcing focused on why or-
ganizations outsourced (determinants of outsourcing, advantages and disad-
vantages of outsourcing) and how organizations outsourced (what functions 
to outsource, how to evaluate the vendor, how to structure the contract). 
Theoretically, IT outsourcing research has a basis in economic theories, or-
ganizational theories, and strategic management theories as well. For exam-
ple, transaction cost theory and neo-classical economic theory are important 
elements in the outsourcing decision-making process. Resource-based theory 
of the firm, including the knowledge-based perspective of the firm, is an-
other example of important scholarly value when applied to IT outsourcing 
models. Partnership and alliance theory is also applicable to understanding 
relationship between the two parties. 
This research had a mixed method approach with literature review, explora-
tory case studies and a quantitative survey. Table 1.1 below summarizes the 
research process, illustrating three research stages, methods employed, who 
was involved, key findings, and output and implications for the following 
stages of research. The process is described briefly below. 
In phase 1 an extensive review of IT outsourcing based research was con-
ducted. Starting with major IS/IT journals, promising articles were followed 
back to their origin, whether based in articles, books, or dissertations. Previ-
ous research has investigated why companies outsource (e.g., Ang & Cum-
mings, 1997; Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993), how companies manage out-
sourcing contracts (e.g., Elitzur & Wensley, 1998), and how to manage an IT 
outsourcing relationship (e.g., Kern & Willcocks, 2002; Kern, 1999). Lately, 
a few researchers have focused on individual level challenges (Ho et al., 
2003; Koh, Ang, & Straub, 2004). Based on the literature review, eleven 
theories concerned with IT outsourcing were recognized, and used to extend 
and strengthen the theoretical understanding of this complex field. They 
were compared in terms of what they recommend for outsourcing. Some 
theories were focused primarily on cost concerns (neo-classical economic 
theory, transaction cost theory, agency theory, contractual theory, theory of 
firm boundaries), and resource concerns (theory of core competencies and 
resource-based theory), while others had partnership concerns (partnership 
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and alliance theory, relational exchange theory, social exchange theory, and 
stakeholder theory). In order to understand the inherent complexities and the 
underlying constructs of managing successful IT outsourcing relationships, 
empirical research was needed. An interesting observation from phase 1 was 
that very little research was conducted on individual level attitudes, behav-
ior, and performance. 
The exploratory case studies in phase 2, conducted through July – Septem-
ber 2004, had two related parts. First, important features of managing IT 
outsourcing relationship were examined. The second part of the exploratory 
case studies consists of an examination of how individuals or groups of indi-
viduals, called stakeholders, influenced the relationship. Data collection was 
done through a total of sixteen interviews, with questions addressing: enter 
and exit strategies, phases and activities, contract development, personnel 
issues, governance structure and relationship management, and knowledge 
management, with a strong emphasis on what characteristics influenced suc-
cessful IT outsourcing relationship. One important stakeholder group was 
recognized as affected seriously by the IT outsourcing arrangement — em-
ployees transferred from client to vendor organizations. In addition to the 
interviews, a survey instrument was developed. All interviewees were asked 
to rate the importance of eleven individual critical success factors from IT 
outsourcing. Core competence management, stakeholder management, and 
production cost reduction, were found to be the most critical success factors 
in the three IT outsourcing relationships studied (Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 
2005).  
In phase 3, a survey instrument was developed to further investigate role 
stress among transplants of IT outsourcing. Data was collected during June – 
August 2005 in a large IT outsourcing service provider. Questionnaires were 
sent to 159 transplants. A total of 103 complete questionnaires were re-
ceived, which makes the overall response rate 64.7%. A few responses were 
later refused because respondents did not belong to the target group of trans-
plants. Three IT outsourcing characteristics were found to influence the per-
ception of transplants’ role stress, which in turn affected work performance. 
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Stage of 
research 
Methods Who involved Key findings/output Implications for next 
phase 
Phase 1 Literature 
review 
Researcher with 
input from supervi-
sor 
Outsourcing literature 
and research was focus-
ing on organizational and 
relationship issues.  
 
To understand the 
inherent complexities 
and the underlying 
constructs of managing 
successful IT outsourc-
ing relationships em-
pirical research was 
needed.  
Continue research into 
individual level atti-
tudes, behaviour, and 
performance of trans-
plants. 
Phase 2 Exploratory 
case studies 
In-depth 
interviews 
with 16 
stake-
holders 
Rolls-Royce – EDS 
SAS – CSC  
ABB – IBM 
Ability to handle transfer 
of employees was critical 
to the relationships. 
Transplants experienced 
radical changes in their 
careers as they got 
moved from client to 
vendor organizations.  
Confirmatory survey on 
occupational stress 
needed. 
Phase 3 Survey  103 IT employees 
transferred from 
client to vendor 
organization 
Role stress was identified 
as prevalent among 
transplants, and found to 
affect task performance. 
Three outsourcing ar-
rangement stressors 
influenced the perception 
of role stress. 
Conceptual refinements 
needed. 
Table 1.1. Overview of the research process. 
 
1.4 Expected contributions 
In reviewing IT outsourcing based research (see Appendix A), very little 
attention was found on the issue of how outsourcing affects individuals. 
Thus, this research intends to shed light on an important stakeholder group 
of IT outsourcing arrangements, the transplants. As this research collected 
data through exploratory case studies and a confirmatory survey, practical 
and theoretical insights will be given. The mixed method approach will en-
rich the data material, and hopefully better the analysis and discussions of 
results.  
As researchers have not looked into the issues of transplants’ role stress pre-
viously this research may broaden our theoretical understanding of the com-
plexities of outsourcing. And further, as practitioners from lower organiza-
tional levels are the focus group of this research, new insights for managers 
might be valuable. 
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1.5 Organization of the dissertation 
This thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2, there is a comprehensive 
review of IT outsourcing based research and literature. In the following 
chapter 3, an overview of the three international based research case studies 
is given, followed by an analysis based on the framework developed in chap-
ter 2. Using theory and results from case studies, chapter 4 proposes a 
framework for understanding transplants’ role stress and effectiveness in IT 
outsourcing. Methodology for the confirmatory survey research is given in 
chapter 5. Data analysis and results are presented in chapter 6. And finally, 
discussion of results and the contributions to research and practice are given 
in chapter 7. 
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2. Understanding the field of investigation 
According to Leiblein, Reuer, & Dalsace (2002), the decision to outsource or 
insource enterprise-wide activities related to the acquisition, deployment, 
and management of IT represents one of the more complex choices facing a 
firm’s mangers. They examined the relationship between outsourcing deci-
sion (governance choice) and technological performance, but they found that 
neither outsourcing nor internalization per se results in superior perform-
ance. Rather, observed differences in the performance of transactions gov-
erned by the different organizational forms were driven by factors underly-
ing governance choice. 
This chapter starts with a short presentation of popular sourcing practices. 
Subsequently, several organization and management theories are presented 
as a means of understanding underlying factors of IT outsourcing. At the end 
of the chapter, the enhanced understanding is synthesized and applied for the 
purpose of this study. 
2.1 A sourcing universe 
Hirschheim and Lacity (2000), define insourcing as “the practice of evaluat-
ing the outsourcing option, but confirming the continued use of internal IT 
resources to achieve the same objectives of outsourcing.” Their research 
contributes to the IT sourcing research base by providing evidence that com-
panies need not necessarily turn to outsourcing to improve IT performance. 
While outsourcing may be a preferred option for some organizations for 
various reasons, such as returning to core competencies or focusing IT staff 
on more business-oriented IT activities, Hirscheim and Lacity show that if 
cost reduction is the major objective, IT managers can oftentimes replicate a 
vendor's cost reduction tactics. Insourcing success, however, is predicated on 
a number of key issues, including aligning perceptions of and agendas for 
IT. 
IT outsourcing has been defined as the “decision to transfer IT assets, leases, 
staff, and management responsibility for delivery of IT services from an 
internal IT function to an external IT provider” (Kern & Willcocks, 2002). If 
the costs represent more than 80% of the IT budget, this is called total out-
sourcing (Lacity, Willcocks, & Feeny, 1996). When the decision is to source 
selected IT functions from external provider(s), while still providing be-
tween 20% and 80% of the IT budget internally, this is called selective out-
sourcing. The vendor(s) becomes responsible for delivering the result of the 
selectively outsourced IT activities, while the customer remains responsible 
for delivering the result of the insourced activities. Traditional outsourcing is 
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depicted by the customer having a one-to-one relationship with large IT ser-
vice companies (e.g., IBM, EDS, CSC). This is the domain of very large 
companies due to the fact that both set-up and maintenance costs are expen-
sive. Unlike traditional outsourcing, business application outsourcing offered 
by application service providers (ASPs) is targeted for the small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). This is typically a one-to-many model, where an appli-
cation will be offered to numerous customers across different sites. The 
emerging technologies coupled with economies of skills (rather than scale) 
make the ASP model a viable and affordable option for SMEs (Currie & 
Seltsikas, 2001). 
Business processing outsourcing is typically the outsourcing of a company’s 
non-core or back-office business processes. Usually those processes are IT 
enabled (or should be IT enabled) and hence can be transformed by the use 
of a new or improved technology platform. The appeal of business process 
outsourcing is that it therefore attempts to involve a new support services 
model involving cost effective, scaleable, efficient services (Honess, 2003). 
The growth in demand for process outsourcing has also seen an expansion in 
the range of services being provided by suppliers. Processes typically out-
sourced include finance and accounting, procurement, human resources, and 
real estate. According to Feeny, Lacity, and Willcocks, (2005), successful 
outsourcing of back-office business functions requires the client to identify 
which competencies to assess, to undertake careful evaluation of supplier 
strengths, and to remain involved in the business processes. 
According to Linder (2004), the concept of transformational outsourcing is 
an emerging practice, where companies are looking outside for help for more 
fundamental reasons — to facilitate rapid organizational change, to launch 
new strategies and to reshape company boundaries. In doing so, they are 
engaging in transformational outsourcing: “partnering with another company 
to achieve a rapid, substantial and sustainable improvement in enterprise-
level performance.” Transformational outsourcing places the power to bring 
new capabilities to the organization squarely in the hands of executives who 
have and value those capabilities. In other words, the outsourcing partner 
provides a management team that is experienced in the capability that the 
organization seeking change needs. And those executives are empowered by 
the outsourcing process to implement the practices they bring with them. 
Since the mid-1990s global outsourcing — sometimes called off sourcing or 
offshoring — has been a fast growing aspect of the world economy. 
Venkatraman (2004) has defined the term offshoring as “the practice among 
U.S. and European companies to migrating business processes to India, the 
Philippines, Ireland, China and elsewhere to lower costs without signifi-
cantly sacrificing quality.” The strategic benefits for firms can be portrayed 
as a means to reduce costs, improve asset efficiency, and increase profits. 
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Criticisms of outsourcing have often been in the areas of changing employ-
ment patterns, globalization of labor force, and its effects on individuals and 
organizations (Clott, 2004). For most companies, coordinating a far-flung 
network of business processes presents new challenges, e.g., security, culture 
and knowledge transfer. For global outsourcing the role of transaction costs 
is almost as significant as production costs (Qu & Brocklehurst, 2003). 
Increasing 
need for 
cooperation 
Global outsourcing 
- Migrating business process overseas 
Transformational outsourcing 
- Organizational change 
 
Business process outsourcing 
- Business process design and operation 
- Systems building 
IS/IT outsourcing 
- Systems development and support 
- Infrastructure operation and management 
Insourcing 
- All (or most) activities in-house 
 
Figure 2.1. A sourcing universe. 
 
The suggested sourcing universe in Figure 2.1 recognizes that a range of 
assets can be outsourced in order to satisfy business objectives. Assets can 
refer to hardware, software, people, and processes, each of which can be 
separately examined. As the extent of assets outsourced increases, there will 
be an increasing need for cooperation between the outsourcing parties, be-
cause of increasing uncertainty. In the case of insourcing, the client company 
retains responsibility for the delivery of all IT service, bringing vendor re-
sources in only to supplement internally managed teams. External delivery 
of services is relatively easy to manage and control, because the amount is 
not very high. In outsourcing, the responsibility for delivery of services, such 
as infrastructure operation and management, systems development and sup-
port, business process design and operation, and organizational change, is 
transferred to an external vendor. This external vendor can even be located 
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overseas. As the complexity of these services increases, so does the uncer-
tainty. And thus, the need for management control systems and trust in the 
outsourcing relationship increases. Characteristics of the transaction, envi-
ronment and parties, can be used in the design of control systems (Langfield-
Smith & Smith, 2003).  
2.2 Theoretical foundations 
In this section, eleven organization and management theories are presented 
according to attributes like focus, aim, unit of analysis, outsourcing philoso-
phy and critical success factors. The primary purpose is to strengthen the 
theoretical understanding of IT outsourcing. This approach is adapted from 
Earl (2001). No claims are made that any one theory outperforms others. 
Each represents a particular theoretical orientation and a different form of 
organizational intervention of IT outsourcing. The theories are not mutually 
exclusive, and two or more of them can be applied to the same outsourcing 
arrangement. Furthermore, there may be other theories that the literature 
review has not encountered. A comparison of theories is presented in Table 
2.1 on page 33. 
2.2.1 Neo-classical economic theory 
Focus, aim, unit of analysis. Neo-classical economic theory regards every 
business organization as a production function (Williamson, 1981), where 
their motivation is driven by profit maximization. This means that compa-
nies offer products and services to the market where they have a cost or pro-
duction advantage. They rely on the marketplace where they have disadvan-
tages. Neo-classical economic theory posits that firms outsource IT to attain 
cost advantages from assumed economies of scale and scope possessed by 
vendors (Ang & Straub, 1998).  
In neo-classical economic theory, outsourcing may arise in two ways. First, 
outsourcing may arise through the substitution of external purchases for 
internal activities. In this way, it can be viewed as a discontinuation of inter-
nal production (whether it be production of goods or services) and an initia-
tion of procurement from outside suppliers. To the extent this type of out-
sourcing reduces a firm's involvement in successive stages of production 
substitution-based outsourcing may be viewed as vertical disintegration. This 
seems to be the most commonly understood type of outsourcing. Outsourc-
ing may also occur through abstention. Outsourcing need not be limited to 
those activities that are shifted to external suppliers. On the contrary, out-
sourcing may also arise when a firm purchases goods or services from out-
side organizations even when those goods or services have not been com-
pleted in-house in the past. In neo-classical economic terms, Gilley and 
Rasheed (2000) posed the question, “Making more by doing less?” Their 
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study empirically examined the extent to which outsourcing of both periph-
eral and near-core tasks influenced the firm's financial and non-financial 
performance. In addition, the potential moderating effects of firm strategy 
and the environment on the outsourcing-performance relationship were ex-
amined. Results indicate that both firm strategy and environmental dyna-
mism moderated the relationship between outsourcing and performance, 
whereas there was no significant direct effect of outsourcing on firm per-
formance.  
In neo-classical economic theory, both the distribution of income and the 
composition of output are endogenously and simultaneously determined by a 
general equilibrium of supply and demand. The underlying data on the sup-
ply side are parametrically given resource inputs and a given technology of 
production for transforming inputs into outputs; on the demand side, the data 
are specified in terms of a given distribution of ownership of inputs and a 
given pattern of preferences for final outputs (Gram, 2003).  
Contribution to the understanding of IT outsourcing. Companies will justify 
their sourcing strategy based on evaluating possibilities for production cost 
savings. Thus, the question of whether or not to outsource, is a question 
whether the marketplace can produce products and services at a lower price 
than internal production. In the context of IT outsourcing, a company will 
keep its IT-function internally if this has production cost advantages, and it 
will outsource when the marketplace can offer production cost savings. 
However, defining outsourcing simply in terms of procurement activities 
does not capture the true strategic nature of the issues (Gilley & Rasheed, 
2000). IT outsourcing is not only a purchasing decision — all firms purchase 
elements of their operations. This is done to achieve economic, technologi-
cal, and strategic advantages. However, the economies of scale and scope 
argument would predict that outsourcing has little to offer to larger firms, 
because they can generate economies of scale and scope internally by repro-
ducing methods used by vendors. As documented by Levina and Ross 
(2003), there are other reasons for large firms to move into outsourcing (e.g., 
the vendor's efficiency is based on the economic benefits derived from the 
ability to develop a complementary set of core competencies). 
2.2.2 Transaction cost theory 
Focus, aim, unit of analysis. According to Henisz and Williamson (1999), 
transaction cost economics is a comparative contractual approach to eco-
nomic organization in which the action resides in the details of transactions 
on the one hand and governance on the other. Given that all complex con-
tracts are unavoidably incomplete (by reason of bounded rationality) and that 
contract as mere promise, unsupported by credible commitments, is not self-
enforcing (by reason of opportunism), the question is which transactions 
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should be organized how. Much of the predictive content of transaction cost 
economics works through the discriminating alignment hypothesis, accord-
ing to which transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with 
governance structures, which differ in their costs and competences, so as to 
effect a (mainly) transaction cost economizing result. Implementing this 
requires that transactions, governance structures, and transaction cost 
economizing all be described.  
Transaction cost economics concurs that the transaction is the basic unit of 
analysis and regards governance as the means by which order is accom-
plished in a relation in which potential conflict threatens to undo or upset 
opportunities to realize mutual gains (Henisz & Williamson, 1999). The 
problem of conflict on which transaction cost economics originally focused 
is that of bilateral dependency. The organization of transactions that are sup-
ported by generic investments is easy: classical market contracting works 
well because each party can go its own way with minimal cost to the other. 
Specific investments are where the problems arise. 
Williamson (1979) identified three types of transactions according to speci-
ficity. Non-specific transactions have low asset specificity and are associated 
with the acquisition of commodities. Idiosyncratic transactions have high 
specificity. Mixed transactions have elements of both commodity and cus-
tomization. Transaction specificity can be viewed alongside transaction fre-
quency, a second major construct of transaction cost economics, which dis-
tinguishes occasional from recurrent transactions. Two frequency categories 
multiplied by three specificity types produces six discrete transaction types. 
It can be argued that the market is better for all but transactions, which are 
both recurrent and idiosyncratic. The third major determinant of transaction 
costs is uncertainty, compounded by the bounded rationality of humans and 
often associated with the complexity of the product to be acquired.  
Uncertainty is recognized as a major determinant of transaction costs. It is 
compounded by the bounded rationality of humans and is often associated 
with the complexity of the product acquired. Given the cognitive limits of 
human actors, complex contracts, such as IT outsourcing contracts, are un-
avoidably incomplete. Contractual incompleteness poses problems when 
paired with the condition of opportunism — which manifests itself as ad-
verse selection, moral hazard, shirking, sub-goal pursuit, and other forms of 
strategic behavior. Because human actors will not reliably disclose true con-
ditions upon request or self-fulfill all promises, contract as mere promise, 
unsupported by credible commitments, will not be self-enforcing 
(Williamson, 2000). 
Contribution to the understanding of IT outsourcing. In transaction cost eco-
nomics, firms are hypothesized to take sourcing decisions to minimize the 
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sum of production and transaction costs (Anderson, Glenn, & Sedatole, 
2000). If transaction costs offset production cost advantages of the external 
supplier, the firm subsumes the activity — an outcome termed vertical inte-
gration or insourcing. Otherwise, it can be argued that the market is better 
for all transactions. The consistency of the empirical results seems startling 
in the light of two problems with this outsourcing philosophy. First, produc-
tion and transaction costs are rarely neatly separable. Second, decision-
makers are likely to be affected by wealth effects associated with sourcing, 
and thus unlikely to make decisions that strictly maximize firm profit 
(Anderson et al., 2000). Researchers have found that production cost differ-
ences seem more influential in sourcing decisions than transaction cost dif-
ferences (e.g., Ang & Straub, 1998).  
The transaction cost economics presumption is that economic actors attempt 
to forecast the potential for opportunism as a function of unfolding circum-
stances, and then take preventive actions in transactions where opportunism 
is likely to be high. Opportunism is an explanatory mechanism, not readily 
observable, and typically empirically untested. However, it is important be-
cause it has potential for enormous impact on economic performance (Jap, 
2001). Opportunism is self-interest seeking with guile, and includes overt 
behavior such as lying, cheating and stealing, as well as subtle behavior such 
as dishonoring an implicit contract, shirking, failing to fulfill promises, and 
obligations. It is the equivalent of bad faith, the implication being that the 
party who is opportunistic is not trustworthy. In an outsourcing setting, op-
portunism may involve misrepresentations, unresponsiveness, unreasonable 
demands, and lying. The notion of opportunism is what differentiates trans-
action cost theory from alternative conceptualizations of the firm, such as 
agency theory, relational exchange theory, or resource-based view. Trying to 
minimize settings in which opportunistic behavior is likely becomes a criti-
cal success factor in IT outsourcing. 
2.2.3 Contractual theory 
Focus, aim, unit of analysis. An outsourcing contract provides a legally 
bound, institutional framework in which each party's rights, duties, and re-
sponsibilities are codified and the goals, policies, and strategies underlying 
the arrangement are specified. Every outsourcing contract has the purpose of 
facilitating exchange and preventing opportunism. Appropriate contractual 
arrangements can attenuate the leeway for opportunism, prohibit moral haz-
ards in a cooperative relationship, and protect each party's proprietary 
knowledge. A complete contract reduces the uncertainty faced by organiza-
tional decision-makers and the risks stemming from opportunism on the part 
of one or more contracting parties. It provides a safeguard against ex post 
performance problems by restraining each party's ability to pursue private 
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goals at the expense of common benefits. An incomplete contract may bring 
about ambiguity, which creates a breeding ground for shirking responsibility 
and shifting blame, raises the likelihood of conflict, and hinders the ability to 
coordinate activities, utilize resources, and implement strategies (Luo, 2002). 
Outsourcing contracts are relational contracts characterized by long dura-
tions of interpartner dependency and enormous unanticipated contingencies 
in an uncertain environment. Outsourcing often involves highly idiosyncratic 
assets that give rise to high coordination costs and appropriation concerns. 
The optimal contract completeness simultaneously requires opportunism 
mitigation and adaptation promotion. Transaction cost economics scholars 
commonly point to three categories of exchange hazards that necessitate 
contractual safeguards (or vertical integration): asset specificity, measure-
ment difficulty, and uncertainty. Asset specificity emerges when sourcing 
relationships require significant relationship-specific investments in physical 
and/or human assets. The presence of these specific assets transform an ex-
change from a world of classical contracting into a world of neo-classical 
contracting in which the identity of parties is irrelevant into a world of neo-
classical contracting in which the identity of exchange partners is of critical 
importance. For example, an information technology outsourcing provider 
may need to customize service offerings to the client’s work setting. Simi-
larly, the client may need to develop a unique understanding of the pro-
vider's procedures, approach, and language to effectively utilize their ser-
vices. Difficulty in measuring the performance of exchange partners also 
generates market hazards. Markets succeed when they can effectively link 
rewards to productivity — that is, they can measure productivity and pay for 
it accordingly. Uncertainty, a third hazard, also challenges an exchange by 
requiring the parties to adapt to problems raised from unforeseeable changes. 
High levels of uncertainty in conjunction with measurement difficulty or 
asset specificity render contracting even more hazardous. This encourages 
more complex contracts (Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
However, a contract alone is insufficient to guide outsourcing arrangements. 
Cooperation is also needed. Cooperation is an improvement process through 
mutual forbearance in the allocation of resources, such that one party is 
made better off and no one is worse off than it would otherwise be. Coopera-
tion is a necessary complement that overcomes long-term contracts' con-
straints in adaptation and execution and becomes an important vehicle that 
nourishes continuity and flexibility when change and conflict arise (Luo, 
2002). Similar to Luo's argument that contract and cooperation are not sub-
stitutes but complements, Poppo and Zenger (2002) argue that contracts and 
relational governance are not substitutes but complements. They found that 
relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are commonly viewed 
as substitutes for complex contracts in interorganizational exchange, and that 
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many argue that formal contracts actually undermine trust and thereby en-
courage the opportunistic behavior they are designed to discourage. 
Contribution to the understanding of IT outsourcing. Kern and Willcocks 
(2000) have investigated contracts in IT outsourcing. The contract in out-
sourcing has been described as a mechanism that establishes the balance of 
power between the client and vendor. Contracts essentially have to be as 
airtight as possible, because research has shown that vendors tend to refer to 
it as their chief source of obligation. Vendors however would prefer to see 
the contract as a working document, giving them flexibility to suggest im-
provements and new services. This is the interest of most vendor companies, 
for their goal is one of profit margins. An IT outsourcing contract tends to be 
more complicated than other business contracts, resembling as it does a hy-
brid between an asset purchase and sale agreement, and a sale/leaseback 
agreement, in that there is a sale of assets or transfer of operations, transfer 
of employees, and a lease back to the customer of the information technol-
ogy services that were divested. This legal complexity is evident in the detail 
and in the time typically invested in negotiating agreement. Third-party legal 
experts have for quite some time emphasized the need for a comprehensive 
contract, not only because it is their livelihood, but also because it basically 
becomes a reference point specifying how the client and vendor relate. Kern 
and Willcocks (2000) identified three common dimensions that can be a 
useful typology for analyzing control in IT: focus of control (directed at 
whom or what), measures of control (degree of control), and process of con-
trol (means of enforcing control). Using this typology as an underlying 
guide, Kern and Willcocks presented a post-contract management agenda as 
the focus of control. The greatest challenge that client companies face fol-
lowing the signing of the contract is the achievement and the enforcement of 
agreed terms. To accomplish the management agenda, an effective commu-
nication and operations structure has to be established in each organization 
and between both parties. 
2.2.4 Agency theory 
Focus, aim, unit of analysis. Agency theory has broadened the risk-sharing 
literature to include the agency problem that occurs when cooperating parties 
have different goals and division of labor. The cooperating parties are en-
gaged in an agency relationship defined as a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision mak-
ing authority to the agent (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory de-
scribes the relationship between the two parties using the metaphor of a con-
tract. In an IT outsourcing relationship this is a client-vendor relationship 
and an outsourcing contract.  
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According to Eisenhardt (1985), agency theory is concerned with resolving 
two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first is the agency 
problem that arises when the desires or goals of the principal and agent con-
flict and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent 
is actually doing. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when 
the principal and agent have different risk preferences. These problems are 
well known in IT outsourcing. An example might be that the client organiza-
tion wants to reduce its IT costs, while the vendor organization wants to 
maximize profits. The agency problem arises when the two parties do not 
share productivity gains. The risk-sharing problem might be the result of 
different attitudes towards the use of new technologies. Because the unit of 
analysis is the contract governing the relationship between the two parties, 
the focus of the theory is on determining the most efficient contract govern-
ing the principal-agent relationship given assumptions about people (e.g., 
self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion), organizations (e.g., goal 
conflict of members), and information (e.g., information is a commodity 
which can be purchased). Thus the question becomes: Is a behavior-oriented 
contract more efficient than an outcome-oriented contract? Outsourcing con-
tracts are to a great extent tied up to service level agreements, where the 
outcome of the service is the focal point. 
The agency theory is applicable when describing client-vendor relationships 
in IT outsourcing arrangements. Typically, the client organization (principal) 
transfers property rights to the vendor organization (agent). In the context of 
IT, assets transferred might be infrastructure, systems and documentation, 
and employees. For a certain amount of money, the vendor organization 
provides services to the client organization. This implies a change in legal 
relationships, and IT services are carried out using a more formal transaction 
process. The status of personal relationships also changes, from that of a 
manager and a subordinate, to that of a client-manager and a vendor. Ac-
cording to agency theory, control mechanisms also change, from that of be-
havioral control, to that of outcome-based control. If both parties to the rela-
tionship are trying to maximize their utility, there is good reason to believe 
that the vendor organization will not always act in the best interests of the 
client. Monitoring and bonding activities in reducing agency costs include 
auditing, formal control systems, budget restrictions, and the establishment 
of incentive compensation systems which serve to more closely identify the 
manager’s interests with those of the outside equity holder. 
Contribution to the understanding of IT outsourcing. The original impetus 
for the development of agency theory was large corporations' separation of 
control from ownership. Thus, its focus was never on organizational bounda-
ries, as with transaction cost theory. Agency theory's primary interest is not 
the decision to source via the hierarchy or via the market. Although all con-
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tractual arrangements contain important elements of agency, agency theory 
is essentially concerned with the delegation of work by the principal to the 
agent via a contract, whether or not they are both within the same organiza-
tion. However, agency and transaction cost theories share several concepts, 
such as opportunism, uncertainty and bounded rationality, and there is a 
rough correspondence between transaction cost economics' hierarchies and 
markets and agency theory's behavior-based contracts and outcome-based 
contracts. The technological and business complexity of IT means that there 
may be a critical success factor for the principal in choosing a suitable agent 
and in monitoring the agent's work. Only the agent knows how hard he is 
working, and that can be especially important in multilateral contracting 
where one agent acts for several principals. This is often the case in IT out-
sourcing because of the market dominance of one (or a few) large firm(s). 
Given the difficulties of behavior-based contracts suggested by agency the-
ory, it is reasonable to assume that the overwhelming majority of clients 
would insist on outcome-based contracts when acquiring IT products and 
services. Such a strategy can only succeed if the client can confidently spec-
ify current and future requirements. But accurate predictions by the client 
may not always be in the vendor's interests, since vendor account managers 
often are rewarded according to contract profitability, which is principally 
achieved through charging the client extra for anything that is not in the con-
tract. 
According to Hancox and Hackney (2000), the choice of contract type de-
pends on the agency costs, which include the principal's effort in assessing 
the agent's performance and the agent's efforts in assuring the principal of his 
commitment. Agency theory holds that human beings act through self-
interest and therefore, as contracting parties, they may have divergent goals. 
An important aspect of the theory is that both principal and agent wish to 
avoid risk when dealing with each other. The principal may prefer to place 
risk with the agent via an outcome-based contract, whereas the agent may 
prefer to avoid risk by having a behavior-based contract. Outcome-based 
contracts are claimed to reduce agent opportunism because the rewards of 
both agent and principal depend on the same actions. Behavior-based con-
tracts need the principal to have sufficient information to identify two possi-
ble dangers: first, whether there is adverse selection (the agent does not pos-
sess the skills he claims); second, moral hazard — the agent is shirking. 
Sourcing via the hierarchy may reduce the overall risk, but agency costs also 
exist in hierarchies. Problems between agents and principals are greater in 
complex organizations with many managerial layers. 
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2.2.5 Theory of firm boundaries 
Focus, aim, unit of analysis. There has been renewed debate on the determi-
nants of firm boundaries and their implications for performance. According 
to Schilling and Steensma (2002), the widely accepted framework of transac-
tion cost economics has come under scrutiny as a comprehensive theory for 
firm scale and scope. At the heart of this debate is whether the underlying 
mechanism determining firm boundaries is a fear of opportunism (as posited 
by transaction cost economics), a quest for sustainable advantage (as posed 
by resource-based view theorists and others), a desire for risk-reducing 
flexibility (as has recently gained increased attention in work on options), or 
a combination of factors. Although perspectives on firm boundaries such as 
transaction costs or the resource-based view are based on fundamentally 
different motivations for pursuing hierarchical control over market contracts, 
they rely on common resource or context attributes as antecedents. 
Contribution to the understanding of IT outsourcing. Schilling and Steensma 
(2002) explored how various attributes of technology to be sourced influence 
the governance mode chosen, and the intermediate mechanisms by which 
they do so. They found that uniqueness and difficulty of imitation are sig-
nificantly related to the perceived potential for sustainable advantage. They 
also found that technological dynamism and difficulty of imitation are sig-
nificantly related to the perceived threat of opportunism. In turn, consistent 
with a transaction cost perspective, the threat of opportunism increases the 
probability of outsourcing. Schilling and Steensma’s findings suggest that 
the resource-based view, transaction cost economics, and an options perspec-
tive may play complementary roles in explaining firm technology-sourcing 
decisions. Firms may pursue resources that are unique or inimitable because 
of their potential to create a sustainable competitive advantage, but the 
uniqueness and inimitability may also create a potential for opportunism. 
The potential for opportunism and the degree of uncertainty associated with 
the technological resources then heavily influence the governance mode 
chosen. In sum, the results imply that the resource-based view explains why 
a firm pursues particular resources rather than others, but transaction costs 
and an options perspective better explain the governance mode undertaken 
for accessing the resources once they are chosen. Therefore, the theory of 
firm boundaries claims that resource-based view, transaction costs, and op-
tions perspectives each explain only a portion of managerial motivation for 
decisions on firm boundaries. The rationale supporting the choices firms 
make regarding technology sourcing is multidimensional; firms are not only 
seeking potential sources of competitive advantage, but are also seeking to 
avoid opportunism and to preserve or create flexibility (Schilling & Steen-
sma, 2002). 
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Garicano and Hubbard (2003) suggest that, more recently, some theorists 
have proposed that firms' boundaries reflect the division of labor across in-
dividuals. Whether a set of tasks is organized within one or multiple firms 
depends on the extent to which individuals specialize. While the particular 
trade-offs these theories emphasize differ from each other, together they 
represent a departure from the earlier literature: there is far less emphasis on 
specificity and far greater emphasis on issues related to the division of labor 
such as specialization and job design. This class of theories is important 
because it has the potential to explain firms' boundaries in a wide range of 
contexts where specificity is unlikely to have an important effect on indi-
viduals' incentives.  
2.2.6 Theory of core competencies 
Focus, aim, unit of analysis. According to Prahalad and Hamel (1990), core 
competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how 
to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of 
technologies. Since core competence is about harmonizing streams of tech-
nology, it is also about the organization of work and the delivery of value. 
The force of core competence is felt as decisively in services as in manufac-
turing. Core competence does not diminish with use. Unlike physical assets, 
which do deteriorate over time, competencies are enhanced as they are ap-
plied and shared. But competencies still need to be nurtured and protected; 
knowledge fades if it is not used. Competencies are the glue that binds exist-
ing businesses. They are also the engines for new business development. At 
least three tests can be applied to identify core competencies in a company. 
First, a core competence provides potential access to a wide variety of mar-
kets. Second, a core competence should make a significant contribution to 
the perceived customer benefits of the end product. Finally, a core compe-
tence should be difficult for competitors to imitate. The tangible link be-
tween identified core competencies and end products is what Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990) call core products — the embodiments of one or more core 
competencies. Core products are the components or subassemblies that actu-
ally contribute to the value of the end products. Core competences are some-
times called firm-specific competence, resource deployments, invisible as-
sets and distinctive competences.  
Quinn (1999) argues that core competencies are not products or “those 
things we do relatively well.” They are those activities, usually intellectually 
based service activities or systems, that the company performs better than 
any other enterprise. They are the sets of skills and systems that a company 
does at best-in-the-world levels and through which a company creates 
uniquely high value for customers. Developing best-in-the-world capabilities 
is crucial in designing a core competency strategy. Unless the company is 
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best-in-the-world at an activity it is someone else's core competency. The 
company gives up competitive edge by not buying that skill from a best-in-
the-world source. Activities which are none-core should be outsourced to 
best-in-world suppliers. 
Contribution to the understanding of IT outsourcing. Core competencies 
theory suggests activities should be performed either in-house or by suppli-
ers. Activities, which are not core competencies, should be considered for 
outsourcing with best-in-world suppliers. Some non-core activities may have 
to be retained in house if they are part of a defensive posture to protect com-
petitive advantage. Employees in non-core functions (even if not facing out-
sourcing) may feel excluded by the organization because they are a non-
dominant discipline. An organization may view IT itself as a core compe-
tence. It seems that most successful companies have a good understanding of 
IT's potential. However, some organizations outsource IT even though they 
see IT as core and delivering competitive advantage. This may be because IT 
can be considered core at the corporate level, but some of its aspects, at 
lower levels, might be commodities. Thus the complexity of IT, and its (at 
least in part) core nature, may make the contracting out of IT a particularly 
challenging exercise. The ability to define IT requirements and to monitor 
their delivery by third parties may be some of the core IT competencies that 
any organization must have if it is to outsource IT successfully. It can even 
be argued that the very acts of specifying and managing supply contracts can 
themselves give competitive advantage. It is critical that client organizations 
are able to define their needs and manage services from their vendors. 
Since most supplier markets are imperfect, Quinn and Hilmer (1994) rec-
ommended that managers must answer three key questions about any activ-
ity considered for outsourcing. First, what is the potential for obtaining com-
petitive advantage in this activity, taking account of transaction costs? Sec-
ond, what is the potential vulnerability that could arise from market failure if 
the activity is outsourced? Third, what can we do to alleviate our vulnerabil-
ity by structuring arrangements with suppliers to provide appropriate con-
trols yet provide for necessary flexibilities in demand? When the potentials 
for both competitive edge and strategic vulnerability are high, the company 
needs a high degree of control, usually entailing the activity internally or 
through joint ownership arrangements or tight long-term contracts.  
The belief that outsourcing of IT is only appropriate when IT is not consid-
ered a core function of the firm's industry was not held by executives inter-
viewed by McLellan, Marcolin, and Beamish (1995). Core activities were 
defined by a firm's management as those that provided the competitive capa-
bilities that lead to competitive advantage. This definition implies that a core 
activity is central to the competitive nature of the industry. The executives 
involved in outsourcing relationships clearly viewed the IT function as cen-
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tral to their competitiveness within the banking industry, yet the firms still 
choose to outsource much if not all of the IT activities.  
Hancox and Hackney (2000) interviewed IT managers to find support for the 
core competencies theory in IT outsourcing. Contrary to vendors' marketing 
material and to much of the literature on IT outsourcing, concentration on 
core competencies did not appear to be a strong motive for IT outsourcing 
among the sample organizations. No organization from either private or pub-
lic sector had systematically examined its activities to identify core and non-
core functions. Most organizations seemed to share the view of IT as a mix 
of core and non-core activities. 
2.2.7 Resource-based theory 
Focus, aim, unit of analysis. The central tenet in resource-based theory is 
that unique organizational resources of both tangible and intangible nature 
are the real source of competitive advantage. With resource-based theory, 
organizations are viewed as a collection of resources that are heterogene-
ously distributed within and across industries. Accordingly, what makes the 
performance of an organization distinctive is the unique blend of the re-
sources it possesses. A firm's resources include not only its physical assets 
such as plant and location but also its competencies. The ability to leverage 
distinctive internal and external competencies relative to environmental 
situations ultimately affects the performance of the business. The resource-
based theory is a useful perspective in strategic management. Research on 
the competitive implications of such firm resources as knowledge, learning, 
culture, teamwork, and human capital, was given a significant boost by re-
source-based theory — a theory that indicated it was these kinds of resources 
that were most likely to be sources of sustainable competitive advantage for 
firms (Barney, 2001). 
The essence of the resource-based theory of the firm lies in its emphasis on 
the internal resources available to the firm, rather than on the external oppor-
tunities and threats dictated by industry conditions. Firms are considered to 
be highly heterogeneous, and the bundles of resources available to each firm 
are different. This is both because firms have different initial resource en-
dowments and because managerial decisions affect resource accumulation 
and the direction of firm growth as well as resource utilization (Løwendahl, 
2000). 
Firms’ resource endowments, particularly intangible resources, are difficult 
to change except over the long term. For example, although human resources 
may be mobile to some extent, capabilities may not be valuable for all firms 
or even for their competitors. Some capabilities are based on firm-specific 
knowledge, and others are valuable when integrated with additional individ-
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ual capabilities and specific firm resources. Therefore, intangible resources 
are more likely than tangible resources to produce a competitive advantage. 
In particular, intangible firm-specific resources, such as knowledge, allow 
firms to add value to incoming factors of production (Hitt, Bierman, Shu-
mizu, & Kochhar, 2001).  
Transformational outsourcing is an emerging practice to bring new capabili-
ties to the organization. Resources are required to bring new capabilities, and 
resources bringing new capabilities can be found in an outsourcing vendor. 
In this context we apply the knowledge-based view of the firm that has es-
tablished itself as an important perspective in strategic management. This 
perspective builds on the resource-based theory of the firm. According to the 
resource-based theory of the firm, performance differences across firms can 
be attributed to the variance in the firms’ resources and capabilities. Re-
sources that are valuable, unique, and difficult to imitate can provide the 
basis for firms’ competitive advantages. In turn, these competitive advan-
tages produce positive returns.  
Contribution to the understanding of IT outsourcing. The value generation 
potential of an outsourcing relationship consists of three factors: client char-
acteristics, the vendor-client relationship, and vendor characteristics. A key 
client characteristic is an understanding of how to manage resources that a 
firm does not own. A key in the vendor-client relationship is formal (con-
tractual) aspect of the relationship. The third factor shaping the outsourcing 
value proposition is the vendor’s own capabilities. From an outsourcing ven-
dor’s perspective, there are many potential opportunities and benefits for the 
client. These opportunities and benefits can be derived from the IT outsourc-
ing vendor’s value proposition. Important vendor characteristics include 
capabilities such as technical competence, understanding the customer’s 
business, and relationship management. Levina and Ross (2003) stressed the 
importance of vendor characteristics in terms of the vendor value proposi-
tion. The concepts of complementarities and competencies explain that out-
sourcing vendors can increase productivity and reduce costs on client pro-
jects by applying a set of complementary application management compe-
tencies. They identified three complementary vendor competencies: IT per-
sonnel development, methodology development and dissemination, and cus-
tomer relationship management.  
Although it is generally accepted that IT is critical for information-intensive 
firms, not all members of top management teams attach the same degree of 
criticality to IT. Perceptions of the CIOs and CEOs of IT importance tend to 
be misaligned. While CIOs recognize IT as vital to an organization’s strat-
egy, CEOs with little background in IT tend to regard IS services as back-
room operations, an expense to be controlled rather than a strategic invest-
ment to be capitalized. Generally, CEOs’ perceptions of IT criticality are as 
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important as, if not more important than, those of the CIOs’ with respect to 
IS sourcing decisions because IS investments represent a significant finan-
cial outlay for corporations. Sometimes management policies and direction 
of IT use are dictated by the CEOs’ psychological involvement and partici-
pation in IS. Thus, we would expect that the greater the perceived criticality 
of IT to the firm, the less likely the firm will outsource its IS services (Ang, 
1993). 
2.2.8 Partnership and alliance theory 
Focus, aim, unit of analysis. Alliances are broadly defined as collaborative 
efforts between two or more firms in which the firms pool their resources in 
an effort to achieve mutually compatible goals that they could not achieve 
easily alone. Resources here are defined as any tangible or intangible entity 
available for use by a firm to compete in its marketplace. When interfirm 
business relationships are collaborative, rather than adversarial in nature, a 
variety of types of these relationships may be classified as alliances, for ex-
ample outsourcing.  
According to Lambe, Spekman, and Hunt (2002), the popularity of alliances 
is growing. Alliances account for anywhere from 6 percent to 25 percent of 
the market value of the typical company. Yet, alliance success remains elu-
sive. Studies find that as many as 70 percent of alliances are not successful. 
Thus, an important question for researchers and practicing managers is what 
makes alliances succeed? Lambe et al. argue that alliance competence con-
tributes to alliance success, both directly and through acquisition and crea-
tion of resources. Using survey data gathered from 145 alliances, empirical 
tests provide support for the posited explanation of alliance success. Alliance 
competence has three facets, labeled alliance experience, alliance manager 
development capability and partner identification propensity. Furthermore, 
consistent with competence-based theory and resource-advantage theory 
conceptualizations of a competence (a higher order resource that is a distinct 
combination of lower order resources), the researchers proposed that these 
three facets are the three lower order resources that collectively comprise the 
higher order resource of an alliance competence. That is, more of each of 
these three lower order resources will contribute to increasing a firm's com-
petence in finding, developing, and managing alliances. Alliance experience 
is a resource that can be leveraged across an organization because it contrib-
utes to knowledge about how to manage and use alliances. Alliance manager 
development capability enables firms to plan and navigate the mechanisms 
of an alliance so that roles and responsibilities are clearly articulated and 
agreed upon. In addition, these managers have the ability to review continu-
ally the fit of the alliance to the changing environment to make modifica-
tions as necessary. Partner identification propensity enables firms to system-
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atically and proactively scan for and identify partners that have the comple-
mentary resources that are needed to develop a relationship portfolio or mix 
that complements existing competencies and enables them to occupy posi-
tions of competitive advantage.  
Furthermore, Lambe et al. (2002) posited that two specific types of resources 
affect alliance success: idiosyncratic and complementary resources. In terms 
of resource-advantage theory, complementary resources may be thought of 
as lower order resources that are brought to the alliance and idiosyncratic 
resources as the higher order resources that are developed by the alliance 
through the process of combining the complementary resources of the part-
ner firms. Idiosyncratic resources are resources that are developed during the 
life of the alliance, are unique to the alliance, and facilitate the combining of 
the distinct lower order resources contributed by the partner firms. Idiosyn-
cratic resources may be tangible, such as computers and cables, or intangi-
ble, such as developing a methodology or a process together. Similarly, 
some researchers refer to idiosyncratic investments or assets. 
Das and Teng (2002b) studied how alliance conditions change over the dif-
ferent stages of alliance development to understand the development proc-
esses of strategic alliances such as an IT outsourcing relationship. They de-
fined three stages in the alliance development process — formation, opera-
tion, and outcome stage. In the formation stage partner firms approach each 
other and negotiate the alliance. Partner firms then carry out the agreement 
and set up the alliance by committing various types of resources. The alli-
ance is initiated and put into operation. Alliances will be formed only under 
certain conditions. These conditions include a relatively high level of collec-
tive strengths, a low level of interpartner conflicts, and a high level of inter-
dependencies. Not only is the formation stage directly influenced by alliance 
conditions, the transition from the formation stage to the operation stage is 
also dictated by the same alliance conditions variables. During the operation 
stage, partner firms collaborate and implement all agreements of the alliance. 
The alliance will likely grow rapidly in size during this stage, somewhat akin 
to the growth stage of organizational life cycles. Other than the growth route, 
an alliance may also be reformed and/or terminated at this stage. During the 
outcome stage, alliance performance becomes tangible and can, thus, be 
evaluated with some certainty. There are four possible outcomes for an alli-
ance at this stage — stabilization, reformation, decline, and termination. A 
combination of outcomes is also possible, such as a termination after refor-
mation. Alliance reformation and alliance termination do not necessarily 
signal alliance failure. Reformation and termination may be the best option 
under certain circumstances, such as the achievement of pre-set alliance 
objectives. Alliance condition variables continue to play a decisive role in 
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the outcome stage. The particular alliance outcome will depend on the condi-
tion of the alliance. 
Das and Teng (2003) discussed partner analysis and alliance performance. 
An important stream of research in the alliance literature is about partner 
selection. It emphasizes the desirability of a match between the partners, 
mainly in terms of their resource profiles. The approach is consistent with 
the resource-based theory of the firm, which suggests that competitors are 
defined by their resources profiles. They found a lack of agreement concern-
ing alliance performance. This lack of agreement reflects an underlying con-
ceptual puzzle: what does effective alliance performance mean? There are 
two distinct loci of alliance performance in the literature: the alliance itself 
and the partners forming the alliance. On the one hand, when alliances are 
viewed as separate entities, alliance performance is the success of these 
separate entities — in terms of, say, profitability or growth rate. On the other 
hand, because partner firms use alliances to achieve certain strategic objec-
tives, alliance performance ought to be measured in terms of the aggregated 
results for the partner firms. 
Contribution to the understanding of IT outsourcing. Client and vendor 
companies may pool their resources to achieve mutually compatible goals. 
Partnership has frequently been noted as a major feature of IT outsourcing. 
Partnership can reduce the risk of inadequate contractual provision, which 
may be comforting for clients about to outsource a complex and high-cost 
activity such as IT. However, in the relationship between vendor and client 
the latter may be over dependent on the former, and goals are not necessarily 
shared. A client may be more comfortable if it knows the vendor already. In 
partner selection, cultural compatibility is vital and shared values and objec-
tives inform all stages of the partnership development process.  
Hancox and Hackney (2000) interviewed IT managers to find support for the 
partnership theory in IT outsourcing. They found that few organizations 
claim to be in a strategic partnership with their IT suppliers. Partnership was 
more likely to be claimed in the area of systems development, where vendors 
needed to have a greater understanding of the organization, than in outsourc-
ing of operations and IT infrastructure support.  
2.2.9 Relational exchange theory 
Focus, aim, unit of analysis. Relational exchange is an interactive process 
where commitments are made, outcomes are observed, and further invest-
ments made, if outcomes meet or exceed expectations. Based on previous 
interactions as well as expectations about the future, a mutual orientation 
develops resulting in a common language and mutual knowledge. The ex-
change is embedded in a normative structure that determines the functioning 
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of the system. Patterns of behavior are taken for granted. The actors share 
common expectations about expected and accepted behavior, and collective 
interests are incorporated into the preferences and belief structures of the 
actors (Rokkan & Haugland, 2002).  
Norms are important in relational exchange because they provide the gov-
ernance rules of the game. These rules depend on the game, which from an 
exchange perspective has been described as either discrete or relational. Dis-
crete exchange norms contain expectations about an individualistic or com-
petitive interaction between exchange partners. The individual parties are 
expected to remain autonomous and pursue strategies aimed at the attain-
ment of their individual goals. Pure discrete exchange is consistent with the 
underlying assumptions of neo-classical economic theory. In contrast, rela-
tional exchange norms are based on the expectation of mutuality of interest, 
essentially prescribing stewardship behavior, and are designed to enhance 
the well being of the relationship as a whole. In the evolutionary model of 
relational exchange, relational norm development takes place during an ex-
tended period of time through many interactions between the partners 
(Lambe, Spekman, & Hunt, 2000). According to this theory, the key to de-
termining how efficiently contract governance is carried out lies in the rela-
tional norms between the transacting parties.  
Many classifications of norms have been proposed, but no one is regarded as 
dominant. Heide and John (1992) have proposed that relational norms are a 
higher order construct consisting of three dimensions: flexibility, informa-
tion exchange, and solidarity. Flexibility, defines a bilateral expectation of 
the willingness to make adaptations as circumstances change. Information 
exchange defines a bilateral expectation that parties will proactively provide 
information useful to the partner. Solidarity defines a bilateral expectation 
that a high value is placed on the relationship. It prescribes behaviors di-
rected specifically towards relationship maintenance.  
Norms create expectations of behavior and imply a certain action and are 
shared by the actors. It is believed that society shares a number of common 
norms that make it necessary for contracts to contain certain features but not 
necessary to include statements about others. Yet norms vary a great deal 
between and within societies as is illustrated by international contracts where 
a foreigner's requirements as to what should go into a contract will often 
surprise us, but what we would not consider necessary to include may sur-
prise them. Artz and Brush (2000) examined supplier relationships that were 
governed by relational contracts, and they found support for the relational 
exchange theory. By altering the behavioral orientation of the alliance, rela-
tional norms lowered exchange costs. 
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Contribution to the understanding of IT outsourcing. Kern and Blois (2002) 
considered the role of norms within networks by describing how BP Explo-
ration outsourced its information technology function. This outsourcing ven-
ture led to the formation of a consortium of vendors. However, this attempt 
was found to have failed. They suggested that central to the failure of the 
consortium was the issue of norms. In the case of BP Exploration, three 
problems arose. First, the consortium's members, though competitors, were 
expected to work closely with each other as the senior partner on some sites 
and as the junior partner on others. Yet neither BP Exploration nor any 
member of the consortium recognized in advance that the norms that they 
usually applied in their relationships with their clients would not be applica-
ble to this situation. Consequently, their staff was working with norms that 
were at best not appropriate to the new situation and at worst made for diffi-
culties. For example, a company's norms do not normally encourage the 
acceptance of flexibility, information exchange and solidarity in contacts 
with competitors, all of which are needed if sound relationships are to be 
developed between organizations. Second, BP Exploration's line managers 
conducted their relationships with the consortium members as if they were 
buying a commodity service. Yet a major reason for outsourcing was BP 
Exploration's desire to obtain a state of the art IT service. Its behavior to-
wards the consortium was therefore based on norms that were inappropriate, 
relative to its stated objectives. The third problem was that one of the ven-
dors was not familiar with European modes of operations and had a horren-
dous job trying to adapt to a non-US culture. Many factors led to BP Explo-
ration being a less than successful experiment in outsourcing. However, a 
major contribution was a failure to recognize the need for establishing norms 
of behavior that were appropriate to the consortium form of organization 
(Kern & Blois, 2002).  
2.2.10 Stakeholder theory 
Focus, aim, unit of analysis. The stakeholder approach to strategic manage-
ment was introduced by Freeman (1984). According to Freeman a stake-
holder is any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the 
achievement of a corporation’s purpose. Stakeholders include employees, 
customers, suppliers, stockholders, banks, environmentalists, government 
and other groups who can help or hurt the corporation. For each category of 
stakeholder groups can be broken down into several useful smaller catego-
ries. Freeman’s focus was to show how executives could use the stakeholder 
approach to manage their organization more effectively. In instrumental 
stakeholder theory, the role of management is seen as achieving a balance 
between the interests of all stakeholders. For each major strategic issue we 
must think through the effects on a number of stakeholders, and therefore, 
we need processes that take into account the concerns of many groups. It is 
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argued that maintaining an appropriate balance between the interests of all 
stakeholder groups is the only way to ensure survival of the firm and the 
attainment of other performance goals. The normative condition is that man-
agers must provide economic and other returns to stakeholders in order to 
continue engaging in wealth creating activities by virtue of the critical re-
sources stakeholders provide to the firm. 
Stakeholder theory is justified on the basis that firms have responsibilities to 
stakeholders for moral reasons, and that there is no priority of one set of 
interests over another. Upholding four principles: 1) honouring agreements, 
2) avoiding lying, 3) respecting the autonomy of others, and 4) avoiding 
harm to others, are a necessary precondition for efficient working. And thus, 
stakeholder theories of the firm establish economic relationships within a 
general context of moral management. Contrary to the traditional under-
standing of the principal-agent relationship used in several IT outsourcing 
studies, a stakeholder orientation will include at least two new dimensions: 
1) a number of stakeholder groups, and 2) the interpretation of the four 
moral principles that underlie stakeholder theory. Neglecting these dimen-
sions, firms will have less satisfied stakeholders, and will show financial 
performance that is consistently below industry average (Shankman, 1999). 
According to Phillips, Freeman, and Wicks (2003), it is commonly asserted 
that the stakeholder theory implies that all stakeholders must be treated 
equally irrespective of the fact that some obviously contribute more than 
others to the organization. Prescriptions of equality have been inferred from 
discussions of balancing stakeholder interests and are in direct conflict with 
the advice of some experts on organizational design and reward systems. 
However, corporations should attempt to distribute the benefits of their ac-
tivities as equally as possible among stakeholders in light of their respective 
contributions, costs, and risks. This interpretation of balance is called meri-
tocracy, where benefits are distributed on the basis of relative contribution to 
the organization.  
Stakeholder theory is a managerial conception of organizational strategy and 
ethics. The central idea is that an organization's success is dependent on how 
well it manages the relationships with key groups such as customers, em-
ployees, suppliers, communities, financiers, and others that can affect the 
realization of its purpose. The manager's job is to keep the support of all of 
these groups, balancing their interests, while making the organization a place 
where stakeholder interests can be maximized over time. The identification 
of stakeholder groups is currently among the central debates in the scholarly 
and popular press (Freeman & Phillips, 2002). 
Contribution to the understanding of IT outsourcing. Lacity and Willcocks 
(2000a) define a stakeholder as a group of people with aligned interests. The 
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term is widely used and accepted by IT outsourcing practitioners and re-
searchers. However, as indicated by some of the reviewed literature above, a 
stakeholder is defined and used differently in finance (issue of CEO respon-
sibility to shareholders or stakeholders), law (requires ownership), and gam-
ing (person who holds the bets). According to Lacity and Willcocks (2000a), 
there are four distinct client IT stakeholder groups and three distinct vendor 
IT stakeholder groups. The groups identified are client senior business man-
agers, client senior IT managers, client IT staff, client IT users, and vendor 
senior managers, vendor account managers, vendor IT staff. An additional 
group is the subcontractors. All stakeholder groups are presumed to have 
significant differences in expectations and goals regarding IT outsourcing. 
Thus, it is reasonable to propose that upholding the interest of these different 
stakeholder groups with the principles of moral management will affect the 
success of IT outsourcing. 
2.2.11 Social exchange theory 
Focus, aim, unit of analysis. Social exchange theory was initially developed 
to examine interpersonal exchanges that are not purely economic. Several 
sociologists are responsible for the early development of this theory. These 
theorists view people's social behavior in terms of exchanges of resources. 
The need for social exchange is created by the scarcity of resources, prompt-
ing actors to engage one another to obtain valuable inputs. Social exchange 
can be defined as voluntary actions of individuals who are motivated by 
return they are expected to bring and typically, in fact, bring from others. 
Social exchange can be viewed as an ongoing reciprocal process in which 
actions are contingent on rewarding reactions from others. There are impor-
tant differences between social exchanges and economic exchanges. Social 
exchanges may or may not involve extrinsic benefits with objective eco-
nomic value. In contrast to economic exchanges, the benefits from social 
exchanges often are not contracted explicitly, and it is voluntary to provide 
benefits. As a result, exchange partners are uncertain as to whether they will 
receive benefits. Thus social exchange theory focuses on the social relations 
among the actors that shape the exchange of resources and benefits. While 
its origins are at the individual level, social exchange theory has been ex-
tended to organizational and interorganizational levels (Das & Teng, 2002a). 
Social exchange theory postulates that exchange interactions involve eco-
nomic and/or social outcomes. Over time, each party in the exchange rela-
tionship compares the social and economic outcomes from these interactions 
to those that are available from exchange alternatives, which determines 
their dependence on the exchange relationship. Positive economic and social 
outcomes over time increase the partners' trust of each other and commit-
ment to maintaining the exchange relationship. Positive exchange interac-
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tions over time also produce relational exchange norms that govern the ex-
change partners' interactions. Implicit in these postulates, the four founda-
tional premises of social exchange theory are: (1) exchange interactions re-
sult in economic and/or social outcomes, (2) these outcomes are compared 
over time to other exchange alternatives to determine dependence on the 
exchange relationship, (3) positive outcomes over time increase firms' trust 
of their trading partner(s) and their commitment to the exchange relation-
ship, and (4) positive exchange interactions over time produce relational 
exchange norms that govern the exchange relationship (Lambe, Wittmann, & 
Spekman, 2001).  
Contribution to the understanding of IT outsourcing. Commitment is a 
widely used construct in social exchange research. It has been defined as an 
exchange partner believing that an ongoing relationship with another is so 
important as to warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it; that is, the com-
mitted party believes the relationship is worth working on to ensure that it 
endures indefinitely. Satisfaction with the exchange relationship is an often-
used variable in social exchange research. Satisfaction can be defined in 
terms of performance satisfaction, which is the level in which a transaction 
meets the expectations of the partners including product and non-product 
attributes. Satisfaction can result from evaluating all aspects of a working 
relationship. Satisfaction/dissatisfaction is a state reflecting a feeling of be-
ing rewarded adequately or inadequately for contributions to the relation-
ship. Satisfaction can be the overall approval of an outsourcing arrangement. 
Satisfaction has been used in research as an operationalization of the success 
of the exchange relationship. According to social exchange theory, satisfac-
tion plays an integral role in relationships. Firms, who receive benefits that 
meet or exceed their expectations and are equal to or superior to outcomes 
available from alternatives, are likely to maintain and expand the relation-
ship. Satisfaction serves as a measure of a firm's view of the outcomes of the 
relationship. While it may not capture a partner's estimation of available 
alternatives, it does provide insight into a relationship's overall performance 
(Lambe et al., 2001). 
2.3 Addressing the research questions 
The two research questions presented in chapter 1 are addressing: (1) how 
transplants’ role stress affects their work outcome, and (2) potential predic-
tors of transplants’ role stress. Below, the organization and management 
theories presented are applied according to how they address the research 
questions. 
Stakeholder theory recognizes the importance of balancing interests of all 
stakeholder groups. Upholding the principles of moral management will 
affect outsourcing success. One important stakeholder group in IT outsourc-
 30
ing is IT workers transferred from client to vendor organization, and who 
offer services back to their original employer for a service fee. The impor-
tance of transplants of IT outsourcing is also recognized by several other 
theories. For example, in transaction cost theory and contractual theory, the 
transfer of human capital or human assets is recognized as a part of the out-
sourcing arrangement. As these theories have transaction and contract as 
their unit of analysis, transplants are not their major concern. Despite this, 
transaction-specific assets, such as human capital, may shift the balance of 
power between the transaction parties as they are transferred. Reviewing IT 
outsourcing based research (see Appendix A) investigation on transplanted 
IT workers seems to be a white spot. 
Agency theory recognizes that principal-agent relationships change as a con-
sequence of outsourcing. Transplants get a new employer, a new principal, 
but they continue to serve their former employer, now as a contractor. Prin-
cipals are claimed to reduce agent opportunism using outcome-based con-
tracts. As a consequence the behavioral aspects are often left out, leaving 
transplants as contractors to fulfill service level agreements. As such, their 
roles change and occupational stress may occur. 
Economic theories are addressing performance, such as high economic bene-
fits, low transaction costs, effective contracts, good principal-agent coopera-
tion, and efficient division of labor, but they are not directly addressing indi-
vidual level work outcome. As such, transplants are not a primary concern of 
economic theories. This research will investigate how the individual trans-
plant is affected by the IT outsourcing arrangement and how this affects 
individual work outcome. 
Partnership and alliance theory and core competencies theory emphasize the 
importance of developing complementary core competencies. According to 
resource-based theory, outsourcing gives clients access to vendor resources. 
Organization of work and delivery of value are outsourcing characteristics 
which may influence transplants’ perception of new roles. Relational norms 
are also recognized as one important environmental characteristic affecting 
individuals. Using social exchange theory, transplants will try to obtain posi-
tive economic and/or social outcomes.  
Looking back at the sourcing universe presented in chapter 2.1, we see that 
transfer of assets, such as employees, is often an integral part of both IT and 
business process outsourcing. Business process outsourcing has not been a 
part of this study, but the issues of investigation may apply for outsourcing 
other business processes as well. In insourcing, transfer of employees is not 
an issue. For transformational outsourcing the clue is first of all to bring new 
capabilities to the organization seeking change. The outcome of the organ-
izational change is not given. The primary driver for global outsourcing is 
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based on the comparative cost of labor. The researcher suggests that care-
fully crafted outsourcing strategies must take into account the unique posi-
tion of transferred IT employees, and this will affect the overall performance 
of the relationship. 
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Cost concerns Resource concerns Partnership concerns  
Neo-Classical 
economic 
theory 
Transactions cost 
theory 
Contractual 
theory 
Agency theory Theory of firm 
boundaries 
Core competen-
cies theory 
Resource-
based theory 
Partnership 
and alliance 
theory 
Relational 
exchange 
theory 
Stakeholder 
theory 
Social exchange 
theory 
Focus Organization 
as a produc-
tion function 
Economic 
organization 
Contract as a 
legally bound, 
institutional 
framework 
Delegation of 
work 
Determinants of 
firm boundaries 
Firm-specific 
skills and know-
how 
Unique 
organizational 
resources of 
both tangible 
and intangible 
nature 
Collaborative 
interfirm 
business 
relationships 
Relational 
norms 
Manage organi-
zations more 
effectively 
Social behavior 
Aim Profit 
maximization, 
obtained from 
economies of 
scale and 
scope 
Governance 
structure; which 
transactions 
should be 
organized how 
Facilitating 
exchange and 
preventing 
opportunism 
Most efficient 
contract 
governing 
principal-agent 
relationship 
Pursuing 
hierarchical 
control or 
market contracts 
Organization of 
work and 
delivery of value 
Leverage 
distinctive 
internal and 
external 
resources 
Achievement of 
mutually 
compatible 
goals 
Effective 
contract 
governance 
Balancing 
interests of all 
stakeholders 
Obtain positive 
economic and/or 
social outcomes 
Unit Company Transaction Contract         Contract Company Company Company Relationship Relationship Firm/ group/
individual 
Individual/ 
organizational 
Outsourc-
ing 
philosophy 
Outsource 
when market-
place can offer 
production 
cost savings 
Firms take 
sourcing decision 
s to minimizes 
the sum of 
production and 
transaction costs 
Contractual 
completeness 
reduces 
uncertainty and 
risk 
Outcome based 
outsourcing 
contract 
reduces 
opportunism 
Outsource if 
there are large 
markets for IT 
services 
available from 
vendors 
Activities which 
are non-core 
should be 
outsourced to 
best-in-world 
suppliers 
Outsourcing 
give client 
access to 
vendor 
resources 
Pooling of 
resources to 
achieve 
mutually 
compatible 
goals 
Collaborative 
actions can act 
to improve the 
client-vendor 
relationship 
Upholding the 
principles of 
moral manage-
ment will affect 
outsourcing 
success 
Satisfaction is the 
overall approval 
of an outsourcing 
arrangement 
Critical 
success 
factors 
Integration 
and exploita-
tion of IT 
services from 
vendor 
Minimize 
settings in which 
opportunistic 
behavior is likely 
Simultaneous 
use of contrac-
tual and 
cooperative 
mechanisms 
Choosing a 
suitable agent, 
and monitoring 
the agent’s 
work 
Matching 
economic 
opportunities to 
individuals’ 
efficiency 
Define needs and 
manage services 
from vendor 
Integrate and 
exploit 
strategic 
resources 
Competence in 
finding, 
developing, and 
managing 
alliances 
Develop and 
secure common 
norms 
Efficient and 
effective 
communication 
with and 
between all 
stakeholders 
Enable social and 
economic 
outcomes which 
outperform 
alternatives 
Table 2.1. Comparison of theories. 
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3. Exploratory case studies 
This chapter reports findings from three exploratory case studies. Explora-
tory case studies have been commonly cited as a part of a hypothesis-
generating process (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) where the goal is to develop 
ideas for further study. This approach was selected in order to understand the 
inherent complexities and the underlying constructs of managing IT out-
sourcing relationships, and to debate the values of further investigating indi-
vidual level behaviour, attitude, and performance. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section describes the case 
study process. Then, in the second section, the three international IT out-
sourcing relationships are presented. In this section, practical issues of man-
aging, such outsourcing relationships, are examined. By this the researcher 
obtained a rich understanding of the relationships studied. In the third sec-
tion, different theoretical lenses were used in order to enhance the under-
standing of particular organizational and management issues of IT outsourc-
ing. And finally, in section four there is a summary of findings and sugges-
tions for further confirmatory research. 
3.1 The case study process 
According to Yin (2003), the case study is preferred in examining contempo-
rary events and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within 
some real-life context. The case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal 
with a full variety of evidence, like documents, artifacts, interviews, and 
observations. For case studies, five components of research design are espe-
cially important: a study’s questions, its propositions (if any), its unit(s) of 
analysis, the logic linking the data to the propositions, and the criteria for 
interpreting the findings (Yin, 2003, p. 21). In designing the case study, all 
these components have been dealt with, as described below. 
In order to understand the inherent complexities and the underlying con-
structs of managing IT outsourcing relationships and the role of different 
stakeholders, empirical research was required. This exploratory case study 
had the following guiding research questions: 1) How do client and vendor 
organizations managing their IT outsourcing relationship? 2) How do differ-
ent stakeholders influence, or get influenced by, the IT outsourcing relation-
ship? As such, the unit of analysis was both the relationship (question 1) and 
the individual stakeholders (question 2). As the investigator’s goal was to 
explore managerial and individual issues, rather than analytical generaliza-
tion, no propositions were developed before the study.  
The selection of cases was based on an instrumental approach, which means 
that the case study was carried out to provide insight into issue or refinement 
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of theory. “The case is of secondary interest; it plays a supportive role, facili-
tating our understanding of something else. The choice of case is made be-
cause it is expected to advance our understanding of that other interest” 
(Stake, 1994, p. 237). All three cases were selected for their paradigmatic 
characteristics in terms of their outsourcing undertaking. In other words, the 
cases were selected because, the ABB – IBM is a global one; the SAS – CSC 
contract belongs to one of the largest buy-outs in Europe; the Rolls-Royce – 
EDS contract is a mature one. All cases are unique, with global client com-
panies from different industries, and all vendor companies are global service 
providers. In all three international based cases more than a thousand em-
ployees were transferred from client to vendor organizations. They provide a 
broad base of relationship practice, suggesting that a case in each company 
would be of interest and value to this research study.  
Data collection was done through interviews, with questions addressing rela-
tionship management issues: enter and exit strategies, activities and phases, 
contract and contract management, governance structures and relationship 
management, personnel issues, and knowledge management, with a strong 
emphasis on what characteristics influenced IT outsourcing relationship. A 
certain group of questions were addressing individual stakeholder attitude, 
behavior, and performance. Thus, interviews were focused directly on case 
study topics. For each client-vendor outsourcing relationship, 2 – 3 inter-
viewees were selected from each of the two parties. A total of 16 interviews 
were conducted, see Table 3.1 for type of interviewee.  
 
Interviewee type Number of interviews 
Client senior managers 2 
Client business managers 1 
Client retained IT managers (CIO) 3 
Client IT staff 3 
Vendor senior manager 1 
Vendor account managers 3 
Vendor IT employees (transplants) 3 
Total 16 
Table 3.1. Interviewee type and number of interviews. 
 
Client and vendor interview guides are presented in appendices B and C, 
respectively. The interviews were scheduled for 1 hour, but some lasted for 
90 minutes. All interviewees were assured anonymity to promote openness. 
Interviews were personal meetings or held as telephone conferences. The 
exploratory case studies were conducted through July – September 2004. All 
interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed immediately afterwards. 
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Transcripts from the 16 interviews comprised 65,342 words and 108 pages 
of text. The analysis of each case was focused essentially on transcripts of 
the interviews, but to some extent on other materials made available to the 
researcher (e.g., presentations, internal reports, press releases, annual reports, 
the Internet). An abbreviation of each case was written and sent to a contact 
person of each participating company for approval. The individual cases 
serve only as the evidentiary base for the study and were used in a cross-case 
analysis. The purpose was not to portray any single one of the relationships. 
Rather, it was to synthesize the lessons learned from all of them, dispersed 
throughout separate cross-case issues.  
3.2 Three international based IT outsourcing relationships  
The case introduction in the first three subsections 0 – 3.2.3 has the purpose 
of presenting the outsourcing ventures and revealing company specific data 
from the discussions of the outsourcing relationships. The overview essen-
tially outlines a brief description of the institution, the role and influence of 
IT, and the degree/extent of the outsourcing. Table 3.2 shows some charac-
teristics of the IT outsourcing relationships studied.  
In subsections 3.2.4 – 3.2.11 empirical data collected are put into cross-case 
issues of managing outsourcing relationships. These issues are enter strate-
gies, phases and activities, contract development and management, transfer 
of IT employees, governance structures, outsourcing costs, retained skills, 
and exit strategies. This is done in order to get a rich representation of the 
cases studied, and to explain the complexity and variety of the arrangements. 
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Client  
company 
Industry Origin Outsourced Start of
deal 
  Length of 
deal 
Size of 
deal 
No of  
people  
trans-
ferred 
Vendor 
company
Rolls-Royce Power for civil aerospace, de-
fence aerospace, marine and 
energy markets 
UK  Infrastructure, application
support and development 
2000
(1996)
144 
months
$2.1bn 1220 EDS 
ABB Power and automation technolo-
gies 
Switzer-
land 
Data centre, infrastructure, 
desktop 
2003 120 
months
$1.1bn 1200 IBM 
Scandinavian 
Airlines 
Air travel and airline related 
businesses 
Nordic  Infrastructure management,
application development and 
support 
2003 60 
months
$1.47bn 1150 CSC 
Table 3.2. Characteristics of the IT outsourcing relationships studied. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1 A mature relationship 
Rolls-Royce is a global power systems company providing power for land, 
sea and air, with leading positions in civil aerospace, defence, marine and 
energy markets. Rolls-Royce is also one of the most famous names in engi-
neering throughout the world. The history of Rolls-Royce starts back in 
1884, when Henry Royce and Charles Royce start to build, manufacture and 
sell quality cars. Success with the cars led to the formation of the Rolls-
Royce Company in March 1906 and to the launch of the six-cylinder Silver 
Ghost, which, within a year, was hailed as “the best car in the world”. At the 
start of the First World War, Charles Royce designed his first aero engine, 
used in the air war by the allies. Demand for the Merlin engine, which pow-
ered the Spitfire during the Second World War transformed Rolls-Royce 
from a relatively small company into a major contender in aero propulsion. 
Rolls-Royce entered the civil aviation market in 1953, and the company has 
become a major player within this market. In the 1980s and 1990s Rolls-
Royce has been undergoing a number of mergers and acquisitions to create 
the only company in Britain capable of delivering power for use in air, at sea 
and on land (Rolls-Royce, 2004b).  
Today, there are some 54,000 Rolls-Royce gas turbines in service and these 
generate a demand for high-value service throughout their operational life. 
Rolls-Royce is a technology leader, employing 35,200 employees and oper-
ating in 48 countries. Group turnover in 2003 ended at £ 5,645 million 
(Rolls-Royce, 2004a). 
Until 1996 Rolls-Royce had its own information technology operation. The 
company was growing rapidly in the 1990s, and both IT costs and the num-
ber of IT employees were increasing dramatically. In the IT business, there 
was a change between large mainframes and green screens to GUI and clus-
tered server environments. The company got to a point where they had to 
manage both environments. The, then, CIO did a study of the capability of 
the IT function. He had serious doubts about the in-house team’s ability to 
handle the change, both on a capability and scale prospective. In addition, 
Rolls-Royce was strapped financially. They considered outsourcing as one 
way, at least in a short term, to help the company deliver its results. Rolls-
Royce also needed a change agent. The company began to look outside for a 
partner to deal with those aspects.  
The first outsourcing deal was done in 1996, and was renewed in 2000 for 12 
more years. Rolls-Royce outsourced the basic operation of the complete 
infrastructure — the management of networks, data centers, servers, and so 
on. And they outsourced the application support for most of their major ap-
plications, and the application development function. What was kept was 
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development of internal software at the control level, such as control systems 
for jet engines. All major assets were transferred, like computers, software, 
and people. More than 1200 people were transferred from Rolls-Royce to 
Electronic Data Systems Corporation (EDS). As almost 90% of the IT 
budget goes with the outsourcer, we may regard this as a total outsourcing. 
Total outsourcing transfers IT assets, leases, staff and management responsi-
bility for delivery of IT services from internal IT function to a third-party 
vendor, which represents at least 80 percent of the IT budget (Lacity et al., 
1996). The intention was to put a long-term agreement in place, and to build 
a close relationship. 
In the early years, after the initial outsourcing, Rolls-Royce kept very little 
competence in-house. But they realized that was unhelpful, because it cre-
ated naivety on their side and created a degree of frustration on the out-
sourcer’s side. This was later corrected and now they have senior people 
with experience in managing outsourcers. The central staff, doing informa-
tion technology, covers the architecture, the oversight of projects, and the 
management of service levels. Today, Rolls-Royce has around 30,000 com-
puter users, and a lot of the staff are using ERP systems. 
In 1999, when Rolls-Royce acquired Vickers (now Rolls-Royce Commercial 
Marine) the company got a strong in-house IT group with more than 70 pro-
fessionals. This group provided operational IT services for more than 3200 
people at 50 locations worldwide. A memorandum of understanding was 
signed in 2000, between Rolls-Royce and EDS, to evaluate outsourcing of 
this group. The process was stopped, concluding that outsourcing was not 
profitable for Rolls-Royce. The in-house IT group of Rolls-Royce Commer-
cial Marine was a self-efficient group with very significant geographic 
boundaries, located in Norway, and serving small business units primarily in 
Norway, Sweden, and Finland. They had just over 10% of the overall IT 
budget. They were kept in-house for two reasons. First of all, they were not 
in the natural environment for an outsourcer. And second, maintaining a 
complete vertical capability in IT was healthy in a CIO perspective. It was 
possible to build on that group to bring services back in-house, and they 
provided Rolls-Royce with direct cost comparison versus the outsourcer. 
3.2.2 The largest buy-out in Europe 2003 
The SAS Group serves northern Europe with air travel and airline related 
businesses. SAS’ parent companies were founded in Denmark (1918), Swe-
den (1924), and Norway (1927). Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) was 
founded August 1, 1946, to co-ordinate flights from Scandinavia to the USA. 
They have more than half a century of aviation experience. SAS airline 
companies are flying to more than 80 major destinations in Scandinavia and 
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in Europe. In addition, there are also flights to the United States and to Asia 
(Scandinavian Airlines System, 2004a).  
Through partnership in Star Alliance, the SAS Group can offer a worldwide 
network covering a total of 673 airports in 127 countries. Today, the SAS 
Group is Europe’s 4th largest airline group, carrying more than 31 million 
passengers in 2003. The SAS Group 2003 revenue was Skr 58,000 million 
employing more than 33,000 people in five business areas — Scandinavian 
Airlines, Subsidiary & Affiliated Airlines, Airline Support Businesses, Air-
line Related Businesses, and Hotels (Scandinavian Airlines System, 2004b). 
SAS started a huge cost reduction program called “turn around 2005”, due to 
the state of the airline market after September 11, 2001. The group looked at 
all kinds of costs, including IT costs. The goal was to reduce IT costs sig-
nificantly within a few years, partly by reducing costs directly and partly by 
exchanging old legacy systems with new standardized ones. Scandinavian IT 
Group (SIG) was sold out of Airline Related Business during the forth quar-
ter of 2003, and the SAS Group entered into an IT outsourcing agree-
ment with Computer Science Corporation (CSC). Under the terms of 
the contract, CSC provides IT consulting, systems integration, appli-
cation development and maintenance, and IT infrastructure services 
for mission-critical SAS business needs, including booking and ticket 
reservation systems, ticket-free travel technologies, self-service check-
in, flight maintenance and cargo control systems. All SAS destination 
airports were included in the services of the outsourcing deal, as they were 
previously serviced by SIG. 
3.2.3 A global deal 
The history of ABB goes back to the late nineteenth century, and is a long 
and illustrious record of innovation and technological leadership in many 
industries. Elektriska Aktiebolaget was established in Stockholm in 1883 as 
manufacturers of electrical lighting and generators. Some years later in 1990 
a merger founded Allmänna Svenska Elektriska Aktiebolaget (Asea). In the 
beginning of 1900, Asea played a major role in the electrification of Swedish 
industry, railways and homes. They expanded their business internationally 
and in the 1980s Asea was one of the top ten companies in the world in 
power technologies. In 1986, the year prior to its merger with Brown, Boveri 
& Cie, Asea had revenues of Skr 46 billion, and 71,000 employees (ABB 
Group, 2004a).  
Brown, Boveri & Cie (BBC) was established in Baden, Switzerland, in 1891. 
Shortly afterwards, BBC was the first company to transmit high-voltage AC 
power. The company has since continued to invent a number of major new 
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technologies — like electrical machines in motors and generators, combus-
tion gas turbines for generating electricity, locomotive technology, trans-
formers and control systems. In 1986, the year prior to its merger with Asea, 
BBC had revenues of Skr 58 billion, and 97,000 employees worldwide 
(ABB Group, 2004a).  
In 1988 Asea and BBC merged to form ABB (Asea Brown Boveri Ltd.), one 
of the largest electrical engineering companies in the world. A large-scale 
program of expansion resulted in several acquisitions in the following years. 
In 2002 ABB streamlined its divisional structure to focus on two core areas 
of business: power technologies and automation technologies. ABB sold its 
Financial Services division, its Oil, Gas & Petrochemicals division, and its 
Building Systems business area. A divestment program of non-core business 
continued in 2003. Today, ABB is a leader in power and automation tech-
nologies that enable utility and industry customers to improve performance 
while lowering environmental impact. The ABB Group of companies oper-
ates in around 100 countries and employs around 105,000 people. The parent 
company is located in Switzerland. ABB Group revenues for 2003 ended at 
$18.8 billion (ABB Group, 2004b). 
By July 28, 2003, ABB and IBM had signed a ten-year agreement to out-
source close to 90 percent of ABB’s information systems infrastructure op-
erations — including the transfer to IBM of more than 1,200 employees. The 
agreement was valued at US$ 1.1 billion and built on a well-established rela-
tionship between the two companies. The contract was part of ABB’s strat-
egy to focus on its core industrial businesses and would help ABB signifi-
cantly reduce costs over the period. Combined with pilot contracts signed in 
the fourth quarter of 2001 for approximately US$ 600 million the full value 
of the relationship approached US$ 1.7 billion over ten years. IBM Global 
Services took responsibility for the operation and support of information 
technology infrastructure in 14 countries in Europe and North America — 
representing some 90 percent of ABB’s information technology infrastruc-
ture. The deal included taking over the management of servers, operating 
systems, and corporate networks, personal computers, and help desks. Con-
trol systems within power and automation technologies were regarded as a 
part of ABB’s core business, and were kept in-house. The company had 
several laboratories developing such industrial IT solutions. Industrial IT 
solutions enabled ABB customers to manage their installations better and to 
link up in real time with their own suppliers and customers. Standard appli-
cations, such as ERP systems, were not a part of the outsourcing deal.  
3.2.4 Enter strategies 
Rolls-Royce did a capability study previous to the outsourcing. It may be 
regarded as a strategy process. Although none of the interviewees used the 
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term “enter strategy” for what was happening at that point in time: the deci-
sion to outsource was regarded as a strategic decision. None of the inter-
viewees were involved in the capability study, as this was done many years 
ago, and before the interviewees entered the companies. The strategic issues 
told to be underlying the outsourcing decision were costs, capabilities, and 
the need for a change agent. Rolls-Royce wanted a 10% reduction in IT 
costs. The criteria that were presented for vendor selection were pretty clear: 
around maximum service levels, being able to handle large, skilled contracts 
of that size, and also pretty clear around costs. EDS had generally been com-
petitive on costs, and they demonstrated that they could provide capability 
for large scale contracts. Rolls-Royce doubted they had necessary in-house 
capabilities to do the required step change from managing large mainframe 
systems to GUI based client-server systems. A change, which was believed 
to require both human capabilities and financial capabilities to succeed. 
Rolls-Royce was looking for a company they might discuss as the change 
agent, a company somewhat different to themselves. They were not looking 
for a traditional outsourcer, but a very service oriented company. A major 
transformation seemed to be a part of the plan, a transformation of Rolls-
Royce from a manufacturing oriented company to a service oriented com-
pany. The culture that EDS was bringing was part of what Rolls-Royce was 
looking for; a service oriented, global, and people oriented company. 
SAS outsourced for three main reasons. First, they wanted to benefit from 
economies of scale offered by an external service provider and to realize 
corresponding cost reduction. Compared with other airliners, the cost and 
efficiency of their internal IT group were far too high. Second, they wanted 
to lift their existing technologies to new platforms and replace their old leg-
acy systems with standard application in order to establish a more cost-
effective platform. And third, they wanted to offer the employees in their 
internal IT group better development opportunities for their professional 
careers. Information technology was the core competence of CSC, but it was 
not at the core of the airliner. SIG management group and their Chairman of 
the Board took the initiative to start the process. 
We were in financial pressure, our bankers pushed the outsourcing 
forward. (Client IT Manager) 
Global IT management at ABB started to develop a strategy document be-
fore the outsourcing, which later was signed by senior management. It was 
never an outsourcing strategy, but a strategy for how to achieve a number of 
aims. It was at the time when ABB had strong financial difficulties. Because 
of this, cost reduction was a significant aim to achieve, and was a factor 
provoking outsourcing. One of the things the CIO did, was to use a lot of 
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time assuring that the countries in ABB were aligned to the outsourcing pro-
ject. The starting point was a strategy document, but it ended up as a pure 
cost case, affected by external environment. During the last few years ABB 
had been through several organizational changes. Focusing on two core 
business areas, power and automation technologies, they sold away other 
business. But, remaining internal functions were huge and inflexible. Simul-
taneously, the requirements from business unit areas were full transparency 
regarding IT. ABB’s financial difficulties at that time and their restructuring 
around two core business areas pushed the IT outsourcing. 
3.2.5 Phases and activities 
Six relationship phases of IT outsourcing are defined as scooping, evalua-
tion, negotiation, transition, middle, and mature phase (Lacity & Willcocks, 
2000a). These phases are discussed in this section as they were recognized at 
the three international based IT outsourcing relationships studied. 
Prior to the outsourcing, Rolls-Royce did a capability study of the com-
pany’s IT function, identifying core competence and activities. The capabil-
ity study raised doubts about the in-house IT function’s ability to handle the 
challenges of the company. This was the scooping phase, establishing a goal 
or vision for the outsourcing. Evaluation and negotiation phases were limited 
in a time perspective. Rolls-Royce went through a very standard procure-
ment process of defining all the pieces that needed to be outsourced, defining 
what was required, and then inviting bids to the standard request for pro-
posal. All the big external outsourcing vendors were involved in the bidding. 
The first contract with EDS, the one for the aero business, was negotiated in 
1996. The second contract for the industrial business was signed in 1997. 
The goal of these phases was first to select the best vendor and then to sign 
the contract. In the transition phase the major goal of the two parties was to 
establish agreed upon operational performance. After the contract was 
signed, there was a ”honeymoon period,” during which the outsourcer gave 
Rolls-Royce ”anything.” The outsourcer put a new desktop on, because it 
was more efficient and because they had got the know-how to standardize. 
The users got lucky; they got something quick and fashionable, and faster 
than what the IT department could deliver. All major IT assets and more 
than a thousand people got transferred to the outsourcer. As service levels 
were established, the parties moved into the improvement phase, where the 
overall goal was to achieve value-added services above operational perform-
ance. The IT department thought they had got a partner they could manage 
and control. Problems arose when Rolls-Royce started to add new services 
and remove old services from the original contract. Rolls-Royce had to pay 
extra for everything, and the parties had to refer to the contract, and they 
started quarrelling. Rolls-Royce merged the aero business and the industrial 
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business, and in 2000 they had to realign the contracts to reflect changes in 
technology, services, and business. The original contracts were made a 
“foot” thick. Then in 2000, they tried to make it a trusted one, and they actu-
ally went to buy services. It was widely reported in the press that it was a 1.3 
billion pound deal over 12 years. When the relationship was extended, the 
mature phase provided an opportunity for the two parties to learn from past 
experiences as well as to explore creative options when constructing the new 
deal. 
In the scooping phase, SAS used business, economic and technical criteria to 
identify potentials for outsourcing. As a part of the company’s huge cost 
reduction program, the group looked at all kinds of costs, including IT costs. 
SIG was at that point of time already a stand-alone company, wholly owned 
by its largest customer, SAS. The management of SIG looked at different 
scenarios for survival; one of them was to sell the company to an external 
service provider. This way SIG could continue to serve its largest customer, 
and with possibilities of gaining large-scale opportunities, and access IT 
capabilities. SIG management meant an outsourcer would be a better place 
for SIG employees. Thus they made a suggestion for their board of directors 
to sell the company. Selective outsourcing was also considered, but they 
concluded it would require too much management attention. The objective of 
the evaluation phase was to select the best and final offer. The SAS board of 
directors decided in August 2003, to start the process of selling SIG and to 
establish a frame agreement for buy-back of services. First step was to de-
velop an information memorandum describing SAS’ IT governance struc-
ture, including a description of SIG as a company in terms of economic con-
ditions, assets, and management. An investment banker was also chosen, a 
short time after the decision, who handled the formalities of the bidding 
process. Several vendors signed the confidentiality statement and they re-
ceived the information memorandum. A few vendors delivered a non-
binding bid. All the Nordic vendors quit, first of all because of the size of the 
deal. The steering committee decided which four vendors should be invited 
to give binding-bids. One of the invited vendors quit and one of them was 
later removed from the list. SAS started negotiation with two vendors. Im-
portant evaluation criteria were economy, financial strength and persever-
ance of partner, sensitivity to SAS’ proposed conditions, and handling of 
SIG personnel. By December 18, 2004, the outsourcing agreement between 
SAS and CSC was signed. Due to the fact that SIG was a stand-alone com-
pany, they were delivering services to SAS on already established agree-
ments, and thus the evaluation and negotiation phases could be done in a 
relatively short period of time. The outsourcing deal was partly a take-over, 
and partly a buy-back of services. Technically the transition of shares took 
place at February 1, 2004. And by this transaction, SAS were transferring IT 
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assets, leases, staff, and management responsibility for delivery of services 
from an internal IT function to a third-party vendor. About 1100 employees 
got CSC as a new employer. Intellectual property rights for business applica-
tions were kept in SAS. As SAS had already been treating SIG as an external 
supplier, the scope, costs, levels and responsibilities of the baseline services 
were already established, but of course some changes were made during 
negotiation. Later, there was some disagreement around contractual interpre-
tations, but no serious problems. And thus, the objective of the transition 
phase, to establish operational performance, was going relatively straight-
forward. Transforming SIG into CSC’s global operating model was, how-
ever, a huge program involving a lot of people from the vendor organization. 
Although operational performance was not affected, the internal focus of the 
transformation period took focus away from value-added services. 
In the scooping phase, ABB identified IT activities for potential outsourcing. 
Although ABB global senior IT management set forth to create a strategic 
vision of IT in the company, the IT sourcing decisions ended up as a busi-
ness decision. As the overall organizational goal was to cut costs, there was 
also a pressure for significant cost reduction within IT. And a few months 
later, close to 90% of ABB’s information technology infrastructure opera-
tions were outsourced to IBM, including more than 1200 employees in 14 
different countries. In the evaluation phase a few potential suppliers were 
invited to bid for the infrastructure operations. There were not many service 
providers that could deliver services to a large number of locations in many 
different countries. ABB were aiming for competition, but one service pro-
vider after the other dropped out. In ABB’s opinion one service provider was 
not capable of delivering the required services at that time, and they were 
also not focused sufficiently hard on cost reduction. They were disqualified. 
Another one declined to bid, because they didn’t believe their chances of 
success were high enough to justify the investment in bid time and quest. A 
third one was interested in making the investment and attempt to win the 
business, but they needed to know ABB as an organization. Due to the very 
difficult financial situation in ABB, it was difficult for senior executives to 
spend time with the service provider. Consequently they lost the third one. 
ABB already had a long lasting relationship with IBM. A pilot outsourcing 
to IBM in Sweden and India twelve months before was at that time going 
reasonably well. And thus, IBM was selected as the best and final offer. 
Negotiation was done in two major areas. The first element was the core 
contract, which was the core service specification. This was negotiated and 
developed centrally by a global team. The other element was that the ABB 
countries negotiated their own versions of the contract, underlying the core 
documents. During the local negotiations, changes to the standard documents 
were kept at a minimum. This was done to obtain economies of scale. One 
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basic country contract was negotiated globally, with very small country 
variations. Global sign-off of the agreement was done July 28, 2003. Coun-
try agreements were signed locally. Transfer of responsibilities took place in 
September 2003. It was a ten-year contract helping ABB significantly reduce 
costs. In the transition phase, the main focus was to establish agreed upon 
operational performance, including consolidation, rationalization, and stan-
dardization of infrastructure. Another important issue was to establish a post-
contract management infrastructure and processes. A relationship alignment 
project between the ABB team and IBM team was set up to take care of this. 
3.2.6 Contract development and management 
In the original outsourcing agreement between Rolls-Royce and EDS, assets 
were transferred, and services bought back through two different contracts, 
one for the aero and one for the industrial business. In 2000 these two con-
tracts were merged into one contract. During the time that Rolls-Royce had 
been in the arrangement, services had been taken away and new services 
were added. The result was that the outsourcing contract had been more 
complicated. In the beginning, the two contracts were arrangements around 
capability and scale. What they were doing in 2000 was to organize the new 
contract around services that could be provided. The new structure was an 
overall master services contract, and then services were grained and man-
aged in so called towers — e.g., data centers, networks, application support. 
Having had a period where they spent a lot of time arguing around interpre-
tations of contractual clauses, Rolls-Royce and EDS had reached the point 
where they hardly used the contract in the day-to-day operations. The two 
parties understood each other’s goals. If there were changes required in the 
contract, then they instructed the lawyers to make them. Rolls-Royce had an 
IT procurement team, a dozen people who were part of the central procure-
ment unit, but had a functional accountability to the IT community. These 
people did follow-up on the commercial part of the contract. 
Concurrent to asking for binding bid, SAS sent contractual suggestions to 
potential vendors, and they asked for remarks on suggested contractual con-
ditions. The previously contractual relationship between SAS and SIG 
served as a base for the new outsourcing contracts. Reviewing both binding 
bids and contractual comments was a learning process for both client and 
vendor, as they learned more about each other and the services to be deliv-
ered. All information around systems solutions — e.g., source codes, costs, 
and service levels — was accessible for bidders in certain “data rooms.” 
SAS were well prepared in the contractual negotiations as they used both 
internal and external expertise, e.g., lawyers, purchasers, and financial ex-
perts. The contract was structured in four parts. First there was an overall 
Master Service Agreement, which lay out the length of the relationship, 
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minimum level of services for the five year agreement, and options for ex-
tending the agreement. Then there was a Share Purchase Agreement, which 
regulated the sale of shares, price of shares, balance sheets, bonds, pensions, 
etc. Subsequently there was a Transition Agreement describing activities tied 
to the transfer of assets, e.g., transferring of IT employees, facilities, hard-
ware, and software licenses. This agreement lasted for six months, and then 
all major transition activities were finished. Finally, there was a Frame 
Agreement, which laid out terms and conditions for buy-back of services. 
This agreement was a traditional service agreement deal with service de-
scription, service levels, prices, conditions, templates, etc. The deal was a 
five-year contract, starting February 1, 2004, with options for extension. 
CSC must make an effort to get SAS to provoke the option. On the other 
hand SAS had the freedom to evaluate the quality of services delivered and 
to pick a new supplier without being locked for a too long period of time. 
There had been some contractual interpretation issues, especially concerning 
price and service clauses. But these issues had been handled successfully of 
by the relationship steering committee, in which both parties were repre-
sented. Each business unit in SAS was responsible for its own use of IT ser-
vices and its own costs, and thus they had a business relationship with CSC. 
Contract managers at CIO’s staff did contractual follow-up at corporate 
level. 
Both parties had accepted the agreement, but they also tried to get the 
maximum out of situations where contractual clauses opened up for 
interpretations. (Vendor Account Manager) 
At ABB, core contract documents were negotiated globally, because the 
service provider could only leverage economies of scale if there were some 
similarities in the environment. The global teams also negotiated one basic 
country contract, which was used in the local negotiations, e.g., between 
ABB Norway and IBM Norway. Statement of work was negotiated globally. 
Country adjustments contained local supplements and further details where 
needed. Responsibility for country agreements was distributed, but sup-
ported with expertise from the global team. Each contract had several exhib-
its and schedules. Exhibits included, e.g., form of country agreement, coun-
try agreement, and country adjustment. There were several schedules — e.g., 
acquired assets, employees, facilities, software, transition, service recipients, 
charges, governance, security, business continuity, exit management, sub-
contractors, and service measurements. The two parties were trying to verify 
as much as possible, and “nothing” should be left to coincidence. It was a 
very complex contractual set up, with one global agreement and 14 separate 
country agreements operating under it, and there were some very complex 
linkages. It was really a global agreement, meaning that the country agree-
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ments did not operate independently. If IBM, for example defaulted in one 
country, consequently ABB had the right to terminate in that country, and 
then they had the right to terminate in all countries participating in the 
agreement. 
3.2.7 Transfer of IT employees 
A thousand people in the aero deal, and an around 200 people in the indus-
trial business deal, were transferred from Rolls-Royce to EDS during 1996 – 
1997. The jobs were transferred to the outsourcer, and the terms and the 
conditions were transferred for a period. This was done in the context of a 
project, where the services and the management of the services were moved 
across in about six months. The standard process in accordance with British 
law was followed. Less than half of those original individuals transferred 
were still involved in service deliveries to Rolls-Royce. EDS had a normal 
turnover rate, and they moved people around in projects. There were people 
no longer interacting with Rolls-Royce, and there were people who had 
skills that were useful serving Rolls-Royce. Transfer of people in an out-
sourcing agreement was an issue that EDS as a company had to be very good 
at. This was stated as the number one risk of an outsourcer. The ability to 
take over the people, keep some of them on the account, and give the others 
opportunities to move elsewhere, was emphasized as fundamental for the 
outsourcer. Another issue stated as critical, was the ability for a client to 
understand the skills to be retained: ”You won’t necessarily find the man-
agement skills to manage outsourcers within a client organization, because 
(by definition) they have not done that before within their internal IT.” Cer-
tainly an IT director, who had previously run an IT department, might not 
always be the right person to run an outsourcing arrangement. Rolls-Royce 
realized it was difficult to run an outsourcer, and it was very different in 
terms of skills. 
The top management of the SAS Group handled the sales process of the 
shares, while the management group of SIG had to handle their employees. 
As this was a friendly take over, there were no immediate changes for the 
employees. All conditions of employment were carried on. About 1100 peo-
ple were transferred from the SAS Group as CSC took over SIG businesses. 
The employees of SIG were informed about the process, the necessity of the 
take over, and they got an understanding there was no other way to keep SIG 
together. During the process, employees did not know the name of the bid-
ders, but of course there were some rumors. Top management of SIG and the 
labor union were involved, but lower level employees and mid-level manag-
ers were not. The employees were loyal to their management and to the 
process, and they understood the reason why. Regardless of that, there was 
some frustration and the situation stressed them. The sales process did not 
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last for more than six months, but the transformation continued when SIG 
was taken over by CSC. Job insecurity was obviously an issue, because 
some places there were double sets of managers and functions. 
We joined a collective job application, without knowing to whom we 
applied and without any opportunity to influence. (Transferred IT 
Employee) 
As a consequence of the outsourcing, more than 1200 employees were trans-
ferred from ABB to IBM. Around 510 of these were transferred under the 
Sweden and India pilots, and the rest were transferred in September 2003. 
Because of the global deal, each country had to follow its local laws for 
transfer of people. ABB countries had to handle the transfer separately, in-
volving human resource managers, labor unions, employees, and informa-
tion, according to local laws. In Norway for example, 35 people had to 
change employer. It was a process where nobody quit or got fired as a con-
sequence of the outsourcing. IBM had experience taking over people and 
they had a procedure for how to handle the following transformation. Old 
organizational structures among transferred people were broken down, and 
the employees were replaced into IBM according to their competencies. This 
meant new managers, new colleagues, and to some extent new clients to 
support. According to a project executive of ABB, the quality of the techni-
cal people who were transferred to IBM was generally high; “A number of 
them had, even in a short period, done extremely well at IBM.” 
3.2.8 Governance structures 
Rolls-Royce had a small corporate staff doing information technology and 
that covered the architecture, the oversight of projects, and the management 
of service levels. And they were relatively senior people. Rolls-Royce 
owned the project management overall, and they also owned the IT architec-
ture. They had an IT procurement team that was part of the procurement 
unit, but had a functional accountability to the IT community. There was a 
tight top management relationship between the two parties. The CIO of 
Rolls-Royce met EDS’ board members once a year for a couple of days, 
where they discussed the progress of the contract and the overall relationship 
in a formal sense. Rolls-Royce also had a “hot line,” where the CIO could 
pick up the phone and get straight through to the CEO of EDS, if something 
was disastrous. There were regular monthly meetings between the CIO of 
Rolls-Royce and those that oversaw the accounts of EDS. One of them was 
account manager and the other was responsible for all the projects and all the 
services. In addition to that, there were a number of meetings. There were 
commercial review boards, the review on expenditure, and there were ser-
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vice review boards that managed the quality of the services against the ser-
vice level and the individual performance of the projects. Where the services 
were provided directly to Rolls-Royce lines of business, the IT head in the 
businesses would work out what was needed for the business and would 
communicate that back to the central IT unit, which in turn brought this back 
to EDS. Thus, the lines of business had a stake holding in defining the stan-
dards. However, managing the services was done centrally. When EDS were 
attempting to manage all the services and interact with all the business divi-
sions, it actually got quite complicated and expensive in terms of manpower. 
So, the management of the services on a day-to-day basis took place from 
Rolls-Royce centrally with experienced service management teams. 
Rolls-Royce had more than 70 IT employees in an in-house team in the 
Commercial Marine business, and this team was a self-efficient group 
mainly serving their own division. But the in-house team was also involved 
in some of the central projects, and thus they cooperated with EDS to some 
extent. Rolls-Royce had a benchmarking process built into the contract 
where they could take the services to a third party to benchmark against 
other companies. However, they had found that to be unsatisfactory, because 
it was very difficult to compare like with like, apples with apples. The in-
house IT department kept in the Commercial Marine division gave a value 
assurance, in the sense that they knew the costs having their own people to 
do the services, which gave Rolls-Royce an opportunity to measure that 
against the outsourcer. 
In the SAS – CSC case, a steering committee was established for an overall 
governance of the relationship. The committee had three members from SAS 
and two members from CSC. From the client side, participants were the 
CIO, the vice president of the airline business, and the manager of IT pur-
chasing. From the vendor side, participants were the account executive and 
the operations manager. There were also established some functional groups 
reporting to the steering committee, and they were working with standardiza-
tion, security, etc. Each business unit in SAS had a relationship with CSC as 
the responsibility for IT services and costs were delegated to the consumers 
of IT services. 
At ABB they realized that outsourcing relationships might be extremely 
dynamic, which was one of the reasons why they tried to develop a contract 
and a governance approach to these contracts that itself was dynamic. As a 
client manager at ABB stated: “Within ten years ABB will be a different 
company than it is today, and so will technology.” A real challenge was to 
develop a contract and a relationship to satisfy a violent cost reduction envi-
ronment, but also at the same time to serve a business expansion environ-
ment. Despite this, the governance model put in place was rather simple. 
Basically it was local meetings with global escalating. Each country was 
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responsible for their operations (service levels) and their financials. Take 
Norway as an example; there were two meetings each week between ABB 
and IBM. First, there was the operational meeting, where technical personnel 
met. And second, there was the commercial meeting, where project execu-
tives met. The intention of the deal was that everything was to be solved 
locally. Each month every country reported its costs to headquarters. And 
once a month there was the project executive meeting, either by phone or 
physically, where all the country executives participated. 
3.2.9 Outsourcing costs 
Due to their financial conditions, Rolls-Royce was looking for a 10% reduc-
tion of IT costs. But the strategic issues underlying the outsourcing decision 
were also internal IT capabilities, and the need for a change agent. Due to 
fact that the decision was made a long time ago, and none of the interview-
ees were involved in the decision-making process, it was difficult to state 
what criteria were the most important. A large company such as Rolls-Royce 
can (to some extent) generate economies of scale and scope internally by 
reproducing methods of vendors. And thus, defining outsourcing simply in 
terms of procurements activities seems not to capture the true strategic dis-
cussion of the Rolls-Royce IT outsourcing. What Rolls-Royce had done, on 
the premises of managing information technology services from the board 
perspectives, was to look at their total IT costs as a percentage of sales. They 
were moving with EDS towards being at least as competitive as the best of 
competitors in terms of low costs as a percentage of sales. The two parties 
were attempting to drive operational costs as low as they could, to open up 
for new investments spent at the highest possible level. 
In the SAS – CSC case it was obvious that IT costs was an important issue. 
Benchmarking of SIG showed that costs were far too high. Enquiring the 
market of IT services, bidders showed that SAS could benefit from econo-
mies of scale by outsourcing IT to an external service provider. In neo-
classical economic theories, outsourcing may be regarded as the substitution 
of external purchase for internal activities and an initiation of procurement 
from outside suppliers (Gilley & Rasheed, 2000). By selling SIG and buying 
services back, the outsourcing reduced SAS’ involvement in successive 
stages of production, and thus the outsourcing might be viewed as vertical 
disintegration. SAS had estimated a turnover of around Skr 10 billion in the 
five-year period of the outsourcing deal. They had gained a 20% cost reduc-
tion, partly taken up-front as a share price, and partly negotiated through 
lower service prices. SAS had estimated its total IT budget to be decreasing 
year by year for the time period 2004 – 2008. For each year in the deal, SAS 
had committed a level of IT purchase from CSC. The committed level could 
be a composite of different services, defined in the Frame Agreement by 
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service descriptions, levels, and prices, or it could be new projects and ser-
vices as well. By the end of each year all services bought from all the differ-
ent lines of business in SAS were counted. If the total level of services did 
not exceed the committed level, an additional fee was calculated. There 
were, however, several mechanisms regulating what was inside the deal and 
what was outside the deal, and how to transfer services between years. 
This long-term deal allows us to significantly take down costs, while 
benefiting from vendors global expertise. (Client CFO) 
There is no doubt ABB had a very strong focus on reducing IT costs. They 
invited the largest outsourcers in the world to bid for their information tech-
nology infrastructure. The scope was defined and the goal was to obtain 
economies of scale. Neo-classical economic theory suggests that all IT func-
tions, which an external vendor can operate at lower costs than the company, 
should be outsourced. Selecting IBM as vendor, ABB would obtain better 
cost-performance of their IT infrastructure. Whatever service IBM provided 
under the contract, they were committed to provide competitiveness com-
pared to the market. The ABB – IBM contract contained a basic volume for 
each of the ten years. For each year there was an estimate of the number of 
users, and with defined decreasing unit prices. By the agreed upon decrease 
in unit prices, ABB had already pocketed the cost savings. 
3.2.10 Retained skills 
When the initial outsourcing took place, Rolls-Royce kept very few skills in-
house. They realized that was unhelpful, because it created naivety on Rolls-
Royce’s side and created a degree of frustration on the outsourcer side. 
Rolls-Royce had to rebuild a team with very experienced IT outsourcing 
managers. Teams were built around managing the services and the projects, 
and managing the procurement activities. Rolls-Royce found that the best 
way of arriving at a strong relationship with the outsourcer was to have peo-
ple who deeply understood the business; meaning, to be an intelligent buyer 
you need to understand your own business. Rolls-Royce realized that they 
needed to keep knowledge about the business processes and how they were 
built up, which included the applications and their architecture. They had to 
rebuild that knowledge in-house — overall architecture skills, solution archi-
tecture skills, contract management skills, strategic management skills, and 
skills to manage top-down governance. 
Failure to set up retained IT management is probably one of the key 
success crushers. We have a lot of problems with it, and the out-
sourcer does not feel it is on their span of influence, because you can-
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not yet tell the client how you should be managed. It requires a lot of 
trust to do that. (Vendor Account Manager) 
The top management decision of SAS was to sell SIG, and not to touch other 
IT communities in the SAS Group. In this way the transfer of SIG could be 
handled clean and fast. Corporate IT, the CIO’s staff, was a small group of 
people. They had gradually built management capacity, contract manage-
ment skills, and service level management skills. They had the responsibility 
for the Frame Agreements with SIG for several years, being more profes-
sional and market oriented year by year. SAS kept around 300 IT employees 
in the airline businesses, ground handling, and technical services. As an ex-
ample, the common function Airline IT was a competence center focusing 
on airline business applications. They had the necessary resources to manage 
and follow-up services, analyze new requirements, and to purchase from 
CSC. The Airline IT organization had more than 100 employees. This kind 
of common function was not expected to be very numerous in the future. As 
the vendor organization was expected to be more professional, SAS would 
continue to professionalize itself as a buyer of business application services. 
The ABB countries were locally responsible for their country agreements, 
and they had the responsibility for operations management, contract man-
agement, and for their business applications, which were not outsourced. 
ABB kept in-house senior sourcing managers following up the commercial 
and economic sides of the deal, and they also kept operational managers 
following up service levels. Globally there was a small group of people han-
dling the global deal. 
3.2.11 Exit strategies 
Rolls-Royce had an exit strategy, because of the length and size of the con-
tract. These plans already existed, the resources were already identified, and 
the major activities were all in place. In the context of commitment to the 
board, the CIO was the risk owner. He reported up to an overall risk commit-
tee. Directors in the company had the responsibility to identify all major 
risks in the business, and to have plans in place to both contain them when 
they occur and to avoid them happening. Exit strategies were important both 
from a risk perspective and from a performance failure perspective. 
In the SAS – CSC deal there were agreed upon termination clauses which, to 
a certain level, described rules and procedures for termination. In the Transi-
tion Agreement there were identified activities, which should refine the op-
erational description of the parties’ obligations if termination occurs. SAS 
were discussing possible exit scenarios, any they had started to work with an 
exit strategy. 
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The global deal of ABB – IBM had a schedule called Exit Management, 
where termination clauses were defined as the two parties’ rights and obliga-
tions in case of exit. The bottom line of the schedule was the costs of quit-
ting. For each year there were defined costs, sinking as the years go by. If 
several countries used the termination clause, this would release a global 
renegotiation. Beyond the economic clauses of termination, there had not yet 
been developed exit plans. 
3.3 Evaluating the IT outsourcing relationships 
This section will use the analytical framework presented in chapter 2 for 
evaluating the case study IT outsourcing relationships. These different theo-
retical lenses are used to enhance the understanding of the relationships on 
topics such as: high economic benefits, low transaction costs, effective con-
tracts, good principal-agent cooperation, efficient division of labor, devel-
opment of skills and capabilities, access to vendor resources, alliance per-
formance, social and economic exchange, and balancing stakeholder interest. 
Of course the researcher is omnipresent in the description, but the theoretical 
lenses give room for different positions or opinions. 
In this form of writing case studies the focus is on interaction between mul-
tiple voices (Van der Blonk, 2003). The empirical case material is not ap-
proached as a neutral collection of facts, but as an ongoing outcome of the 
interaction between the diverse actors and events. The chapter is, in this 
sense, the result of a complex construction of influences and interpretations, 
and where the researcher’s own voice is not the least important one. 
3.3.1 Production costs reduction 
According to neo-classical economic theory, firms outsource IT to attain cost 
advantages from assumed economies of scale and scope possessed by ven-
dors (Ang & Straub, 1998). Neo-classical economic theory regards every 
business organization as a production function (Williamson, 2000), and 
where their motivation is driven by profit maximization. This means that 
companies offer products and services to the market where they have a cost 
or production advantage. They rely on the marketplace where they have 
disadvantages. According to neo-classical economic theory, companies will 
justify their sourcing strategy based on evaluating possibilities for produc-
tion cost savings. Thus, the question whether to outsource, is a question 
whether the marketplace can produce products and services at a lower price 
than internal production. In the context of IT outsourcing, a company will 
keep its IT function internally if this has production cost advantages, and it 
will outsource when the marketplace can offer production cost savings. 
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In all three cases, an important driver of outsourcing was cost reduction. 
Rolls-Royce was looking for a 10% reduction of costs. In the SAS – CSC 
case it was obvious that IT costs was an important issue. Bidders showed 
that SAS could obtain a 20% cost reduction, benefiting from economies of 
scale by outsourcing IT to an external service provider. There was no doubt 
ABB had a very strong focus on reducing IT costs. They invited the largest 
outsourcers in the world to bid for their information technology infrastruc-
ture. The scope was defined and the goal was to obtain economies of scale. 
As stated by ABB’s CFO: “This long-term deal allows us to significantly 
take down costs, while benefiting from IBM’s global expertise.” (Source: 
press release of July 2003). Client companies reported reduction of costs, 
better cost-performance, economies of scale and scope, compared to internal 
IT function. Selecting global outsourcing vendors, the client companies 
could obtain better cost-performance of their IT functions. 
Principles of neo-classical economic theory were recognized in the decision 
making process of outsourcing. Client companies outsourced their IT func-
tion to gain IT cost savings. The IT function, including IT assets such as 
employees, was nothing but a production function, which an external service 
provider could handle more effectively than the client company. As such, the 
only concern of the client company was costs of services, and they were 
handling responsibility of transferred employees to the vendor company. For 
the purpose of this study we notice that neo-classical economic theory does 
not pay very much attention to the human side of IT outsourcing. 
3.3.2 Transaction cost reduction 
IT outsourcing causes additional costs to occur that are labeled transaction 
costs. Transaction costs occur in the exchange between client and vendor. 
According to transaction cost theory, transaction costs are positively associ-
ated with (1) the necessity of investments in durable, specific assets, (2) 
infrequency of transacting, (3) task complexity and uncertainty, (4) difficulty 
in measuring task performance; and (5) independencies with other transac-
tions. Organizations choose to source via their own hierarchy or via the mar-
ket based on relative costs, which has two components: production costs and 
transactions costs. In every IT outsourcing transactions costs are present in 
terms of effort, time and money incurred in searching, creating, negotiation, 
monitoring, and enforcing service contracts between client and vendor. 
Therefore, transactions costs can erode comparative advantages in produc-
tion costs of vendors.  
Rolls-Royce had no doubt discovered the costs of service and contract man-
agement. By outsourcing, Rolls-Royce had transferred to EDS, physical IT 
assets and almost all resources with IT competencies. What they later realize 
was that they had a problem understanding what the vendor was doing, what 
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technology and what costs were reasonable. Business needs were of course 
developing, and these needs had consequences for technology and costs. 
Rolls-Royce’s contract managers were not able to understand and control the 
development within a complex information technology and business envi-
ronment. And thus, they had to build strong teams around services and pro-
jects, procurement activities, and knowledge about business processes and 
applications. ABB seemed to be aware of the complexity of their global deal, 
and they had got management teams with both operational and sourcing 
expertise locally and globally. Although transaction costs were significant in 
all three cases, production cost differences seemed to be more influential in 
the sourcing decision than transaction cost differences. 
Case studies recognized human capital as a transaction-specific asset. Ven-
dor investments in human and physical assets may have shifted the balance 
of power between the transaction participants. Transplants of IT outsourcing 
may contribute to reduction of uncertainties of the outsourcing arrangement. 
As transplants already know clients infrastructure and systems and how they 
support client business processes, transplants are able to deliver the required 
services although they have a new employer. But transplants may also be 
exposed to vendor opportunism and bounded rationality. As transplants learn 
to know demands and obligations from both client and vendor, it is not 
unlikely they may feel occupational stress. 
3.3.3 Contract completeness 
When entering an IT outsourcing arrangement, vendor and client sign a con-
tract. An outsourcing contract provides a legally bound, institutional frame-
work in which each party’s rights, duties, and responsibilities are codified 
and the goals, policies, and strategies underlying the arrangement are speci-
fied. Every outsourcing contract has the purpose of facilitating exchange and 
preventing opportunism. A complete outsourcing contract reduces uncer-
tainty and risks, but a contract alone is insufficient to guide outsourcing evo-
lution and performance. Luo (2002) argues that contract and cooperation are 
not substitutes, but complements in relation to performance. Since outsourc-
ing involves repeated inter-organizational exchanges that become socially 
embedded over time, cooperation is an important safeguard mechanism 
mitigating external and internal hazards and overcoming adaptive limits of 
contracts. 
The original Rolls-Royce – EDS contract was made a “foot thick,” but still 
they started quarreling. The ABB – IBM outsourcing relationship was based 
on a complex contractual set up, with both global and local agreements, and 
complex linkages between them. Although they had tried to cover “every-
thing,” contractual completeness was Utopia. For example in Norway there 
had been more than 80 contractual changes or supplements within the first 
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year of the deal. Because of environmental dynamism, contract and contract 
governance also had to be dynamic. ABB and IBM had recognized the need 
to manage the relationship professionally, and a relationship alignment pro-
ject was the enabler for supporting the contractual and commercial relation-
ship between the two parties. SAS and CSC had a professional attitude de-
veloping the outsourcing contract. A skilled team from SAS met a special 
European business development team from CSC. The contract was more 
complex and comprehensive than any previous deal between SAS and SIG. 
Despite this, the steering committee with representatives from both parties of 
the relationship had several times been forced to handle disagreements re-
garding interpretation of contractual terms. 
Transfer of physical and human assets from client to vendor was a part of the 
outsourcing relationships studied. Typically, the outsourcing contracts were 
outcome based, specifying service levels of infrastructure and information 
systems. The contracts were set up to take care of the transactions between 
the parties (sales and lease back). Human assets were typically IT employees 
transferred from client to vendor, and which continued to deliver services 
back to their prior employer. Transplants were an important part of the sale 
of assets agreement, but they were only an indirect part of the lease back 
agreement. Transplants became “invisible” as behavioral aspects were left 
out of the contract. As such, an incomplete contract may bring about ambi-
guity and raise the likelihood of conflict, which in turn will decrease the 
outsourcing performance. 
3.3.4 Vendor behavioral control 
In an outsourcing relationship, the cooperating parties engage in an agency 
relationship defined as a contract under which one organization (the princi-
pal) engages another organization (the agent) to perform some service on its 
behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the 
agent. Agency theory describes the relationship between the two parties. 
According to Eisenhardt (1985), agency theory is concerned with resolving 
two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first is the agency 
problem that arises when the desires or goals of the principal and agent con-
flict, and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent 
is actually doing. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when 
the principal and agent have different risk preferences (Gonzales, Gasco, & 
Liopis, 2005). These problems are well known in IT outsourcing. An exam-
ple might be that the client organization wants to reduce its costs, while the 
vendor organization wants to maximize profits. 
The initial outsourcing contract between Rolls-Royce and EDS had a lack of 
transparency, which was a potential for mistrust. When something was going 
wrong the contract played an important role. The contract was reviewed in 
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2000, and the parties were putting a new long-term arrangement in place and 
built a pretty close relationship. A high degree of transparency of difficulties 
like finance, should remove mistrust. In both cases ABB – IBM and SAS – 
CSC, the parties agreed upon the service levels and their prices. As outsourc-
ing contracts were outcome based, client companies were not intended to do 
behavioral control of vendors or their IT employees 
Before outsourcing, from a principal-agent perspective, client organization 
was principal and transplants served as agents in the same organization. Af-
ter the outsourcing, relationships changed. Transplants were no longer agents 
of the client organization, but they became agents of a new principal, the 
vendor organization. The vendor organization contracted its services to cli-
ent organization and operated as an agent of the client organization. Trans-
plants became contractors to the client organization, and they were only 
indirectly agents of their former employer. As such, transplants of IT out-
sourcing must adopt new attitudes towards their previous principal (client 
organization), their new principal (vendor organization), and towards the 
outsourcing arrangement (where they serve as contractor). 
Ho et al. (2003) examined client managerial attitudes and expectations to-
ward transplants in IT spin-off arrangements. Specifically, they focused on 
the phenomenon of persistent client managerial expectations by exploring 
the conditions under which client managerial expectations persist and the 
effect on client managerial evaluation of transplant performance. They posit 
that client managers will expect former subordinates to perform their duties 
and contribute much as they did in the past, even though these duties and 
responsibilities may not be included in the new outsourcing contractual ar-
rangement. 
3.3.5 Demarcation of labor 
Firm boundaries — defined as the scope of revenue-sharing arrangements 
across individuals — reflect trade-offs associated with referral problems, 
which are problems of matching economic opportunities to individuals’ effi-
ciency (Garicano & Hubbard, 2003). A large theoretical literature focuses on 
the question, “What determines firms’ boundaries?” In our case of IT out-
sourcing, firms’ boundaries are determined by the extent to which there are 
large markets for specialization. If there are large markets for IT services 
available from vendors, then a client company will tend to outsource more of 
its internal IT function. 
In the case of SAS, one of the arguments for outsourcing was that the inter-
nal IT Group had better development opportunities for their professional 
careers at an outsourcer. During the transformation program, employees 
were replaced according to their competencies. In the case of ABB, IT em-
 59
ployees were transferred into IBM according to their competencies. Out-
sourcing information technology infrastructure and the people operating it, 
ABB and IBM obtained a clear and unambiguous division of labor. The idea 
was that individuals transferred to IBM would increase their efficiency 
through specialization, and this would benefit ABB through cost reduction. 
EDS stated that the ability to take over people, keeping some of them at the 
account, and giving others the opportunity to move elsewhere (specialize), is 
the number one risk of an outsourcer. 
One of the oldest ideas in economics is that returns to specialization increase 
with market size. If there are large markets for IT services available from 
vendors, then a client company will tend to outsource more of its internal IT 
function. In our case of IT outsourcing, firms' boundaries were determined 
by the extent to which there were large markets for specialization. As IT 
workers get transferred to vendors they have an opportunity to become even 
more specialized, working for an IT service provider. 
3.3.6 Core competence management 
After outsourcing, the client organization will typically focus on and 
strengthen its core competencies. Core competencies can be defined as the 
skills that are the determinant resources for a firm’s competitive advantage. 
Quinn (1999) argues that core competencies are not products or “those 
things we do relatively well.” They are the set of skills and systems that a 
company does at best-in-the-world levels and through which a company 
creates uniquely high value for customers. According to the theory of core 
competencies, developing best-in-the-world capabilities is crucial in design-
ing a core competency strategy. Long-term advantage will depend on identi-
fying the next unique combination no one else is exploiting in the market-
place; however, sustainable competitive advantage is strongest if tied to 
firm-specific capabilities.  
In case studies, production cost reduction was not the only reasons for out-
sourcing. New business strategies and restructuring of client companies were 
also important drivers. ABB was restructuring around two core business 
areas, and SAS admitted that information technology was not at the core of 
the airliner. Core competencies theory suggests activities which are none-
core should be considered for outsourcing with best-in-the-world suppliers. 
ABB’s and SAS’ outsourcing vendors, IBM and CSC respectively, are large 
IT service companies with information technology and systems as their core 
competence. Client managers interviewed in case studies expected their ven-
dor organizations to influence transplants’ work outcome. They expected 
transplants to become more professional service providers. 
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According to Levina and Ross (2003), client and vendor should develop 
complementary core competencies. A vendor's efficiency is based on the 
economic benefits derived from the ability to develop a complementary set 
of core competencies. This ability, in turn, is based on the centralization of 
decision rights, and shared with clients through formal and informal relation-
ship management structures. An outsourcing vendor must develop different 
competencies, as suggested by Levina and Ross: IT personnel development, 
methodology development and dissemination, and customer relationship 
management. As such, the role of transplants may change as they get trans-
ferred from client to vendor. 
3.3.7 Vendor resource exploitation 
With resource-based theory, organizations are viewed as a collection of re-
sources that are heterogeneously distributed within and across industries. 
The value generation potential from vendor resources can be significant for 
the client. If the vendor has strategic resources, applications of these re-
sources for the client can provide the client organization with sustained com-
petitive advantage. Strategic resources are characterized by being valuable, 
rare, non-imitable, non-transferable, non-substitutable, combinable, and ex-
ploitable (Barney, 2002) . 
The ability to handle technological change was reported as a major issue for 
outsourcing, as both Rolls-Royce and SAS had a challenge, handling cost 
reduction and new technologies at the same time. According to resource-
based theory, outsourcing is a strategic decision that can be used to fill gaps 
in the firm’s IS resources and capabilities. In the case of Rolls-Royce and 
SAS, there was a difference between desired capabilities and actual capabili-
ties. Both companies needed external resources to implement the required 
technological changes.  
But the transplants also represented an important resource in the outsourcing 
arrangements. A unique combination of transplants, infrastructure and sys-
tems, were required to secure the delivery of services from vendor back to 
client company. In the short-term, the vendor company needed the trans-
plants to do infrastructure operation and management, and systems devel-
opment and support. For the client company, the transplants served as a 
safeguard for the delivery of services. And thus, transplants work outcome 
affects the success of the relationship. 
Interesting to notice, the transforming of Rolls-Royce from a manufacturing 
oriented company to a service oriented company, seemed to be a part of the 
plan. According to Linder (2004), vendor resources can be brought to the 
organization to facilitate rapid organizational change, which might be impor-
tant for long-term survival of the client. In this specific case of Rolls-Royce, 
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the vendor’s ability to do change agentry was an important criterion for ven-
dor selection. EDS were engaged for IS/IT outsourcing and for transforma-
tional outsourcing. 
3.3.8 Alliance exploitation 
Partnership, often referred to as an alliance, has frequently been noted as a 
major feature of IT outsourcing. Alliances are broadly defined as collabora-
tive efforts between two or more firms in which the firms cooperate in an 
effort to achieve mutually compatible goals that they could not achieve eas-
ily alone (Koh et al., 2004).  
The outsourcing arrangement studied was based on tightly defined contracts, 
and where the main goals were not necessarily shared. For example, ABB 
had a contract that locked in their cost savings. IBM, on their side, had to 
balance profit with customer satisfaction, and internal business control. The 
IT outsourcing relationship seemed to be an arm's length cooperative rela-
tionship, rather than one of strategic partnership. ABB needs IBM to provide 
the IT infrastructure service; IBM needs ABB to pay the fee. While it is clear 
that these goals are not shared, each party has a vested interest in the other’s 
success. This type of cooperative relationships manifests itself when goals 
are complementary, and when each party needs something from the other 
party to succeed (Lacity & Willcocks, 2000a). 
According to Lambe et al. (2002), competence in finding, developing, and 
managing alliances is recognized as important to alliance success. This will 
also apply for an IT outsourcing relationship. Relationship managers are 
higher order resources, who must develop their understanding of how to 
facilitate the combining of the distinct lower order complementary resources 
contributed by the outsourcing parties. Transplants of IT outsourcing had 
competencies which client organization no longer posited. IT assets were 
transferred from client to vendor organization, and transplants had unique 
skills and know-how to operate, maintain, and support information technol-
ogy and systems service delivery back to the client organization. As a result 
of the outsourcing arrangement, the client organization no longer had these 
competencies in-house. Thus, it is reasonable to state that transplants con-
tribute to distinctive client — vendor complementary resources. Transplants’ 
competencies may be considered as vital for service delivery in the outsourc-
ing arrangement, especially in the first phase after contract signing. For the 
client organization, transplants may contribute to reduction of uncertainty 
and improve the communication between vendor and client organization. For 
the vendor organization, transplants may secure the ability to fulfill contract 
agreements. 
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3.3.9 Relationship exploitation 
According to relational exchange theory, a partnership is dependent on rela-
tional norms. Norms are expectations about behavior that are at least par-
tially shared by a group of decision makers. Norms are important in rela-
tional exchange because they provide the governance rules of the game. 
Relational norms are based on the expectation of mutuality of interest, essen-
tially prescribing stewardship behavior, and are designed to enhance the 
wellbeing of the relationship as a whole (Lambe et al., 2000). Kern and Blois 
(2002) have studied norm development in a major IT outsourcing relation-
ship. Their findings suggest: 1) where unusual organizational structure is 
proposed, management must recognize the possibility that norms dominant 
within the constituent organizations will not necessarily be compatible, 2) 
where norms are not compatible the action must be taken through changing 
management schemes in order to develop appropriate norms, and 3) the de-
velopment and initialization of new norms takes time. Norm development 
becomes more salient as the relationship matures. 
The relationship alignment project of ABB and IBM is one example of de-
velopment of new norms. The project was seen as a key success factor to 
create and maintain a good working relationship between the two parties. 
The objective of the project was (among others) to create a framework to 
manage the natural tension between both parties, to find an agreement on a 
vision of how the parties needed to work together, to build a strong working 
relationship between the teams in the various countries, to build and commit 
to an appropriate strategic relationship structure and enabling mechanisms, 
to support a group-wide collaborative approach, to review and refine roles & 
responsibilities, and to align across all countries. 
Businesses recognize the impossibility of a contract meeting every eventual-
ity so that there is a need for adaptability within a contract and the comple-
tion of a contract is frequently dependent upon workers being able to take up 
a lot of the uncertainty. Both the normal economic models of a market trans-
action and the legal model of a contract tend to obscure the degree to which 
large numbers of contracts are agreements to deliver an indefinite good or 
service for an indefinite price. Without such willingness to be adaptable 
many business relationships would grind rapidly and regularly to a halt. 
Norms are in a sense the lubricants that keep relationships from being sty-
mied by their contractual terms (Kern & Blois, 2002). In case studies, out-
sourcing contracts were outcome based, measuring agreed upon levels of 
specified services for an agreed upon price. Transplants of IT outsourcing 
were the contractors to deliver the services. They were the employees ulti-
mately faced with uncertainty of indefinite services. Developing and secur-
ing relational norms will guide transplants with regard to how to behave if 
and when exchange issues occur. Prescribed behavior shared by the parties 
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will reduce transplants’ uncertainty of their new role. And thus, relational 
norm will supplement the outcome-based contractual agreements and benefit 
the relationship as a whole. 
3.3.10 Social exchange exploitation 
Social exchange theory assumes self-interested actors who transact with 
other self-interested actors to accomplish individual goals that they cannot 
achieve alone. Self-interest and interdependence are central properties of 
social exchange. Two or more actors, each of whom has something of value 
to the other, decide whether to exchange and in what amounts. Thus, a criti-
cal success factor becomes the enabling of social and economic outcomes 
that outperform alternatives. This applies both at individual level and inter-
organizational level. Outsourcing may have a negative impact on employees' 
sense of job security and loyalty. Barthélemy (2003b) defined overlooking 
personnel issues as a deadly sin of outsourcing. Meaning, there is more to 
outsourcing than transferring people and renegotiating their pay and benefits. 
Transplants of IT outsourcing not only change employer, but as a result their 
social network and outcome may also change. 
3.3.11 Stakeholder management 
The following stakeholder theory recommendations for successful IT out-
sourcing relationships are meant to create efficient and effective communica-
tion with and between stakeholders to secure continued support from all 
stakeholders, to balance their interests and to make the IT outsourcing ar-
rangement such that all stakeholders achieve their goals. During the case 
studies several stakeholder groups were identified — client senior manage-
ment, client business management, client retained IT management, client IT 
users, transferred IT employees (transplants), vendor senior management, 
vendor account management, and vendor IT employees — each group with 
its own expectations and goals.  
• Client senior management was driven by the overall financial goals 
of their companies, and typically their main interest was to gain eco-
nomic benefits from the outsourcing. As contracts were signed, sen-
ior managers lost their interest in the outsourcing relationship.  
• Client business management was constantly seeking more efficient 
IT services. They expected better service quality at lower prices, and 
a professional client-vendor relationship. Business managers also 
expected the vendor to be innovative, coming up with new solutions. 
After all, vendor was a world-class outsourcing company. 
• Client retained IT management initially expected the same service 
levels and the same accessibility to their service provider as prior to 
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outsourcing. Their experience was however a more formal and 
commercial relationship. Running an IT outsourcer was very differ-
ent from running an internal IT department, different in terms of 
skills and emphasis. Senior project executives, sourcing managers, 
and operations managers were first of all responsible for systems 
and infrastructure service delivery, and to secure commercial and 
contractual agreements. 
• Client IT users typically expected better IT services. But very soon 
they realized that a professional service provider required a more 
formalistic interaction. Taking away a lot of legacy and non-
standard IT from the users, the outsourcer had to be careful not to 
make a bad name for itself.  
• IT employees transferred from client to vendor (transplants) repre-
sented a huge group in all three cases. First they were doing business 
as usual, but after some time they got redeployed into competencies 
and they got new colleagues. The transition of employees from the 
internal IT department to the global business of the outsourcer was 
an important issue, as some employees liked it and others did not. 
Some looked forward to work as an IT professional within an or-
ganization where IT was core competence. 
• Vendor senior management was driven by growth and profit expec-
tations. Thus, the initial analysis up-front (due-diligence) was fun-
damental. Their investments in such deals were huge, and their 
number one priority was on safeguarding their investments.  
• Vendor account management had to balance profit, customer satis-
faction, and business control procedures. 
• Vendor IT employees were those people doing the job (sometimes 
called factory or delivery unit). Their mission was to deliver agreed 
upon service levels, neither more, nor less. To some extent they 
were involved up-front to see how easy the transferred IT depart-
ment could be built into their own factory.  
• Third party suppliers had more or less no influence in the process. 
Some of them regarded the outsourcing as a threat because it re-
duced their turnover; others saw it as an opportunity as they got 
more sales. Regardless of that, they had to spend time transferring 
leases and licences from one company to the other.  
Some other stakeholder groups were also identified, such as vendor transi-
tion groups, labor unions, and even client customers. In one organization, a 
vendor transition group was established having a standardize process for 
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transition, and they were HR oriented types of people. Labor unions were 
representatives for the IT employees, but they also represented a power base 
in themselves, which they would like to maintain. Client customers were 
also mentioned as a stakeholder group. Although they could not influence 
the process, some of the consequences might hit them. 
These stakeholder groups are different from those identified by Lacity and 
Willcocks (2000a) at one important point: interviewees recognize and em-
phasized the important group of transplants. In all three cases the transplant 
group counted more than 1000 people. Transplants were not recognized in 
the study of Lacity and Willcocks (2000a). Another interesting observation 
was that the interviewees seemed to be aware of other stakeholders’ expecta-
tions and goals. Transplants were a necessary precondition for the success of 
the deal. And thus, their contribution must be seen in the light of costs and 
risks. This requires efficient and effective communication with and between 
stakeholders. Neglecting the moral principles that underlie stakeholder the-
ory, vendor companies will have less satisfied transplants, and transplants 
will show performance that is consistently below industry average. Vendor 
(and client) organizations have responsibilities to transplants for moral rea-
sons. Upholding moral principles is a necessary precondition for transplants’ 
efficient working. 
3.4 Summary and recommendations for confirmatory research 
This chapter presented and discussed three paradigmatic case studies that 
broadly span the most common outsourcing arrangements in today’s indus-
try. They were conducted to investigated the outsourcing relationship, its 
development, and configuration, and investigated how individuals affect or 
get affected by the relationship. The rich qualitative data illustrated the com-
plexities inherent to relationship management, revealing in particular the 
difficulties different stakeholders encountered. 
3.4.1 Summary of findings 
The three international based outsourcing cases studied in this research fol-
lowed two guiding research questions, an interview protocol was designed 
and handed out before the interviews, and the analysis of each case focused 
essentially on transcripts of interviews. Regarding scientific generalization, 
the aim of the case studies was twofold: 1) to identify characteristics influ-
encing and creating successful IT outsourcing relationships, and 2) to iden-
tify individual level attitude, behavior, and performance. The purpose of the 
qualitative phase of research was to obtain a richer description and under-
standing not only of how to manage successful IT outsourcing relationships, 
but also more specifically about individual level (transplant’s) role stress, the 
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organizational context in which it occurs, and the consequences of role 
stress.  
Two major themes emerged from the qualitative study. First, stakeholders 
interviewed emphasized the following issues as important in managing suc-
cessful IT outsourcing relationships: clear enter strategies; relationship 
building activities important after contract signing; specialist resources 
needed for contract development and management; ability to handle transfer 
of IT employees is critical; establishment of new governance structures; the 
economy of outsourcing is not only production cost reduction; client skills 
have to be rebuilt to handle the outsourcer, establishment of exit strategies 
serve as a safeguard making the client able to handle difficult situations.  
And second, stakeholders emphasized the unique position of the transplants. 
Occupational stress was recognized among transplants. That is, transplants 
perceived different expectations and demands from stakeholders they dealt 
with. The outsourcing arrangement stressors identified were such as client 
managerial persistent expectations, relational norms, and complementary 
core competencies. These stressors will be discussed in more detail in next 
chapters. Transplants interviewed reported different attitudes, behavior and 
task performance, and also different perception of occupational stress. 
3.4.2 Judging the quality of the case studies 
By the use of the conceptual model (as developed in chapter 2, Table 2.1) as 
a heuristic tool, a number of insightful pointers were elucidated, allowing the 
researcher to focus on particular elements of managing the relationship. 
These further demonstrate that the framework provides a good basis upon 
which to explore the outsourcing relationship. The analysis also identified 
the existence of a need to further investigate transplants’ role stress. Based 
on Yin (2003, p. 34), the following tests should be conducted to judge the 
quality of the study: 
• Construct validity: establishing correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied. As the case studies were of exploratory na-
ture, no operational measures were established. Despite this, the 
concepts were studied in three independent outsourcing relation-
ships. For each single case study, a draft report was written and re-
viewed by key informants at each side of the relationship. From a 
methodological viewpoint, the corrections made through this process 
enhanced the accuracy of the case study, hence increasing the con-
struct validity of the study. The cross case analysis presented in this 
chapter was based on single case study reports. 
• Internal validity: establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain 
conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished 
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from spurious relationships. During the exploratory case studies, the 
researcher was not concerned with making causal claims. Based on 
interviews and (to some extent) documentary evidence collected as 
part of the case study, the researcher “infers” that a transplant’s per-
ceived role stress resulted from factors in the outsourcing arrange-
ment. And in turn, the researcher “infers” that a transplant’s role 
stress resulted in lower task performance. But are the inferences cor-
rect? This is what is to be analyzed further in the next phase of re-
search. 
• External validity: establishing the domain to which the study’s find-
ings can be generalized. Using three independent case studies, the 
researcher has shown that the results are applicable to another 
neighborhood. Although no statistical generalization can be made, 
the researcher has tried to show analytical generalization. For exam-
ple, a theory of transplants’ role stress caused by the outsourcing ar-
rangement was tested by replicating the findings in a second and a 
third case. The same results occurred, which indicated support for 
the theory.  
• Reliability: demonstrating that the operations of a study, such as the 
data collection procedures, can be repeated with the same results. 
The researcher has documented the procedures followed such that 
other researchers can repeat the work. The case study protocol is 
documented in Appendix B and C. Thus, it is possible for others to 
repeat the researcher’s procedures. 
These four tests are considered relevant for judging the quality of a research 
design. For the exploratory part of this research, not all of them were ful-
filled. Therefore, confirmatory research was needed to further investigate 
transplants’ role stress and task performance in IT outsourcing relationships. 
In the next chapter hypotheses and research models are developed, followed 
by a methodological description of the survey. 
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4. Theory development and hypotheses 
While exploring the transfer of IT workers from client to vendor organiza-
tions as an important issue of the outsourcing arrangement in previous chap-
ter, this chapter will elaborate on individual level effects of outsourcing. As 
a consequence of outsourcing, this chapter proposes that transplants are 
likely to be exposed to occupational stress. Occupational stress will bring 
about ambiguity and raise the likelihood of conflict, which in turn will de-
crease the outsourcing performance. Hypotheses of role stress among trans-
plants in IT outsourcing arrangements are elaborated.  
In the first section, definitions and research from role theory are applied to 
the phenomenon of interest. In the second and third section, hypotheses of 
the influence of role stressors and environmental characteristics are pro-
posed, respectively. Finally in this chapter, the last section synthesizes the 
research model.  
4.1 Transplants’ role stress 
From the discipline of psychology researchers have found that the cost of 
unmanaged stress is nothing less than an increased risk of morbidity and 
mortality (Siegrist, 1998), and occupational stress represents a real threat to 
quality of life for employees (Danna & Griffin, 1999). Moreover, stress in 
the workplace represents a potential loss of talent for organizations as top 
performers disengage from work where occupational stress, its causes, 
symptoms and sequelae are prevalent (Cartwright, 2000). Interesting to no-
tice, there has been very little outsourcing research at an individual level. 
Exploratory case studies, described in previous chapter, were indicating the 
existence of role stress among transplants of IT outsourcing.  
Selye (1964) used the term “stress” to describe a set of physical and psycho-
logical responses to adverse conditions or influences. The term “stressor” 
was used to describe the external force or influencing act on the individual 
and “stress” to denote the resulting reaction. The influence of different role 
stressors on work outcomes is supported conceptually by the role episode 
model of Kahn and colleagues (1964), who suggest that (1) boundary span-
ners interact with different role senders in many episodes to obtain informa-
tion, direction, and assistance; (2) role sender demands and expectations take 
the form of perceived stressors when an employee believes that there is con-
flict (e.g., among demands) and ambiguity (e.g., about expectations); (3) 
perceived stressors are influenced by a person’s psychological, dispositional, 
and sociological characteristics; and (4) persistent stressors are likely to 
overwhelm the person’s resources and thereby have a dysfunctional impact 
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on his or her behavioral and psychological job outcomes, e.g., task perform-
ance.  
In this research, transplants of IT outsourcing are boundary spanners, inter-
acting with different role senders, e.g., client managers, client IT users, ven-
dor managers, and co-workers. As these role senders have very different 
positions in the outsourcing arrangement they are likely to have very differ-
ent demands and expectations, which may stress the transplanted IT employ-
ees. Transplants might perceive role conflict as a consequence of different 
demands or role ambiguity as a consequence of different expectations. 
Transplants’ perceived role stress is proposed to have dysfunctional impact 
on their task performance. 
The potential negative effect of role stress has been recognized for some 
time. Research conducted by Rizzo, House, and Lirtzmann (1970), among 
others, suggests role ambiguity, and role conflict as linear negative antece-
dents to organizational outcomes. Role theory states that, when the behavior 
expected of an individual is inconsistent — one kind of role conflict — 
he/she will experience stress, become dissatisfied, and perform less effec-
tively than if the expectations imposed on him/her did not conflict. Role 
conflict can therefore be seen as resulting from violation of the two classical 
principles and causing decreased individual satisfaction and decreased or-
ganizational effectiveness (Rizzo et al., 1970). Likewise, role theory states 
that role ambiguity — lack of the necessary information available to a given 
organizational position — will result in coping behavior by the role incum-
bent, which may take the form of attempts to solve the problem to avoid the 
sources of stress, or to use defense mechanisms which distort the reality of 
the situation. Thus, according to role theory, ambiguity should increase the 
probability that a person will be dissatisfied with his role, will experience 
anxiety, will distort his role, and will thus perform less effectively (Rizzo et 
al., 1970). 
In this research, role stress is used as a proxy for transplant perceived pres-
sure in his/her new role at the vendor organization. The two concepts of role 
conflict and role ambiguity emerged as separate dimensions in previous re-
search. These two facets of role stress are used as antecedents to the trans-
plant’s task performance. For the purpose of consistency, this research will 
use “stressors” to denote the external force or situation acting on the individ-
ual, and “stress” will denote the deformation or changes produced in the 
individual as a result of those forces. This research will contribute to con-
temporary role research by examining the influence of individual level role 
stress on the basis of task performance in IT outsourcing arrangements. 
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4.2 Influence of role stress on task performance 
Empirical research in the discipline of marketing has examined the effects of 
role stressors on a salesperson’s job outcomes. Conventionally, the linear 
influence of role stressors on performance has been examined (e.g., Yam-
marino & Dubinsky, 1990; Teas, 1983; Michaels, Day, & Joachimsthaler, 
1987), finding support for a dysfunctional view that role stressors have sig-
nificant dysfunctional (negative) effects on job performance. Lately, poten-
tial nonlinearities have also been investigated, both curvilinear (e.g., Singh, 
1998; Nygaard & Dahlstrom, 2002) and interactional effects (e.g., Singh, 
1998). However, these researchers haven’t yet come to a clear conclusion, 
neither has this type of research been conducted in the field of IS manage-
ment. 
As encountered in case studies, transplants of IT outsourcing are affected by 
a variety of environmental stimuli from different sources, and with different 
timing and desirability. The transplant’s perception of environmental stress-
ors influences his/her experience of role stress, which in turn leads to behav-
ioral, physical and/or psychological outcomes. Transplants (and others) in-
terviewed in case studies were indicating occupational stress. They were 
talking about a situation of changing employer, a change which they hadn’t 
even been able to influence. Some of them had worked for their previous 
employer for years. They had their career there, colleagues, and even friends 
there, and they knew for sure business process and how information technol-
ogy and systems supported the business process. At their new employer they 
had got new managers, new colleagues, and new business rules. In addition, 
the outsourcing relationship raised several issues regarding costs, resources, 
and partnership which strongly influenced their new role. Some transplants 
interviewed were not very happy being transferred, while others saw the 
outsourcing arrangements as an opportunity. As such, transplants may per-
ceive these stressors individually, affecting the level of role stress experi-
enced by the individual. The perception of stressors is the interface of envi-
ronmental stimuli and the individual’s way of understanding (Fevre, 
Matheny, & Kolt, 2003). Some employees may perceive stressors as good 
stress and some may perceive them as bad stress. Applying these general 
evidences, this research suggests that a transplant’s perceived role stress has 
a negative, linear, and dysfunctional relationship with his/her task perform-
ance. 
Hypothesis 1a: Transplant’s perceived role conflict is nega-
tively related to task performance. 
Hypothesis 1b: Transplant’s perceived role ambiguity is 
negatively related to task performance. 
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4.3 Outsourcing characteristics as antecedents to role stress 
In this section three outsourcing characteristics — complementary core 
competencies, client managerial persistent expectation, and relational norms 
— are proposed as environmental stressors influencing a transplant’s percep-
tion of role stress. These three stressors are discussed below in hypothesis 2, 
3, and 4, respectively. 
4.3.1 Complementary core competencies 
Researchers have used a variety of different terms to talk about a firm’s re-
sources, including competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), skills (Grant, 
1991), capabilities (Van der Heijden, 2001), and assets (Ross, Beth, & 
Goodhue, 1996). In this research we define complementary core competen-
cies as the degree to which firms are able to eliminate deficiencies in each 
other’s portfolio of resources by supplying distinct capabilities, knowledge, 
and other entities (Lambe et al., 2002). By this, client and vendor enhance 
each other’s ability to achieve business goals. According to Quinn and Hil-
mer (1994), companies can substantially leverage their resources by devel-
oping a few well-selected core competencies of significance to customers, 
focusing investment and management attention on them, and strategically 
outsource many other activities.  
Levina and Ross (2003) have studied one long-term successful applications 
management outsourcing arrangement. They suggest that the vendor’s effi-
ciency is based on the economic benefits derived from the ability to develop 
a complementary set of core competencies. Their study indicates that an IT 
application management vendor can deliver value to its clients by develop-
ing a set of experienced based core competencies that (1) address client 
needs and markets conditions, (2) exhibit complementarities that result in 
efficient service delivery, and (3) depend on the vendor’s control over, and 
centralization of, decision rights on a large number of projects from multiple 
clients. This ability, to develop a complementary set of core competencies, is 
shared with clients through formal and informal relationship management 
structures. 
As a consequence of outsourcing, transplants got transferred to the vendor 
company, a company which define IS/IT competencies as their core compe-
tencies. This new organization of work and delivery of value, with comple-
mentary core competencies, is proposed to have a positive effect on organ-
izational work performance. Vendor organizations can pay attention to what 
they are best at, i.e. the sets of skills and capabilities that create high value 
services for client organizations.  
But complementary core competencies may affect individual level work 
outcome as well. As transplants previously worked for the client company, 
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they know which are the client’s core competencies and skills, and which are 
not. They also know the core competencies of their new employer, the ven-
dor organization. As transplants perceive the two parties of the relationship 
as being able to eliminate deficiencies in each other’s portfolio of resources, 
this may contribute to a reduction of a transplant’s perceived role stress. 
Expectations among different stakeholder are harmonized according to the 
new organization of work, and thus reducing a transplant’s role conflict. The 
given organization of competencies is clear and understood among the 
stakeholders, thus reducing a transplants role ambiguity. And thus it is pro-
posed,  
Hypothesis 2a: Complementary core competencies are nega-
tively related to transplant’s role conflict. 
Hypothesis 2b: Complementary core competencies are nega-
tively related to transplant’s role ambiguity. 
Demarcation of labor, in line with client and vendor companies’ core compe-
tencies, will reduce transplants’ perception of role stress, and in turn increase 
their task performance. But there may be an alternative explanation. IT em-
ployees are replaced according to their competencies. As they got transferred 
from client to vendor, transplants got the opportunity to specialize, and thus 
improve their efficiency. Thus a direct relationship is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2c: Complementary core competencies are posi-
tively related to transplant’s task performance.  
4.3.2 Client managerial persistent expectations 
Belief perseverance describes the tendency for prior beliefs and expectations 
to persevere, even in the face of new data or when the data that generated 
those beliefs and expectations are no longer valid (Anderson & Kellam, 
1992). Applied to the IT outsourcing context, these socio-psychological find-
ings lend weight to the notion that client managers do not change their old 
schemas and expectations regarding former subordinates, even though the 
managers may recognize that these ex-subordinates are no longer officially 
under their jurisdiction but are under the supervision of another organization.  
According to Ho, Ang and Straub (2003), client managers found it both dif-
ficult and awkward to manage former subordinates as external contractors. 
In their research Ho et al. (2003) found a positive relationship between client 
managers’ persistence of expectations and their perceived performance of IT 
outsourcers. The researchers offer two alternative explanations for the posi-
tive relationship. First, client managers’ perceptions are influenced by prior 
expectations; people construct their perceptions to be aligned with their prior 
expectations. The second alternative explanation lies in the research on be-
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havioral confirmation. It was found that people’s expectations have an effect 
on their own behavior, which in turn elicits expectation congruent behavior 
in others.  
From their prior experience in supervising the transplants (as subordinates), 
client managers have developed clear expectations about what the trans-
plants should provide to the organization, such as a requisite level of work, 
effort, and commitment. Evidence from social psychology suggests that ex-
pectations and beliefs are not readily subject to change, even in the face of 
disconfirming evidence. Hence, if prior expectations persist into the IT out-
sourcing relationship, client managers would tend to think of these trans-
plants as if they still were subordinates, imposing on them role expectations 
that are not appropriate under the new contractual relationship. Likely, ven-
dor managers are also imposing on them role expectations. And thus client 
managerial persistent demands and expectations may take the form of per-
ceived stressors, when a transplant believes there is role conflict and ambi-
guity. 
Hypothesis 3a: Client managerial persistent expectations are 
positively related to transplant’s role conflict. 
Hypothesis 3b: Client managerial persistent expectations are 
positively related to transplant’s role ambiguity. 
Client managerial persistent expectations will increase transplants’ percep-
tion of role stress, and in turn decrease their task performance. An alternative 
explanation lies in the line of behavioral confirmation. Client managers’ 
expectations have an effect on their own behavior, which in turn elicits ex-
pectation congruent behavior in transplants; meaning, transplants who ex-
perience persistent client manager expectation will deliver according to cli-
ent manager expectations. Thus, a direct effect is proposed: 
Hypothesis 3c: Client managerial persistent expectations are 
positively related to transplant’s task performance. 
4.3.3 Relational norms 
The potential beneficial effect of relational norms has been recognized for 
some time. Research conducted by Heide and John (1992); Artz & Brush 
(2000), among others, suggests that as relational norms become more preva-
lent, we will observe the following three behaviors: co-operation will replace 
competition as the norm, opportunistic behavior will decline, and relation-
ship adaptability will increase. It has been proposed that relational norms are 
a higher order construct consisting of three dimensions (Heide & John, 
1992). First is flexibility, which defines a bilateral expectation of the will-
ingness to make adaptations as circumstances change. Second is information 
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exchange, which defines a bilateral expectation that parties will proactively 
provide information useful to the partner. Third is solidarity, which defines a 
bilateral expectation that a high value is placed on the relationship, and pre-
scribes behaviors directed specifically towards relationship maintenance.  
As transplants previously were a part of a client organization, and now are a 
part of a vendor organization, they get affected by two different corporate 
cultures and different types of work behavior. Due to history, both parties 
might serve as role senders, imposing on transplants different demands and 
expectations. Creating and maintaining relational norms for the outsourcing 
relationship might reduce the probability of inconsistent expectations. Rela-
tional norms prescribe stewardship behavior among parties. Although rela-
tional norms are designed to enhance the wellbeing of the relationship as a 
whole, such norms may as well serve as a role sender reducing transplants’ 
perceived role ambiguity and conflict. Thus it is proposed:  
Hypothesis 4a: Relational norms are negatively related to 
transplant’s role conflict. 
Hypothesis 4b: Relational norms are negatively related to 
transplant’s role ambiguity. 
The existence of relational norms will decrease a transplant’s perception of 
role stress, and in turn increase his/her task performance. Another alternative 
explanation exists. Transplants of IT outsourcing experience several 
changes, e.g., organizational, personal relationships, and work practice. 
From a transplant’s perspective, flexibility represents insurance that change 
of work practice will be subject to good-faith. Information exchange repre-
sents a safeguard to the transplant in the sense that both client and vendor 
managers can be expected to provide him/her with all necessary information 
to do a good job. As solidarity prescribes behavior directed specifically to-
ward relationship maintenance, it represents a safeguard to the transplants 
because it deters both client and vendor from using decision control in a way 
that would be detrimental. As norms serve as a general protective device 
against deviant behavior, a particular property is their prescription of behav-
iors promoting the goals of the individual parties. Client managers, vendor 
managers, and transplants’ behavior are prescribed. Hence, we propose that 
the presence of normative structures will increase transplants’ work out-
come. 
Hypothesis 4c: Relational norms are positively related to trans-
plant’s task performance. 
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4.4 Synthesizing the research model 
The research model examined in the next phase of research is depicted in 
Figure 4.1. In this model, IT outsourcing environmental characteristics are 
specified as exogenous variables, and role stress and task performance are 
specified as endogenous variables. The hypothesized relationships among 
the variables in Figure 4.1 are indicated by plus and minus signs. The predic-
tor variables are defined as follows below. 
Task performance refers to the degree to which a transplant can fulfill re-
sponsibilities and meet quality standards. 
Role conflict refers to the degree of incongruity or incompatibility of expec-
tations associated with a transplant’s role. 
Role ambiguity refers to the lack of clarity of a transplant’s behavioral re-
quirements.  
Complementary core competencies refers to the degree to which the trans-
plant‘s competence can enhance the client organization’s ability to achieve 
business goals. 
Client managerial persistent expectations is the degree to which client man-
agers continued to expect the transplants to respond as if they were still sub-
ordinates. 
Relational norms are expectations about behavior shared by decision mak-
ers. 
Lacity and Willcocks (2000a) identified six outsourcing phases — scooping, 
evaluation, negotiation, transition, middle, and mature phase. These phases 
were also recognized in case-studies. Stakeholder relationships vary during 
activities within phases, depending on goal alignment. In this research, data 
was collected in the transition phase of a relationship. This is the phase 
where IT employees get transferred from client to customer organizations, 
and where they experience disequilibria in their employment. On large con-
tracts, transition activities may last from 18 months to more than 2 years 
(Lacity & Willcocks, 2000a). 
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 Figure 4.1. Proposed research model. 
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5. Confirmatory research methodology 
As part of this study, the research model presented in the previous chapter 
was empirically tested through the use of a survey. This chapter discusses 
methodological issues related to the development and use of the survey in-
strument. The first section is a description of the unit of analysis. The second 
section describes the data collection process. This is followed by a discus-
sion of the instrumentation, including a description of pretest and pilot, and 
the development of the measures used in hypothesis testing. 
5.1 Unit of analysis 
Case studies have to a large extent discussed outsourcing relational issues, 
but they have also explored the need for research at individual transplant 
level. The research model, presented in the previous chapter, emphasizes the 
interface of environmental stimuli and individual perception of those stimuli. 
Thus, in this part of the research the level of theory is the independent indi-
vidual, the transplant that gets transferred from the client company to the 
vendor company. With respect to perceived role stress, individual members 
of a transplant group are independent of that group’s influence. Thus, the 
value of a construct for an individual member of the group is independent of 
the value of the same construct for other members of the same group. Varia-
tion in the constructs is conceptualized simply as between-individual varia-
tion (Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994).  
As the unit of analysis is at transplant individual level, the researcher needed 
access to an outsourcer. And thus, the researcher contacted one global out-
sourcer located in Norway, asking for permission to conduct a survey among 
transplants of IT outsourcing. Permission was given, and the survey was 
prepared for transplants in the company. 
5.2 Sample and data collection 
For the most part, prior research has analyzed outsourcing at the organiza-
tional or relationship level. The current study was designed to provide in-
sight into how individuals were affected by and affect the outsourcing by 
gathering data about their work performance. Consequently, the target popu-
lation for this study was those IT employees transferred from a client to a 
vendor organization, and who continue to delivering services back to the 
client organization. Focusing on the transplants of IT outsourcing as the unit 
of analysis suggests an approach in which individuals are requested to an-
swer a questionnaire. The research was supported by the management of the 
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vendor company and the company’s Works Council. The council had equal 
participation from the labor union and management.  
A web-based tool, QuestBack version 7.2, was used for design, data collec-
tion and reporting of survey data. A list of email addresses for potential re-
spondents was received from the human resource department of the vendor 
company. This list included all employees transferred from a particular client 
company to the vendor. These email addresses were copied into QuestBack, 
which took care of the distribution. Each potential respondent received an 
email with a short explanation of the purpose of the research, a statement of 
support from top management of the company and the Works Council, a 
statement of confidentiality and anonymity, and researcher contact informa-
tion. At the end of the email there was a link to the web-based questionnaire. 
In the first email distribution of the questionnaire, three of the respondents 
were removed because they did not work for the vendor company any more. 
Data was collected for the most part during the summer of 2005, and with a 
reminder a little later in the autumn. The names of participating employees 
were ensured not to be disclosed. QuestBack took care of the respondents’ 
anonymity. Respondents were asked to take contact if they had questions 
about any item on the questionnaire or about the study in general. Three 
respondents contacted the researcher by phone, to make sure about the ap-
propriateness of the study. Twelve responses were rejected because of in-
complete questionnaires.  
There are some concluding comments to the data collection. First, prior to 
the survey distribution it was stressed by the contact person of the vendor 
company and by the Works Council that participation in this study was vol-
untary. Second, participants should be anonymous and the company name 
should not be disclosed. During data collection, the email invitation con-
firmed anonymity and confidentiality.  
5.3 Development of survey instrument 
A questionnaire was developed and used to collect the survey data. Items in 
the questionnaire measured concepts drawn from management theory and 
the information systems literature. Each construct was measured using mul-
tiple items. The items, with the exception of some demographic data such as 
gender and educational background, were measured on 7-point Likert scales. 
The definition and operationalization of each measure is described in greater 
detail in section 5.4. 
To ensure that the instrument was valid for use, a draft instrument was quali-
tatively and quantitatively pre-tested as suggested by Straub (1989). Instru-
ment validation was done through three operations — pretest, technical vali-
dation, and pilot test. Then a full-scale survey was conducted. 
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5.3.1 Pretest 
In the pretest, the draft questionnaire was subject to a qualitative testing of 
validities. Personal interviews were conducted with a number of participants 
in order to locate and correct weaknesses in the questionnaire instrument. 
Interviewees included: an academic expert in methodology, an academic 
expert in IT outsourcing, an academic expert in language and business cul-
ture, two practitioner experts in IT outsourcing, and two transplants affected 
by IT outsourcing. In addition a technical expert in QuestBack was con-
sulted. The selection of interviewees was designed to get maximum feedback 
from various experts. The total number of interviewees in the pretest was 
eight. 
Interviews were both formal face-to-face, on-site meetings with practitio-
ners, and more informal (and repeated) discussions with academic and tech-
nical experts. The duration of each practitioner interview was approximately 
45 minutes to an hour. At the beginning of each interview, respondents were 
informed they were participating in a pre-test, and, in addition to responding 
to the questions, respondents were also asked to comment verbally on the 
conceptual clarity and word usage in the questionnaire. On the average, re-
spondents took about 15 – 20 minutes to complete the questionnaire. The 
remaining time was used to discuss each respondent’s reaction to the ques-
tionnaire. Overall, respondents had little trouble understanding the question-
naire.  
One respondent explicitly commented that the questionnaire was too long, 
but others, when asked to comment on the questionnaire’s length, did not 
express fatigue or lack of interest. One respondent suggested that a change 
from English to Norwegian language would ease respondents’ completion of 
the questionnaire. “At least the researcher should avoid the use of difficult 
academic terms,” the respondent suggested. The respondent pinpointed the 
use of some advanced business English terms, and he had to use a dictionary 
a couple of times to make sure he had understood the questions. Since the 
vendor company is a global outsourcer, they had English as their formal 
business language. Discussing this problem with the chief human resource 
officer of the vendor company, he told me the employees were used to an-
swering internal questionnaires in English. And thus the researcher con-
cluded to continue with the English version of the questionnaire. One re-
spondent also reported a need for better positioning of questions. Another 
respondent underlined the difference between business cultures in the two 
outsourcing parties. The client company had a value-based management and 
the vendor culture was based on top-down management, he said. 
As the intention was to collect data through a web-based tool, several of the 
respondents suggested putting some effort into writing an introduction email. 
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Included in the introduction email was: a short presentation of the research 
project, a statement of support from the outsourcer’s top management and 
the Works Council, and an assurance of confidentiality and anonymity. The 
last point was important since the level of analysis was at an individual level.  
The pretest also led to the development of two screening questions at the 
beginning of the questionnaire to make sure respondents were delivering 
service back to their prior employer. This was done to make secure respon-
dents were in the transplant target group. This screening was also explained 
to the respondents in the short introduction to the survey. Finally, an aca-
demic expert in language and business culture reviewed the questionnaire. 
The language expert, fluent both in Norwegian and English, checked the 
questionnaire for consistency, flow, imprecise word use, and obvious mis-
takes. 
The intention of the pretest was to ensure clarity and readability of the ques-
tionnaire and to ascertain that the theory-based items tapped issues of con-
cern to the respondents (content validity and reliability). Clarification of 
constructs and the means of the operationalization were also undertaken 
(construct validity). Content validity was addressed by encouraging partici-
pants to single out pointless questions and suggest new areas of inquiry. 
5.3.2 Technical validation and pilot test 
To further validate the instrument, a pilot survey was carried out. The pilot 
test disconfirmed measurement problems in the instrument. Besides their use 
in validation, pilot tests are also desirable because they provide a testing 
ground for final administration of the instrument. A small department, geo-
graphically separated from others, was selected as the site for the pilot study. 
The questionnaire was sent to thirteen employees, with a data collection 
period of one week. Eight employees responded, which gave a response rate 
of 61.5% for the pilot study. 
In the introduction the respondents were told they were participating in a 
pilot test of the questionnaire. In addition to responding to the questions, 
they were asked to comment verbally on the conceptual clarity and word 
usage in the questionnaire. A separate textbox for this purpose was available 
at the end of the questionnaire and they were also invited to make a tele-
phone call. Three respondents made a phone call to the researcher and five 
respondents filled out the text box at the end of the questionnaire to give 
their comments. Respondents agreed upon the relevance of the research. In 
unison, they suggested using Norwegian in the final questionnaire. They 
were used to speaking technical English. As they did encounter some diffi-
cult business or management terms, they had to use a dictionary to make 
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sure they understood all of the questions. Thus the average time to fill out 
the questionnaire was around 20 minutes.  
The purpose of technical instrument validation is to validate construct valid-
ity and reliability. If measures vary little across methods of measuring 
those variables, they can be said to be independent of the methods 
used to gather the data and to demonstrate high construct validity. This 
research has adapted existing measures from the literature to ensure 
strong construct validity. Reliability is a statement about the stability of 
individual measures across replications from the same source of information 
(multi items scale). If enough respondents are inconsistent in their answers 
to these items, the items will contain abnormally high measurement error 
and hence, unreliable measures. Appendix D shows that Cronbach alphas in 
this study were not very different from alphas in other studies. 
5.3.3 Revisions to construct definitions and measurements 
Two pointless questions were removed from the questionnaire. These items 
were pinpointed from several respondents in the pretest and the pilot study. 
Items were removed from scales with high alpha. In addition, three item 
scales with low alpha were extended with one item each. Complementary 
core competence scale was extended with one new item from Van der He-
jden (2001). Flexibility scale was extended with one item from Rokkan & 
Haugland (2002), and the solidarity scale was extended with one new item 
from the same authors. A careful introduction was given to each set of ques-
tions for positioning purposes. This was suggested by academic experts, but 
also as an answer to the respondents’ difficulties with reading some of the 
questions.  
The questionnaire was translated to Norwegian, based on unison suggestions 
from respondents in the pilot study and from one academic expert. The most 
frequent method of accomplishing the adaptation, and verifying the equiva-
lence of new scale with the original language version, is the procedure of 
translation, back-translation, and verification (Brislin, 1970). Back-
translation is typically used to verify semantic equivalence of a translated 
measure to the original scale. The initial translation from English to Norwe-
gian was done by the researcher. A draft version of the questionnaire, with 
both English items and translated Norwegian items, was emailed to two aca-
demic experts fluent in Norwegian and English. Some corrections were sug-
gested by the reviewers, and these were implemented into the final version 
of questionnaire.  
Although validity of the adapted scale depends fundamentally on semantic 
equivalence, back translation always involves subjective evaluations. A 
study by Mallinckrodt and Wang (2004) developed a “dual-language split-
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half” quantitative method of verification to supplement back-translation 
judgments. Correlations between the “dual-language split-halves” were not 
statistically different from correlations between all-English sets of the same 
items. There were also no differences in retest reliabilities. And thus, this 
research used the following procedure in translating and verifying semantic 
equivalences of the adapted measures. First, the researcher prepared a bilin-
gual first draft translation. Second, two bilingual academic experts verified 
the equivalence of translation and original version item-by-item. They were 
knowledgeable about the constructs and they were working independently. 
They also verified equivalence of the translated scale instructions. If items or 
portions of instructions were initially declared not equivalent, this was dis-
cussed until all items were declared equivalent. The quantitative verification 
phase was dropped since prior research found no such problems.  
5.4 Measures 
Whenever possible, existing measures were adopted for this study. However, 
given the exploratory nature of the study, and the fact that a large number of 
variables have not previously been used in outsourcing context, it was neces-
sary to pretest and pilot test the variables. This was done by finalizing a 
working definition for those constructs, based on relevant literature and 
comments from practitioner experts and academic experts. Individual meas-
urement items were then developed for each construct. Once a preliminary 
version of the items was complete, it was reviewed and subject to a pilot test 
as described previously. With the exception of a few demographic items, all 
variables were measured on a seven-point Likert scale anchored at one end 
by “strongly disagree” and the other end by “strongly agree.” Six constructs 
were operationalized for the study. A summary of the constructs can be 
found in Table 5.1 below, and the items used to operationalize each of the 
constructs can be found in Appendix D. 
Complementary core competencies is the degree to which the transplant’s 
competence can enhance a client organization’s ability to achieve business 
goals. Vendor managers’ expectations are to eliminate deficiencies in the 
parties’ portfolio of resources by using a transplant’s distinct capabilities and 
knowledge. Hence, transplants are seen as a resource that can enhance cli-
ent’s ability to achieve its business goals. From the vendor’s perspective, 
client core competence includes the experience and product knowledge the 
transplant has in the vendor’s product category as well as the administrative, 
supervisory, and strategic ability of the client’s executives. Complementary 
resource was operationalized with three items from Lambe, Spekman and 
Hunt (2002) and one item from Van der Heijden (2001). The questionnaire 
items read: (item CCC1) I contribute different capabilities to [client com-
pany], (item CCC2) I have complementary strengths that are useful to [client 
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company], (item CCC3) I have separate abilities that, when combined with 
[client company]’s capabilities, enable them to achieve goals beyond their 
individual reach, (item CCC4) I have the capability to envisioning the [client 
company]’s business processes which technology makes possible. Four 
items used to measure this variable is presented in Appendix D. 
 
Construct Measure assesses Key references Items* 
Complementary 
core competencies 
Degree to which the transplant’s 
competence can enhance client 
organization’s ability to achieve 
business goals 
Lambe et al. (2002), 
Van der Heijden 
(2001) 
4 (3) 
Client managerial 
persistent expecta-
tions 
Degree to which client managers’ 
continued expectations of the 
transplants to respond as if they 
were still subordinates 
Ho et al. (2003) 6 (7) 
Relational norms The party’s expectations of mak-
ing adjustments in the ongoing 
relationship in accordance with 
changing circumstances. 
Heide & John (1992), 
Rokkan & Haugland 
(2002) 
10 (10) 
Role conflict Degree of incongruity or incom-
patibility of expectations associ-
ated with transplant’s role 
Nygaard & Dahlstrom 
(2002) 
5 (6) 
Role ambiguity Lack of clarity of transplant’s 
behavioral requirements.  
Nygaard & Dahlstrom 
(2002) 
7 (7) 
Task performance Degree to which transplant can 
fulfill responsibilities and meet 
quality standards. 
Kuvaas (2006) 6 (6) 
* Final item numbers (initial item numbers) 
Table 5.1. Definitions of constructs. 
 
Client managerial persistent expectations is the degree to which client man-
agers continued to expect the transplants to respond as if they were still sub-
ordinates. Belief perseverance describes the tendency for prior beliefs and 
expectations to persevere, even in the face of new data or when the data that 
generated those beliefs and expectations are no longer valid (Anderson & 
Kellam, 1992). Applied to the IT outsourcing context, these socio-
psychological findings lend weight to the notion that client-managers do not 
change their old schemas and expectations regarding former subordinates, 
even though the managers may recognize that these ex-subordinates are no 
longer officially under their jurisdiction but are under the supervision of 
another organization (Ho et al., 2003). In total, six items measured the con-
struct. Questionnaire items read: because I was previously a part of client 
organization before outsourcing, managers in the client organization now 
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expect me to: (item PME1) be more willing to work extra hours, (item 
PME2) perform my job more reliably, (item PME3) volunteer to do more 
tasks over and above the service level agreement, (item PME4) invest more 
in improving current skills to serve the better, (item PME5) be more willing 
to put in a full day’s work for a full day’s pay, (item PME6) suggest more 
initiatives on technology issues to them. Six statements used to measure this 
variable is presented in Appendix D.  
Relational norms are defined as a higher order construct consisting of the 
dimension flexibility (FLE), information exchange (INF), and solidarity 
(SOL). Flexibility describes the party’s expectations of making adjustments 
in the ongoing relationship in accordance with changing circumstances. In-
formation exchange expresses the expectation that particular pieces of in-
formation that might help the other party will be provided. Solidarity refers 
to expected degrees of efforts of the parties toward preserving the relation. 
Each dimension is measured as a multi-item scale with a Likert-type format.  
Three items of flexibility were adapted from Heide & John (1992) and one 
new item was picked from Rokkan and Haugland (2002) due to low alpha on 
the original scale. The items of flexibility read: (item FLE1) flexibility in 
response to request for changes is a characteristic of this relationship, (item 
FLE2) the parties expect to be able to make adjustments in the ongoing rela-
tionship to cope with changing circumstances (item FLE3), (item FLE4) the 
terms of an ongoing transaction are not renegotiable under any circum-
stances.  
Four items of information exchange were adapted from Heide and John 
(1992). Questionnaire items read: (item INF1) in this relationship, it is ex-
pected that any information that might help the other party will be provided 
to them, (item INF2) Exchange of information in this relationship takes 
place frequently and informally, and not only in accordance with a specified 
agreement, (item INF3) it is expected that parties will provide appropriate 
information if it can help the other party, (item INF4) it is expected that we 
keep each other informed about events or changes that may affect the other 
party. Three items of solidarity were adapted from Heide & John (1992) and 
one new item was picked from Rokkan and Haugland (2002) due to low 
alpha on the original scale.  
The questionnaire items of solidarity read: (item SOL1) problems that arise 
in the course of this relationship are treated by the parties as joint rather than 
individual responsibilities, (item SOL2) the parties are committed to im-
provements that may benefit the relationship as a whole, and not only by the 
individual parties, (item SOL3) the parties in this relationship do not mind 
owing each other favors, (item SOL4) an important feature of this relation-
ship is that neither party would do something damaging to the other party.  
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The underlying structure of the relational norm construct was approached in 
a molecular way. Each of the three norm types represented a separate dimen-
sion, which reflected an existing overall factor structure. It was hypothesized 
that an overall latent structure existed, indicated by its first order types. 
Thus, relational norm was represented only through one combination of 
norm types. Similarly, different transplants can only have the same percep-
tion through the same combination of beliefs. If the molecular perspective is 
valid, a comparison of the loadings would be an indicator of the relative 
importance of each indicator in reflecting the overall perception (Chin & 
Gopal, 1995). Twelve items were used to measure this variable, see Appen-
dix D. 
The role stress scales were based on the seven point measures developed by 
Rizzo, House, and Lirtzmann (1970). The conflict and ambiguity measures 
consisted of six and seven items, respectively. Role conflict refers to the 
degree of incongruity or incompatibility of expectations associated with a 
transplant’s role. Questionnaire items role conflict read: (item CON1) I re-
ceive assignments without the manpower necessary to complete the task, 
(item CON2) I have to circumvent rules or policies to complete assignments, 
(item CON3) I receive incomplete requests from two or more people, (item 
CON4) I am often given assignments without adequate resources and mate-
rials to execute them, (item CON5) I work on unnecessary tasks for [client 
company], (item CON6) I have to work under vague directives or orders. 
Role conflict consisted of six items, as detailed in Appendix D.  
Role ambiguity refers to the lack of clarity of a transplant’s behavioral re-
quirements. Questionnaire items role ambiguity read: (item AMB1) I feel 
certain about how much authority I have, (item AMB2) I know what my 
responsibilities are, (item AMB3) I have just the right amount of work to do, 
(item AMB4) I know that I have divided up my time properly, (item AMB5) 
I know exactly what is expected of me, (item AMB6) Expectation of what 
has to be done is clear, (item AMB7) I perform work that conforms with my 
values. Role ambiguity consisted of seven items, respectively, as detailed in 
Appendix D.  
Task performance, the major dependent variable, refers to the degree to 
which a transplant can fulfill responsibilities and meet quality standards. 
Work performance was operationalized into six components by Kuvaas 
(2006) Three items to fulfill responsibilities were based on (Brockner, Tyler, 
& Cooper-Schneider, 1992), and three items to meet quality standards were 
based on (May, Korczynski, & Frenkel, 2002). Questionnaire items read: 
(item TAP1) I try to work as hard as possible, (item TAP2) the quality of my 
work is top-notch, (item TAP3) I intentionally expend a great deal of effort 
in carrying out my job, (item TAP4) I often put in extra effort in carrying out 
my job, (item TAP5) I almost always perform better than an acceptable 
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level, (item TAP6) I often perform better than expected from me. The six 
items are presented in Appendix D.  
5.5 Instrument validation 
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss methodological issues related to 
data collection and measurement item construction. A survey-based ap-
proach was prepared to gather data from transplants in one vendor organiza-
tion. In general, items were based on insights gained from literature and 
definitions of the construct from previous research. The items were first 
reviewed in a pretest and then the resulting instrument was subjected to a 
pilot test. According to Straub (1989), a researcher should pretest and/or 
pilot test instruments, attempting to assess as many validities as possible in 
the instrument development process. 
Content validity; The researcher has done a pre-test of the instrument among 
academic experts, practitioner experts, and transplants affected by outsourc-
ing. Experience from the pre-test was that the label attached to the measures 
seems to be appropriate. Items seem to measure what they claim to. 
Construct validity; All constructs used in this research seem to have theoreti-
cal agreement on its content. The more a construct is used by researchers in 
more settings with outcome consistent with theory, the more its construct 
validity. Only a few corrections to the constructs were applied in this re-
search, leaving most items unchanged. The researcher was testing the in-
strument using both a paper version and an electronic version of the ques-
tionnaire. Stability across methodologies was not tested statistically, but no 
abnormalities were observed or reported. There is no reason to believe that 
the data reflects artefacts of instrument, but rather it is reasonable to believe 
the data is a reflection of true scores. 
Reliability; High correlations between alternative measures (large Cronbach 
alphas) are usually a sign that the measures are reliable. In this research the 
investigator adapted existing measures from the literature to ensure 
strong construct validity. Cronbach alphas are reported in Appendix D 
and discussed in previous section. 
During the process of pretest and pilot testing, the survey instrument has 
been improved. Full scale implementation of the survey instrument was con-
ducted immediately after the pretest and pilot study were finished. Details 
concerning the survey results and analysis are given in the next chapters. 
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6. Data analysis and results 
The purpose of analysis is to reduce data to an intelligible and interpretable 
form so that the relations of research problems can be studied and tested 
(Kerlinger, 1986, p. 125). This chapter will document the process employed 
in scrutinizing and organizing the data, compare the results with expected 
outcomes, and draw conclusions based on those results. 
First in this chapter there is a discussion of Structural Equation Modeling in 
general, and a specific form known as Partial Least Square. The second sec-
tion contains descriptive characteristics of the respondents. Following a rec-
ommended two-stage approach to assess the research model (Hair, Ander-
son, Tatham, & Black, 1995), a confirmatory factor analysis was first con-
ducted to assess the measurement model. Consequently, the structural rela-
tionships were examined. The study’s major findings are summarized in the 
final section. 
6.1 Structural equation modeling 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) has been used in almost every con-
ceivable field of study, including psychology, sociology, and management 
(Hair et al., 1995). In the IS field, the use of SEM has increased dramatically 
in recent years (e.g., Goles, 2001; Ho et al., 2003; Bock, Zmud, & Kim, 
2005). The reason for its attractiveness is twofold: 1) it provides a straight-
forward method of dealing with multiple relationships simultaneously while 
providing statistical efficiency, and 2) its ability to assess the relationships 
comprehensively, has provided a transition from exploratory to confirmatory 
analysis. 
SEM is a second-generation data analysis technique that not only assesses 
the structural model — the assumed causation among a set of dependent and 
independent constructs — but, in the same analysis, also evaluates the meas-
urement model — loading of observed items (measurements) on their ex-
pected latent variables (constructs). The combined analysis of the measure-
ment and the structural model enables measurement errors of the observed 
variables to be analyzed as an integral part of the model, and the factor 
analysis to be combined in one operation with hypothesis testing (Gefen, 
Straub, & Boudreau, 2000). SEM evaluates the reliability and validity of the 
measurement items while simultaneously evaluating the research model 
within which the constructs are embedded.  
Of particular interest in this study is SEM’s ability to model latent variables 
(sometimes referred to as factors). Latent variables are unobservable vari-
ables, or variables that cannot be directly measured. These latent variables 
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are measured indirectly via the use of measurement items (also known as 
observed variables or manifest variables) that either reflect or form the latent 
variable. An example of a latent variable in this study is “role ambiguity.” 
Role ambiguity is a concept that cannot be directly measured. However, it 
can be indirectly measured by linking it to a set of items that can be directly 
measured. In this case seven Likert-scale items were used as indicators, or 
manifest variables that represent the underlying concept, termed role con-
flict. Thus, for the purpose of analysis, the latent variable role ambiguity was 
characterized in terms of the seven measurement items used to represent it. 
A general SEM model can be broken down into two components; the meas-
urement model, and the structural model. The measurement model, some-
times called the outer model, is concerned with the relationship between 
latent variables and the specific set of items associated with each of them. 
The structural model, sometimes called the inner model, is concerned with 
the relationship between the various latent variables. The structural model 
represents the theory posited by the researcher. The measurement model 
provides a means to evaluate the validity of the measurement items and their 
relationships with their associated latent variables. 
Several different techniques fall under the SEM umbrella. The best known 
are covariance-based approaches reflected by software such as LISREL, 
AMOS, and EQS (Goles, 2001). Covariance-based SEM techniques gener-
ally utilize a maximum-likelihood function and endeavor to minimize the 
difference between the covariances of the sample data and those implied by 
the estimated parameters of the theoretical model. Underlying covariance-
based SEM techniques are the twin assumptions that the data follows a nor-
mal distribution, and that the observations are independent of each other 
(Chin & Gopal, 1995). Covariance-based SEM is also subject to certain con-
straints relative to sample size. Minimal sample sizes range from 200 to 800, 
depending on the power analysis of the specific model (Chin & Newsted, 
1999). 
An alternative to covariance-based SEM techniques is the partial least 
squares approach, exemplified by PLS-Graph (hereafter referred to as PLS). 
This technique is a variance-based approach that is oriented towards the 
predictive aspects (variance explanation) of the model, as opposed to covari-
ance-based techniques that are oriented towards corroborating the overall 
model fit. PLS also estimates parameters separately for each block of indica-
tors associated with a particular latent variable, as opposed to the covari-
ance-based approach of simultaneously estimating all parameters. Thus in 
PLS any bias in the estimates of one parameter is less likely to affect the 
estimates of other parameters. Further, due to its use of an ordinary least 
squares algorithm, PLS is relatively immune to instances where the sample 
data is not normally distributed, and is not subject to the restrictions on sam-
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ple size as is covariance-based SEM. Minimally acceptable samples sizes for 
PLS range from 30 to 100, depending on the model (Chin & Newsted, 1999; 
Gefen et al., 2000). 
These two versions of SEM techniques, covariance-based and partial least 
square, differ in the orientation of their analysis, and in the nature of their 
underlying assumptions. Consequently, each type is more appropriately used 
in certain situations. Covariance-based techniques are more suited when the 
underlying theory is strong and the overall objective is theory testing. In 
contrast, PLS’ forte is its ability to help the researcher understand and pre-
dict the relationships of the individual latent variables among themselves. 
That is, when the objective is oriented more towards theory building than 
theory testing (Chin & Newsted, 1999; Gefen et al., 2000). 
This study has several characteristics that must be taken into consideration 
when determining which analysis tool is appropriate. It is the first study to 
corporate different environmental stressors, role stress, and work perform-
ance of transplants in IT outsourcing arrangements. It also breaks new 
ground in the decomposition of outsourcing environmental stressors. Conse-
quently, it is more of an exploratory study than a confirmatory one. Further-
more, the model contains second-order factors.  
In short, the theoretical model is complex and untested. In addition, the sam-
ple size of transplants available falls below the minimum recommendation of 
200 cases for covariance-based SEM methodologies. Taking all into account, 
it is obvious that PLS is a more appropriate tool in this instance for data 
analysis than covariance-based SEM techniques. Consequently, PLS-Graph 
version 3.0 was selected to analyze the data and test the model. 
6.2 Sample characteristics 
The survey collected information regarding the respondent’s gender, educa-
tional background and study field, years employed by the client company, 
and current position in the vendor company. This section summarizes the 
demographic information of the respondents, see Table 6.1. 
All employees transferred from client to vendor in a particular outsourcing 
case — a total of 159 transplants — were asked to participate in the survey. 
A total of 103 respondents answered the questionnaire, and this makes the 
overall response rate 64.7%. In an initial screening of the data collected, 11 
of the respondents were removed from the data set because these respon-
dents no longer delivered services back to their previous employer. They 
served other clients or they were in an internal staff function without client 
responsibilities. The remaining 92 respondents were serving their previous 
employer, either partly or as the only customer. This screening and prepara-
tion was necessary to fulfill obligations given by the previous definition of 
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transplant. Transplants are employees who formally leave their organization 
and are transplanted into the vendor company, who employs them and offers 
their services back to the original employer for a service fee.  
 
Measure Items Frequencies Percent 
Male 73 79.3 % Gender 
Female 19 20.7 % 
High school 21 22.8 % 
Bachelor’s (3 years) 39 42.4 % 
Master’s (5 years) 12 13.0 % 
PhD - - 
Educational background 
Other 20 21.7 % 
Technology/information sciences 68 73.9 % 
Economics/management 5 5.4 % 
Study field 
Other 19 20.7 % 
0 – 3  4 4.4 % 
4 – 6 28 30.4 % 
7 – 9  18 19.5 % 
Years employed by client 
company 
10 or more 42 45.6 % 
Group A (17 months) 69 75.0 % Time since transferred from 
client to vendor Group B (7 months) 23 25.0 % 
Senior management 2 2.2 % 
Account/service management 6 6.5 % 
Service provider 77 83.7 % 
Current position at vendor 
company 
Staff function 7 7.6 % 
Table 6.1. Sample characteristics of respondents. 
 
Respondents in the survey were transferred at two different points in time — 
75% of them were transferred around 17 months prior to the survey (Group 
A) and 25% of them were transferred to the vendor company around 7 
months prior to the survey (Group B). The ratio of answers between groups 
is approximately the same as the ratio between overall sizes of groups. Ini-
tially, the size of Group A was around three times the size of Group B. 
Taken as a whole, 79.3% of the respondents were male and 20.7% were 
female. Regarding their highest educational background, 22.8% had com-
pleted high school, 42.4% had a Bachelor’s degree or equivalent, 13.0% had 
a Master’s degree, and 21.7% had other educational background (mostly one 
or two years of higher education). Not surprisingly, 73.9% of the respon-
dents had their main field of study within technology and information sci-
ences. A small group of 5.4% had studied economics and management. 
Other fields of study included such things as natural sciences, social sci-
ences, and the humanities.  
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Respondents’ current positions in the vendor company were within man-
agement (8.7%), service provider (83.7%), and staff function (7.6%). A little 
bit more than half of the service providers were delivering systems services, 
and a little less than half were delivering technology services.  
Interesting to note was the length of the respondent’s previous employment 
at the client company. They had on average worked 8.3 years at the client 
company before outsourcing, and 43.7% of the respondents had worked for 
10 or more years at the company. Only 20.4% of the respondents had been 
employed by the client company for less than 6 years prior to the outsourc-
ing. 
Taken as a whole, this indicates that the majority of the respondents are 
knowledgeable and involved transplants who are well qualified to comment 
on individually perceived expectations, role stress, and task performance, 
caused by the outsourcing arrangement. 
6.3 Evaluating the measurement model 
Factor analysis was used to uncover the latent structure of the set of vari-
ables. Attribute space was reduced from a larger number of variables to a 
smaller number of factors. As this research uses constructs on the basis of 
pre-established theory, a confirmatory factor analysis was done to determine 
if the number of factors and the loadings of measured variables confirmed 
what was expected from prior research. Indicator variables were selected on 
the basis of priory theory and factor analysis was used to see if they loaded 
as predicted on the expected number of factors. The researcher’s a priori 
assumption was that each factor was associated with a specified subset of 
indicator variables. A minimum requirement of confirmatory factor analysis 
is that one hypothesized beforehand the number of factors in the model, but 
usually expectations also exists about which variables will load on which 
factors (Kim & Mueller, 1978, p. 55). With this, the researcher was able to 
determine if the measures created to represent a latent variable really be-
longed together. 
The confirmatory factor analysis was approached using PLS-Graph version 
3.0. While PLS is typically used to model causal relationship among latent 
variables (factors), it is equally possible to use PLS to explore confirmatory 
factor analysis measurement models. The measurement model was analyzed 
in three stages. First, the individual item reliabilities were examined. Second, 
the model’s convergent validity was reviewed. And finally, discriminant 
validity was assessed. This process provided assurance that the constructs 
were adequately and reliably measured prior to analyzing the structural 
model. 
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Individual item reliability was examined by looking at the loadings, or corre-
lations, of each indicator on its respective construct. For reflective indicators, 
a generally recognized rule of thumb is that items with a loading of 0.707 or 
above demonstrate acceptable reliability (Barclay, Higgins, & Thompson, 
1995; Chin, 1998). This threshold implies that there is more variance shared 
between the measures and their constructs than there is error variance. Ap-
pendix E shows the loadings of the items on their respective constructs, 
along with weight, standard error, and t-value. The initial analysis indicated 
that elimination of some items would enhance the fit indices. Standardized 
residuals indicated significant cross-loadings for three items. Two items of 
the relational norm construct and one item on the role conflict construct were 
deleted. The rest of the items were left intact to retain semblance of similar-
ity with scales used in past studies. Pursuit of optimal fit can limit the con-
ceptual domain (Nygaard & Dahlstrom, 2002). All factor loadings in the 
trimmed model have t-values that exceed 2.0. Removal of the three items 
offered stronger representation of the data measured as composite reliability 
and average variance extracted (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3). 
The next step in analyzing the measurement model was to evaluate conver-
gent validity. This indicates the indicators for a given construct should be at 
least moderately correlated among themselves. Poor convergent validity 
among the indicators for a factor may mean the model needs to have more 
factors. Cronbach’s alpha is commonly used to establish convergent validity. 
Convergent validity was evaluated by examining the composite reliability 
and average variance extracted from the measures. Reliability is a measure 
of the internal consistency of the construct indicators, depicting the degree to 
which they indicate the common latent (unobserved) construct. More reliable 
measures provide the researcher with greater confidence that the individual 
indicators are all consistent in their measurements. A commonly used 
threshold value for acceptable reliability is 0.70 (Hair et al., 1995), although 
this is not an absolute standard, and values below have been deemed accept-
able if the research is exploratory in nature.  
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Measures Items Cronbach’s alpha Composite reliability Average variance extracted 
Core competencies 4 0.735 0.840 0.574 
Persistent expectations     6 0.878 0.907 0.621
Relational norms 10 0.885 0.909 0.514 
Role conflict 5 0.795 0.853 0.539 
Role ambiguity 7 0.842 0.883 0.525 
Task performance 6 0.898 0.923 0.669 
Table 6.2. Results from confirmatory factor analysis. 
 
Variable         Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1) Core competencies 5.364 1.035 0.757      
2) Persistent expectations 4.033 1.446 0.360 0.788     
3) Relational norms 4.393    1.022 0.213 0.031 0.716    
4) Role conflict 4.135     1.262 -0.028 0.302 -0.233 0.734   
5) Role ambiguity 3.624 1.141     -0.330 -0.057 -0.526 0.320 0.724  
6) Task performance 5.263 0.966      0.408 0.177 0.400 0.057 -0.623 0.817 
Note: The shared numbers in the diagonal row are squared roots of the average variance extracted, which is the square root of the vari-
ance shared between the constructs and their measure. Off diagonals are the correlations between constructs. The diagonal should be 
larger than any other corresponding row or column entry in order to support discriminant validity. 
Table 6.3. Means, standard deviations, correlation, and AVE of variables. 
Table 6.2 shows the composite reliability scores for each of the constructs 
are well above 0.70, ranging from 0.840 to 0.923, demonstrating an accept-
able level of internal consistency of the construct indicators. Another meas-
ure of reliability is the variance extracted measure. This measure reflects the 
overall amount of variance in the indicators accounted for by the latent con-
struct. Higher variance extracted values occur when the indicators are truly 
representative of the latent construct. Recommendations typically suggest 
that the variance extracted value for a construct should exceed 0.50 (Fornell 
& Larcker, 1981). Table 6.2 shows that the average variance extracted by 
our measures range from 0.514 to 0.669, which are above the acceptability 
value. In addition, Appendix E exhibits the weights and loadings of the 
measures in the research model. Bootstrap resampling procedure was used to 
assess the significance of PLS parameter estimates. The results of 500 re-
samples indicate that all measures are significant on their path loadings at 
the level of 0.01. 
Dicriminant validity indicates the extent to which a particular construct dif-
fers from other constructs. In PLS analysis, one criterion for adequate dis-
criminant validity is that a construct should share more variance with its 
measure than it shares with other constructs in the model (Barclay et al., 
1995). One method of assessing discriminant validity is to examine the aver-
age variance extracted (AVE) for the construct. This measure, developed by 
Fornell and Larcker (1981), is the average variance shared between a given 
construct and its indicators. The AVE of a given construct should be greater 
than the variance between that construct and other constructs. That is, the 
AVE should exceed the square of the correlation between any two constructs 
(or the square root of AVE should be greater than the correlation). This im-
plies that more variance is shared between a particular construct and its indi-
cators than between that construct and another construct. In addition, the 
AVE value should be greater than 0.50, indicating that more than 50% of the 
item’s variance is captured by the construct (Chin, 1998). 
Table 6.3 presents the AVE values, in bold type on the diagonal. The values 
shown for AVE are the square root of the AVE; the other values are the cor-
relations between constructs. An examination of Table 6.3 shows that the 
AVE values meet the criteria. Values are greater than 0.50 for each con-
struct, and they are greater than the correlations between their respective 
construct and all other constructs. The AVE values on the diagonal are 
greater than the off-diagonal values in the corresponding rows and columns; 
each construct shares larger variance with its own measures than with other 
measures.  
A second criterion for discriminate validity is that no item should load more 
highly on another construct than it does on the construct it intends to meas-
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ure. Thus, the researcher also considered both loadings and cross-loadings to 
establish disciminant validity; these are shown in Appendix F. Factor analy-
sis was accomplished through SPSS version 13.0, a general-purpose statisti-
cal package which supports factor analysis. This traditional method allowed 
the researcher to examine factor loadings of indicator variables to determine 
if they loaded on latent variables as predicted by the researcher’s model. 
This provided a detailed insight into the measurement model, and as such the 
traditional method is a useful analytic supplement to the analysis of alterna-
tive measurement factor models using a structural equation modeling pack-
age (such as PLS). Items in Appendix F are grouped by constructs, with the 
loadings of their respective constructs in bold type. Going down the columns 
in Appendix F, it is apparent that the loadings for the items in each group on 
their respective constructs are higher than any other items in that column. 
This suggests that the items associated with a particular construct are more 
highly correlated with that construct than are any other items, and hence are 
more internally consistent. Factor loadings represent the correlation between 
the individual indicator and its factor. The researcher employed the concept 
of statistical power to specify the factor loading for a sample size of 92 re-
spondents. According to Hair et al. (1995), a factor loading of 0.65 is re-
quired for significance at 0.05 level, which gives a power of 80 percent. 
Before testing for a significant relationship in the structural model, one must 
demonstrate that the measurement model has a satisfactory level of validity 
and reliability (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). These results from the confirma-
tory factor analysis indicate that the constructs are reliably measured and are 
adequate for hypothesis testing. 
6.4 Evaluating the structural model 
With an adequate measurement model and an acceptable level of multicol-
linearity, the proposed hypotheses were tested with PLS. The results of the 
analysis are depicted in Figure 6.1 and estimates of environmental stressors, 
role stress and task performance are shown in Table 6.4. Results are pre-
sented in the following sequence: task performance construct, role conflict 
construct, and role ambiguity construct. 
The influence of role stress on task performance is the focus of hypotheses 
H1a and H1b. We hypothesized in H1a that role conflict would be negatively 
related to task performance. Contrary to this hypothesis, results indicate a 
significant, positive relationship between these two variables (ß = 0.284, t = 
3.3127, p < 0.001). Findings provide support for H1b, relating role ambigu-
ity negatively to task performance (ß = -0.588, t = 6.4881, p < 0.001). That 
is, a transplant’s role stress measured as role conflict and role ambiguity, is 
influencing work outcome measured as task performance. The pair wise 
correlation between role ambiguity and role conflict is 0.320, and indicates 
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no shared variance between the role ambiguity and role conflict variables. 
These interesting results are discussed later in the next chapter.  
Hypotheses H2c, H3c, and H4c examine complementary core competence, 
client managerial persistent expectations, and relational norms, respectively, 
as antecedents of task performance, but none of these relationships were 
found to be significant; meaning, no direct effect was found. 
Hypotheses H2a, H3a, and H4a examine antecedents of role conflict. H2a 
suggests a negative relationship between complementary core competence 
and role conflict, H3a suggests a positive relationship between client mana-
gerial persistent expectations and role conflict, and H4a suggests a negative 
relationship between relational norms and role conflict. Neither the core 
competence parameter in H2a (ß = -0.106, t = 0.9601), nor the relational 
norm parameter in H4a (ß = -0.221, t = 1.7768), were found to be signifi-
cantly related to role conflict. H3a suggests a positive relationship between 
client managerial persistent expectations and role conflict. Results indicate a 
significant, positive relationship between these two variables (ß = 0.347, t = 
2.8578, p < 0.01).  
Hypotheses H2b, H3b, and H4b examine antecedents of role ambiguity. The 
persistent expectations parameter in H3b (ß = 0.046, t = 0.3454) was not 
found to be significantly related to role ambiguity. H2b suggests a negative 
relationship between complementary core competence and role ambiguity, 
and H4b suggests a negative relationship between relational norms and role 
ambiguity. Results indicate a negative relationship between the core compe-
tence parameter and role ambiguity in H2b (ß = -0.246, t = 2.3162, p < 0.05), 
and also a negative relationship between the relational norms parameter and 
role ambiguity in H4b (ß = -0.475, t = 4.9561, p < 0.001). 
Explained variance for role conflict was 15.9% and for role ambiguity ex-
plained variance was 32.9%. A much greater explained variance was associ-
ated with task performance, 50.8%. There are no community standards for 
what is an acceptable level of explained variance (Gefen et al., 2000). In the 
basic research of fields like sociology, levels under 10% are commonly re-
ported. Nevertheless, this research acknowledges that the 15.9% explained 
variance found was not high. However, it is close to the range of results 
found in other IS theory-based empirical studies. For example, the studies 
published in the top-ranked IS journals explain variance in the 20 – 30% 
range (see Ho et al., 2003; Bock et al., 2005 for a sample of such studies). 
When the context of this study is taken into consideration — its exploratory 
nature, and the fact that it is one of the few studies to empirically examine 
how outsourcing affects individuals, the results are encouraging and interest-
ing. 
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Figure 6.1. Results of PLS analysis. 
 
Dependent  
variable 
Predictor variable Hypothe-
sized sign 
Path  
coeffi-
cients 
t Significance 
level 
R² 
Role conflict Core competencies  
Persistent expectations 
Relational norms 
- 
+ 
- 
-0.106 
0.347 
-0.221 
0.9601 
2.8578 
1.7768 
- 
p < 0.01 
- 
0.159 
Role ambiguity Core competencies  
Persistent expectations 
Relational norms 
- 
+ 
- 
-0.246 
0.046 
-0.475 
2.3162 
0.3454 
4.9561 
p < 0.05 
-  
p < 0.001 
0.329 
Task perform-
ance 
Core competencies 
Persistent expectations 
Relational norms 
Role conflict 
Role ambiguity 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
- 
0.205 
-0.020 
0.114 
0.284 
-0.588 
1.4462 
0.1784 
1.0557 
3.3127 
6.4881 
- 
- 
- 
p < 0.001 
p < 0.001 
0.508 
If the absolute value of the test statistic is greater than the upper critical value, then 
we reject the null hypothesis. 
Table 6.4. Role stress and task performance estimates. 
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 6.5 Evaluating the overall model 
SEM is based on causal relationships, in which change in one variable re-
sults in change in another variable. In this research, role theory was used to 
explain role stress and work outcome of transplanted IT employees. The 
guiding theoretical perspectives explaining relationships between environ-
mental stressors and transplants’ perception of role stress were core compe-
tence theory, relational norm theory, and cognitive psychology/social ex-
change theory. As such, the causal relationship suggested was based on a 
theoretical rational.  
The proposed relationships were portrayed in a path model with theoretically 
based constructs, and arrows between them indicating the causal relation-
ships between exogenous and endogenous variables of the model. The theo-
retical basis for the research model was developed in chapters 4 and 5. The 
model was specified formally as a series of equations that defined: (1) the 
structural equations linking constructs, (2) the measurement model specify-
ing which variables measure which constructs, and (3) a set of matrices indi-
cating any hypothesized correlations among constructs. In this chapter, a 
two-phased approach was used to assess the research model. First, a confir-
matory factor analysis of the reflective measures was done. And second, 
structural equation modelling was used to assess the proposed relationships. 
Initially, SEM was formulated for testing a series of causal relationship with 
the covariance matrix type. In this study the primary purpose was to examine 
only patterns of relationship, not with total explanation as needed in theory 
testing, and thus the correlation matrix was acceptable. PLS Graph v3.0, a 
correlation matrix based technique, was selected as appropriate for testing 
the proposed model. According to Green (1991), sample size can be deter-
mined if three values are specified: alpha, the probability of committing a 
Type I error (i.e., incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis); power, one mi-
nus the probability of making a Type II error (i.e., not rejecting a false null 
hypothesis); and effect size, the degree to which the criterion variable is 
related to the predictor variables in the population. To conduct power analy-
sis for this research, choices of values for alpha, power, and effect size were 
made. Alpha was set at 0.05, the traditional level of significance. Power was 
set at 0.80, a value proposed by Cohen (cited in Green, 1991) as appropriate 
for a wide range of behavioral research. Effect size was thought to range 
between small (0.2) and moderate (0.5). A typical study in the behavioral 
sciences would have a medium effect size (Cohen, cited in Green, 1991). 
Due to the partial nature of the estimation procedure in PLS, where only a 
portion of the model is involved at any one time, only that part requires the 
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largest multiple regression needed to be found. Looking at the model speci-
fication, the largest of two possibilities was: (1) the block with the largest 
number of formative indicators or (2) the dependent latent variable with the 
largest number of independent latent variables influencing it (Chin & New-
sted, 1999). In this research all latent variables have been modeled as reflec-
tive. The dependent latent variable with the largest number of independent 
latent variables influencing it was task performance, with five paths going 
into it. Thus, the largest regression at any one time consists of five independ-
ent variables. Assessing a medium effect size as defined by Green (1991), a 
minimum sample size of 91 was needed to obtain a power of 0.80. With a 
large effect size, the sample requirements drops to 42. PLS analysis, wherein 
a sample size of 92, had no problem detecting structural paths up to 0.588 
and loadings of 0.60 and 0.80. In other words, sample size was appropriate 
for PLS analysis. 
The PLS Graph v3.0 program had no problem identifying the proposed 
model. Using PLS Graph, the ability of the model to account for the sample 
covariances is not available. Instead, closer attention was paid to the predic-
tiveness of the model. Following recommendations from Chin and Newsted 
(1999), the R2 for dependent latent variables, the Stone-Geisser test for pre-
dictive relevance, and Fornell and Larcker’s avagrage variance extracted 
measure was used to assess predictiveness, whereas bootstrap resampling 
procedures were used to examine the stability of estimates. Explained vari-
ance of latent variables was ranging from 15.9% to 50.8% which was satis-
factory. According to Chin (1998), most of the loadings should be at least 
0.60 and ideally at 0.70 or above, indicating that each measure is accounting 
for 50 percent or more of the variance of the underlying latent variable. 
Standardized paths should be at least 0.20 and ideally above 0.30 in order to 
be considered meaningful. Item loadings are presented in Appendix E, show-
ing that most loadings were above 0.70. All path coefficients are shown in 
Figure 6.1, and Table 6.4 shows the significance of five paths. The structural 
paths and loadings seem to be of substantial strength. The AVE measures 
exceeded the square of the correlation between any two constructs, which 
provided evidence for construct validity. 
6.6 Summary 
A two-phased approach was used to assess the research model. First, a con-
firmatory factor analysis of the reflective measures was done. And second, 
partial least square was used to assess the proposed relationships. The meas-
urement model defines the construct (latent variables) that the model will 
use, and assigns observed variables to each. The structural model defines the 
causal relationship among these latent variables. The arrows between the 
latent variables represent the structural connections. The measurement model 
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uses factor analysis to assess the degree that the observed variables load on 
their latent constructs. The structural model estimates the assumed causal 
relationship among the exogenous and endogenous latent constructs. The 
results of the analysis, summarized in Table 6.5, will be discussed further in 
the next chapter. 
 
Hypotheses Results 
H1a: Transplant’s perceived role conflict is negatively re-
lated to task performance 
Not supported (significant 
in opposite direction) 
H1b: Transplant’s perceived role ambiguity is negatively 
related to task performance 
Supported 
H2a: Complementary core competencies are negatively 
related to transplant’s role conflict 
Not supported 
H2b: Complementary core competencies are positively re-
lated to transplant’s role ambiguity 
Supported 
H2c: Complementary core competencies are positively re-
lated to transplant’s task performance 
Not supported 
H3a: Client managerial persistent expectations are negatively 
related to transplant’s role conflict 
Supported 
H3b: Client managerial persistent expectations are negatively 
related to transplant’s role ambiguity 
Not supported 
H3c: Client managerial persistent expectations are positively 
related to transplant’s task performance 
Not supported 
H4a: Relational norms are negatively related to transplant’s 
role conflict 
Not supported 
H4b:  Relational norms are negatively related to transplant’s 
role ambiguity 
Supported 
H4c: Relational norms are positively related to transplant’s 
task performance 
Not supported 
Table 6.5. Results from hypotheses testing. 
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7. Discussion of results 
The purpose of the confirmatory research was to develop and test a compre-
hensive model for examining individual level role stress and work perform-
ance of transplants in IT outsourcing; the environmental stressors in an IT 
outsourcing arrangement, transplants’ perception of role stress, and the ef-
fects of role stress on task performance. Drawing on prior research from the 
fields of information management, marketing, organization and manage-
ment, theories were employed as the theoretical foundation for the model. 
Empirical data was first collected through three exploratory internationally 
based research case studies, and then a survey was distributed to transplants 
of one IT outsourcing arrangement. The results partly supported the pro-
posed model. 
In the first section of this chapter, the major findings of this study will be 
summarized and discussed. This is followed by a discussion of potential 
limitations of the study and suggestions for future research in section two. 
And finally, the third section present potential implications for researchers 
and practitioners, and an overall conclusion of the study is given.  
7.1 Discussion of major findings 
Findings from exploratory case studies indicated that transplants perceived 
role stress as they got moved from client to vendor organizations. Conse-
quently, the goal of the confirmatory survey has been to examine role stress 
and task performance among transplants in an IT outsourcing arrangement. 
Including all or most of the sources of role stress and job characteristics in a 
single study poses significant challenges to the trade-offs between complete-
ness and parsimony (the quality of being careful with resources). For this 
initial study of role stress in IT outsourcing arrangements, the researcher 
addressed this trade-off by focusing on outsourcing characteristics that have 
received attention in the literature (to maintain comparability) and which 
have been reasonably well-grounded in theory (to maintain conceptual 
soundness).  
Therefore, this study focuses on two dimensions of role stress (role conflict 
and role ambiguity) and three outsourcing arrangement stressors (persistent 
expectations, complementary core competencies, relational norms), and ex-
amines their influence on work outcomes (measured as task performance). 
The results support the negative influence of role ambiguity on task per-
formance, and the positive influence of role conflict on task performance. 
The survey also identifies outsourcing arrangement stressors that serve as 
antecedents of role stress. In addition, potential time constraints, i.e. the time 
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differences of transfer among the two groups of transplants, were analyzed, 
but found to be not significant.  
7.1.1 Effects of role stress on task performance 
Role stress are generally conceptualized using two interrelated constructs: 
role conflict and role ambiguity (Rizzo et al., 1970; Nygaard & Dahlstrom, 
2002). Role conflict occurs when a transplant believes that the expectations 
and demands of two or more members of his or her role set are incompatible 
(e.g., role expectations from a vendor manager and a client manager). 
Strength of ties between a transplant and client is not unlikely because of 
previous employment. Role ambiguity relates to the perceived lack of infor-
mation a transplant needs to perform his or her role adequately and his or her 
uncertainty about expectations of different role set members. The business 
relationship between client and vendor organization is negotiated over some 
time during the outsourcing project, but transplants experience an overnight 
change in their role as they are transferred from client to vendor organiza-
tion. On large contracts it is not unlikely that transition activities may last 
from 18 months to more than 2 years (Lacity & Willcocks, 2000a). In this 
survey data was collected in the transition phase of a selected outsourcing 
arrangement. Two groups, A and B, of respondents had been transferred 
from client to vendor 17 months and 7 months prior to the survey. 
Conventionally, the linear influence of role stressors on task performance 
has been examined, suggesting that role stress has significant dysfunctional 
(negative) effects on task performance. This confirmatory research was look-
ing for supporting evidence from the field of IT outsourcing. The influences 
of role stress on task performance were hypothesized to be negative for both 
role conflict and role ambiguity. As expected, the path from role ambiguity 
to task performance was negative, meaning higher levels of role ambiguity 
decreased task performance. Contrary to what was hypothesized, the path 
from role conflict to task performance was positive; meaning, a higher level 
of role conflict was associated with higher levels of task performance.  
Previous studies in other fields have examined relationships between role 
stress and effectiveness, yet the results do not unequivocally support the 
hypotheses of a negative relationship (Nygaard & Dahlstrom, 2002). Re-
searchers have proposed alternative perspectives to the linear effect of role 
stress on job performance; the relationship appears to be (1) a variant of the 
Yerkes-Dodson Law, or (2) a three-phase model known as General Adapta-
tion Syndrome, and (3) influenced by a moderator effect. Below, these three 
alternative models are discussed.  
Yerkes-Dodson Law has been used in describing an inverted U-shaped curve 
relating role stress to task performance (Michaels et al., 1987; Singh, 1998). 
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Thus, one might speculate that increased arousal improves performance only 
up to a certain point, after which further increase in arousal is linked with 
decrements in performance levels. The positive relationship between role 
conflict and task performance, found in the survey, may be explained by 
Yerkes-Dodson Law, because heightened role conflict improved task per-
formance. This explanation will apply up to a certain point, at which contin-
ued increase in role conflict will reduce the task performance level. Apply-
ing Yerkes-Dodson Law as a theoretical reason to explain the relationship 
found in this research, the conflict variable can be modified via the square 
term. For example, in a simple regression model, a curvilinear model with 
one turning point can be modeled with the equation Υ = β0 + β1X1 + β2X12 
where β0 is the intercept, X1 is the linear effect of role conflict, and X12 is the 
curvilinear effect of role conflict. For interpretation purposes, the positive 
quadratic term indicates a U-shaped upward curve, while a negative coeffi-
cient indicates an inverted U-shaped downward relationship. An inverted U-
shaped relationship is supported if (1) the coefficient for a linear term is 
positive (e.g., β1), (2) the coefficient for a quadratic term is negative (e.g., 
β2), and (3) both coefficients are significant (Singh, 1998). The signs are 
reversed for a U-shaped relationship. 
Selye (1959) offers a contrasting perspective in his presentation of the Gen-
eral Adaptation Syndrome (G-A-S) as a three-phase model of reactions to 
stressors. The alarm phase is characterized by increasingly lower levels of 
performance. For example in an IT outsourcing arrangement, where trans-
plants immediately after transfer to a vendor organization increase their per-
ception of environmental stressors, which lower their task performance. Dur-
ing the reactance phase, performance factors increase and resistance to stress 
increases. Selye (1974) uses the term “eustress” to describe positive conse-
quences of stress and “distress” to describe negative consequences of stress. 
Eustress is accompanied by coping behaviors that enable people to overcome 
stress and accomplish tasks that are considered worthwhile. Beyond some 
threshold, however, the exhaustion phase is observed, in which reactions are 
similar to those in the initial phase. The periodicity outlined in G-A-S aug-
ments the hypotheses examined in prior research. The linear effects offered 
in many studies are embedded in the initial and final phases of the function 
(negative relationship in the alarm phase and the exhaustion phase). The 
function also incorporates logic from Yerke’s and Dodson’s (1908) research 
on habit formation to account for nonlinear influences of stress. This rela-
tionship is incorporated into G-A-S function by a positive relationship in the 
reactance phase. Applying the General Adaptation Syndrome on the rela-
tionship, the conflict variable can be modified via the sine function. A curvi-
linear model with two turning points can be modeled with the equation Υ = 
β0 + β1X1 + β2sine(X1) where β0 is the intercept, X1 is the linear effect of role 
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conflict, and sine(X1) is the curvilinear effect of role conflict. An inverted 
sine-shaped relationship is supported if (1) the coefficient for a linear term is 
positive (e.g., β1), (2) the coefficient for a sine term is negative (e.g., β2), and 
(3) both coefficients are significant. 
The non-linear relationships discussed above require the creation of an addi-
tional variable to represent the changing slope of the relationship over the 
range of the independent variable. This focuses on the relationship between 
one single independent variable (role conflict) and the dependent variable 
task performance. Singh (1998) has investigated the interaction effects of 
other independent variables and role stressors on job performance. He found 
that task variety buffers the effect of role conflict on job performance. In his 
research, salespeople faced fewer dysfunctional consequences of role con-
flict when task variety was high. This is termed moderator effect, which 
occurs when a third independent variable causes the relationship between a 
dependent and an independent variable to change depending on the value of 
the moderator variable. The moderator effect is represented in multiple re-
gressions by a term quite similar to the polynomials described earlier to rep-
resent nonlinear effects. The moderator term is a compound variable formed 
by multiplying X1 by the moderator X2, which is entered into the regression 
equation. The moderated relationship was represented as Υ = β0 + β1X1 + 
β2X2 + β3X1X2 where β0 is the intercept, X1 is the linear effect of role con-
flict, X2 is the linear effect of client managerial persistent expectations, and 
X1X2 is the moderator effect of client managerial persistent expectations on 
role conflict.  
To determine whether the alternative models were significant, the analyst 
first estimated the original (unmoderated) equation and then estimated the 
moderated relationships. If the change in R2 was statistically significant, then 
a significant effect of the alternative model was present. Appendix G shows 
regression with task performance, role conflict, and the additional non-linear 
and interaction variables.  
First, The General Adaptation Syndrome was represented by Υ = β0 + β1X1 + 
β2sine(X1) in Model 2. Both coefficients of independent variables were sig-
nificant, but their sign was not as expected to represent the alarm phase, 
reactance phase, and exhaustion phase. The proposed Model 2 suggested 
increased performance in the alarm phase, decreased in the reactance phase, 
and again increased performance in the exhaustion phase. And thus we 
found no support for the General Adaptation Syndrome.  
Second, an inverted U-shaped relationship was represented as Υ = β0 + β1X1 
+ β2X12 in Model 3. Both coefficients of dependent variables were signifi-
cant, but their sign was the opposite of what could be expected applying 
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Yerkes-Dodson Law. The proposed Model 3 suggested an upward U-shaped 
curve, and thus we found no support for Model 3.  
Third, the interaction effect was represented as Υ = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + 
β3X1X2 in Model 3. The specific interactional influences appear significant, 
including the interactive positive influence of role conflict and client mana-
gerial persistent expectation (β3 = 0.129, p < 0.01). In addition, role conflict 
(β1 = -0.526, p < 0.01) had the proposed dysfunctional effect. In other words, 
client managerial persistent expectation appeared to buffer the effects of role 
conflict on task performance.  
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Figure 7.1. Interaction effect of role conflict and client managerial persistent expec-
tations on task performance. 
 
As indicated in Figure 7.1, role conflict has a negative effect on task per-
formance when client managerial expectations are at a “low” level. Role 
conflict has a positive relationship with task performance when client mana-
gerial persistent expectations are at a “high” level. As such, transplants face 
fewer dysfunctional consequences of role conflict when client managerial 
persistent explanation is high. Prior research has not reported such effects. 
An explanation of these results was sought, and thus, follow-up interviews 
with three randomly selected transplants were conducted. Findings from 
these interviews are reported later in section 7.1.4. Other buffering effects 
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were sought both in survey data and case-studies, but no such effects were 
found. 
7.1.2 Effects of outsourcing arrangement stressors 
As expected all three outsourcing arrangement stressors affected transplants’ 
perception of role stress. Client managerial persistent expectations had a 
significant positive affect on role conflict; meaning, higher levels of expecta-
tions gave higher levels of conflict. As client managerial expectations per-
sist, transplanted IT workers perceive role conflict. The phenomenon of cli-
ent managerial persistent expectations was identified by Ho et al. (2003). 
They also found that persistence of expectations had a distinctive positive 
influence on client managerial perception of contractor performance. This is 
interesting, because transplants’ perceived higher levels of persistent client 
managerial expectations also perceived higher levels of role conflict, which 
in turn was positively related to their self-reported task performance. This 
indicates the presence of an outsourcing arrangement stressor. The proposed 
positive relationship between client managerial persistent expectation and 
role ambiguity was found not significant.  
Relational norms were found to have a significant negative effect on role 
ambiguity, meaning that more clearly defined roles and procedures (higher 
levels of relational norms) reduced the perception of uncertainty about a 
transplant’s role. Kern and Blois (2002) studied the establishing of norms of 
behavior in a single IT outsourcing relationship. They concluded that the 
need for establishing relational norms was not recognized by the parties in-
volved, and that the failure of the consortium was due to the issue of 
“norms.” In this research, perception of relational norms had a significant 
negative impact on role ambiguity. Meaning, the better defined roles of be-
havior, the less the transplant’s perceived confusion about his or her role. In 
turn, higher levels of role ambiguity had a negative effect on task perform-
ance. This indicates that relational norm is an outsourcing arrangement 
stressor. The proposed negative relationship between relational norms and 
role conflict was found not significant.  
According to Quinn (1999), developing best-in-the-world capabilities is 
crucial in designing a core competence strategy. Unless a company is best-
in-the-world at an activity, it is someone else’s core competency. Trans-
plants’ perception of complementarities in core competencies had a signifi-
cant negative effect on perception of role ambiguity. Clearly defined firm 
borders and work responsibilities reduces a transplant’s perception of role 
ambiguity. In turn, and not surprisingly this had a positive effect on task 
performance. Complementary core competencies are recognized as an out-
sourcing arrangement stressor. The proposed negative relationship between 
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complementary core competencies and role conflict was found not signifi-
cant.  
Hypotheses proposed alternative positive relationships between the three 
outsourcing arrangement stressors — complementary core competencies, 
client managerial persistent expectations, and relational norms — and a 
transplant’s individual task performance. However, no such direct effects 
were found significant. A possible explanation of these results is that the 
relationship measures of outsourcing arrangement stressors and task per-
formance concealed important complexities of the variable. For example, 
relational norms can be judged both positive and negative. Perhaps, for the 
workers transplanted, there are established new procedures and routines for 
communicating with the client. Some transplants may view this as positive, 
others as negative, depending on individual disposition or preferences. Com-
plementary core competencies might also be judged both positive and nega-
tive among transplanted IT workers. Positive among some transplants, e.g., 
demarcation of work, specialization and job design. Negative among other 
transplants, e.g., they are not allowed anymore to work with client business 
process (which was really the reason for attending the client company). And 
likewise, persistence of expectations may be judged differently depending on 
the strength of ties with the previous client manager. In sum there was found 
no significant direct effect of outsourcing arrangements stressors on task 
performance. 
As stated by Fevre, Matheny, and Kolt (2003) stress is the response to 
stressors in the environment. The stressors identified in this research de-
scribe three different external forces, or outsourcing arrangement character-
istics, influencing transplants’ individual level of role stress. In this part of 
the research, focus has been on how transplants interpret environmental 
stimuli and how these interpretations lead to experiences of role conflict and 
role ambiguity. 
7.1.3 Potential time constraints 
As this research was using cross-sectional data, where two groups of trans-
plants got transferred at different points in time, it was interesting to know 
whether differences between sample averages was significant. A two-sample 
test was found appropriate. The t-test assesses the statistical significance of 
the differences between two independent sample means. The two different 
transfer times represented a treatment with two levels. A treatment is a cate-
gorical independent variable observed that can be represented in various 
levels. In this research, the treatment was transfer time — Group A was 
transferred 10 months prior to Group B. To determine whether the two dif-
ferent transfer times were viewed differently (meaning that the treatment had 
an effect), t statistics was calculated. The t statistics is the ratio of the differ-
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ence between the sample means to its standard error. If a statistically signifi-
cant difference is found, the researcher can then examine the actual mean 
values to determine which group is higher on the dependent variable. 
As predicted, those transplants represented in Group B (transferred 7 months 
prior to the survey) had higher level role ambiguity (M = 4.00, SD = 1.16) 
than those represented in Group A (M = 3.49, SD = 1.11). See Appendix H 
for pair wise comparison of means between all constructs of Group A and 
Group B. Levene’s test for equality of variances, which is a test for homoge-
neity of variance, was not significant (p > 0.05). The variances can be as-
sumed to be homogeneous and the equal variances’ line of values for the t-
test can be used. Although the average mean indicates a difference between 
the groups, it was not significant beyond the 0.05 level: t(90) = -1.847; p = 
0.068. For all other constructs the differences in means was less than re-
ported for role ambiguity, e.g., role conflict of Group B had a slightly higher 
level (M = 4.21, SD = 1.06) than Group A (M = 4.10, SD = 1.32), and again 
differences in means was not significant beyond the 0.05 level: t(90) = -
0.361; p = 0.719. Thus, it was reasonable to assume equal variances. 
According to Lacity and Willcocks (2000a), it is not unlikely that transition 
activities for large outsourcing contracts may last from 18 months to more 
than 2 years. This includes relationship activities such as establishing post-
contract management structures and processes, but also implementing con-
solidation, rationalization, and standardization. Suppliers’ bids are often 
based on cost-reduction tactics, such as consolidating data centers, standard-
izing software and hardware platforms, centralizing IT staffs, and so on. 
Implementing these projected savings might be unpopular among the trans-
plants. The supplier needs the savings to earn profit on the account, and they 
have got the power to overcome transplants’ resistance. In all three case-
studies, reported in chapter 3, huge transition projects were set up. Old or-
ganizational structures were broken down, employees were replaced accord-
ing to competencies; some of them got new managers and new colleagues, 
and some got new clients to support. Geographical relocation was also men-
tioned as a stressor. Prior to the confirmatory survey the outsourcer had just 
finished a huge transformation, integrating IT workers from client and ven-
dor organizations. As transplants from Group A and Group B seemed to be a 
part of the same process, this may explain the findings (no differences in 
means and variance between the two groups). 
The researcher also controlled for other constraints, such as gender, educa-
tional background, study field, years employed by the client company, cur-
rent position at the vendor company. No significant differences between the 
two groups were found. 
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7.1.4 Transplants’ interpretation of role stress 
Three months after the survey, the researcher conducted follow-up inter-
views with three randomly selected transplants. In face-to-face meetings, the 
transplants were asked open questions about stressors in their outsourcing 
environment, their individual role stress and work performance. The meet-
ings lasted for around one hour, and were tape-recorded. Transcripts were 
written immediately after interviews. 
As all three transplants had previously participated in the survey, only a very 
short introduction was given by the researcher. The first question was about 
their individual perception of role stress. All transplants recognized role 
stress as an issue relevant for their own outsourcing arrangement. One trans-
plant stated: “The terms and conditions of employment were handled with 
care, but our new role was not clearly defined.” This referred to lack of clar-
ity of transplants’ behavioral requirement. Another transplant stated there 
were incompatible expectations from client and vendor managers. Client 
managers had both a professional attitude towards agreed upon service lev-
els, he said, but also expectations towards delivery of extra services, such as 
on-site helping behavior or other activities which were not specified in the 
contract. Vendor managers had expectations towards delivery of cost-
effective services. This was a stressful situation as one transplant reported: 
“We worked hard to satisfy both groups of stakeholders.” The contractual 
side of the outsourcing arrangement was not the problematic one. Instead, 
the human side (e.g., personal relationships) of the arrangement stressed the 
transplants. As such, both role conflict and role ambiguity were recognized. 
When asking transplants questions about how the stressful situation affected 
their work outcome, some interesting statements were given. “I don’t think 
the quality of service has been reduced, but job satisfaction has been,” one 
transplant stated. Asking the transplant “why,” the researcher was told this 
was because of work pride. Transplants worked as hard as possible, trying to 
satisfy both previous (client) mangers and new (vendor) managers. Another 
transplant indicated a tight relationship between a client manager and a 
transplant as a reason for a transplant’s high performance level. You see: 
“First, we perform according to agreed upon service levels, and then we do 
the extra services as we always have done.” In the first couple of months this 
was ok, but as time went by this became more and more stressful.” A third 
transplant stated: “You can live with the stress for a few months, but not for 
a very long time.” The researcher was told that a number of transplants had 
quit because of the stressful situation, a larger number than vendor manage-
ment had expected. The transplants interviewed were indicating that high 
levels of role stress were caused by high expectations from both client and 
vendor managers. For a period of time these expectations will cause high 
task performance. This explanation may explain the interaction effect of role 
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conflict and client managerial persistent expectation on task performance 
found in section 7.1.1. As time went by, things were going better, one trans-
plant stated. But another transplant stated his organizational commitment 
was negatively affected by the stressful situation. 
All three interviewees pin-pointed they had been a “full time employee.” 
Meaning, their new institutional environment was very different from what 
they were used to. At the outsourcer transplants found clearly defined rou-
tines, procedures, and a rigid bureaucracy which they were not used to. They 
were told what to do and what not to do. Their influence was reduced. As 
one transplant stated, “Being employed by an outsourcer was both an advan-
tage and a disadvantage. Your role is clearly defined, but it kills your crea-
tivity.” There was no doubt that written material such as roles, responsibili-
ties, terms and conditions, had affected their role perception. 
Perception of stress was also affected by competence, one transplant stated. 
Many technicians and systems developers had made a career at the out-
sourcer. These transplants discovered their IT competence was at the core of 
the outsourcer, but not at the client where they came from. Consequently, 
their competence was regarded as useful at the outsourcer. These transplants 
had got the opportunity to learn more and to work on other accounts. An-
other one stated: “What gives me security and safety is my competence.” At 
the outsourcer the transplants had the opportunity to develop, make a career, 
at a professional IT service provider. 
Asking the transplants a final question about other potential factors influenc-
ing role stress, interesting reflections came up. “Some of us have an interest-
ing job to do, and we are trying to control the situation by focusing 100% on 
the job,” one transplant stated. Examples were transplants given a manage-
rial appointment immediately after transfer, and transplants who continued 
working in projects. These individuals were not stressed by the outsourcing 
arrangment, the transplant claimed. Another transplant interviewed told the 
researcher he had a positive attitude towards the outsourcing. Shortly after 
the transfer to the vendor organization the transplant became a “problem 
manager” in a transformation project. The traditional problem solution struc-
ture had broken down, and the transplant had to work very hard with prob-
lem solving activities. By this the transplant was able to handle the stressful 
situation. This indicates that personality or individual dispositions my affect 
the perception of role stress.  
These follow-up interviews were conducted to get a richer picture of the 
findings from the survey. Transplants confirmed recognition of individual 
level role stress. Through the interviews the researcher was able to deepen 
his understanding of some of the environmental stressors. Interviewees also 
proposed an explanation for the buffering interaction effect of role conflict 
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and client managerial persistent expectation. Transplants were also indicat-
ing other effects of role stress, such as dissatisfaction, decreasing organiza-
tional commitment, and intention to leave the organization. 
7.2 Limitations and further research 
Findings must be interpreted in the light of the study’s limitations. First, 
cross-sectional data were used, and consequently the time sequence of the 
transfer could not be determined without any further analysis. Two groups 
were independently transferred, approximately ten months apart. The results 
of pair wise comparison of the two samples showed no significant differ-
ences, so we assumed equality of variances and equality of means. This 
should be analyzed further, e.g., it could be interesting to see if differences 
could be found when asking transplants closer to the transfer and even right 
before the transfer. Second, the respondent’s task performance was measured 
as self-perception and these perceptions may not have corresponded exactly 
with the objective facts. The issue of self-rated versus supervisor evaluations 
of transplants’ task performance are discussed separately in the following 
section. Third, because a limited sample of transplanted IT workers was 
used, caution is necessary in making generalization without additional em-
pirical testing of the models. Fourth, the respondents provided all the meas-
ures of the explanatory and dependent variables and these measures were 
obtained at the same time by similar scaling procedures. Method variance 
therefore may have inflated the strength of some of the relationships. 
7.2.1 Self-rated vs. supervisor evaluations of transplant’s task per-
formance 
Researchers seem to agree that common method variance is a potential prob-
lem in behavioral research. Although random errors are problematic, sys-
tematic measurement errors are particularly serious because they provide an 
alternative explanation for the observed relationships between measures of 
different constructs that is independent of the one hypothesized (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). According to Podsakoff et al., one of 
the most widely used techniques that has been used to address the issue of 
common method variance is what has come to be called Harman’s one-factor 
test. The basic assumption of this technique is that if a substantial amount of 
common method variance is present, either a) a single factor will emerge 
from the factor analysis or b) one general factor will account for the majority 
of the covariance among the measures. The principal component analysis 
conducted in this research generated six factors with eigenvalues of one or 
more, and an explained variance of the factors ranging from 24.470% (factor 
1) to 4.006% (factor 6). The diagnostic technique indicates that no single 
factor accounts for all of the covariance among the items. Despite this, the 
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single-factor test is not evidence that the measures are free of common 
method variance.  
In this research, transplants’ task performance could potentially have been 
rated by supervisors, peers, and even by client managers or users. Scullen, 
Mount, and Goff (2000) demonstrated substantial bias in a variety of subjec-
tive evaluations, whether they are completed by managers, by self, by peers, 
or by subordinates. They found that 62 percent of the variance across mana-
gerial evaluations was due to rater bias effects, whereas only 27 percent of 
the variance was due to actual job performance. Levy and Sharma (1993) 
demonstrated that self-reports are significantly correlated with objective 
information, whereas managerial evaluations are not. The academic litera-
ture referred above finds no support for a low correlation between self-report 
and objective measures of performance; nor does it support a high correla-
tion between managerial evaluations and objective measures of performance. 
There is no reason to presume differences in applying these findings to trans-
plants of IT outsourcing. As transplants continue delivering ongoing services 
back to their previous employer, it is likely that they know their responsibili-
ties and how to meet quality standards of these services. Transplants also 
know their responsibilities according to demands from their new employer. 
As indicated by respondents in follow-up interviews, transplants try to sat-
isfy expectations and demands from both client and vendor managers. None-
theless, these two groups of managers do not necessarily know the effort and 
quality of each individual transplant’s work. Thus, there is no reason to be-
lieve that self-reported measures of transplant’s task performance are less 
accurate than supervisor or client evaluations. 
Research conducted by Sharma, Rich, and Levy (2004), suggests that sales-
people’s self-rated performance tends to be upward biased, but also that the 
amount of bias does not seem to vary across performance levels. They calcu-
lated managerial and self-ratings for three performance tiers — low, me-
dium, and high performers. Managerial ratings of low performers were 
found to be significantly lower than high performers. However, there were 
no differences in managerial evaluations of the low and medium groups, and 
the medium and high groups. The results from self-ratings show significant 
differences between each of the three groups.  
It is not unlikely that the transplants in the present study may have overesti-
mated their performance levels, but such overestimations may not have af-
fected the results. Furthermore, whereas performance rating by supervisors 
helps rule out the validity threats of the self-report and mono-methods, pre-
sent research suggests that performance ratings conducted by supervisors 
may be even more biased than transplants’ self-reported measures. Conse-
quently, it is far from obvious that the extra effort involved in gathering data 
by supervisors could have produced better performance data. 
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7.2.2 Interpreting and modifying the research model 
Drawing from the general literature on stress, Fevre et al. (2003) have devel-
oped a series of three tenets. First, stress is the response to stressors in the 
environment. By definition, stress is either good or bad or a combination of 
the two. Second, in addition to the amount of stress they cause, stressors can 
be identified by a series of characteristics: the timing of the stressor, the 
source of the stressor, the perceived control of the stressor, and the perceived 
desirability of the stressor. Third, whether stressors result in good stress and 
bad stress depends on the individual’s interpretation. 
In this research, three outsourcing arrangement stressors were found to influ-
ence transplants’ perception of role stress. Two dimensions of role stress 
were role conflict and role ambiguity. Findings showed that outsourcing 
arrangement stressors affected the two dimensions of role stress, which in 
turn affected work outcome. The amount of stress and the sign of the rela-
tionship varied. Although the research model addressed environmental stim-
uli and individual perception of those stimuli, the impact of individual char-
acteristics on transplants’ interpretation of stressors was not addressed. The 
dimensions were neither defined as “good stress” nor as “bad stress.” 
Given the limitations above, the researcher encourages others to examine 
findings through more rigorous research designs and across different compa-
nies. We also recognize the value, in future studies, of extending the research 
models to (1) include the transplant’s perception of one’s locus of control, 
efficacy, and affective disposition; (2) identify even more outsourcing ar-
rangement stressors; (3) examine more thoroughly transplants’ response to 
role stress. In Figure 7.2, a revised research model is presented, which incor-
porates the three tenets of occupational stress drawn from Fevre et al. 
(2003). 
 
 
Figure 7.2. Revised research model. 
Transplant’s 
role stress 
Transplant’s 
locus of control 
Transplant’s 
work outcome 
Outsourcing 
arrangement 
stressors 
 115
7.3 Implications and conclusions 
This research has been conducted in three phases. In the first phase, a thor-
ough review of IT outsourcing based research was conducted. The findings 
from this part was that primary focus of IT outsourcing literature and re-
search has been on organizational and relationship issues. Several organiza-
tion and management theories were presented in chapter 2 as a means of 
understanding underlying factors of IT outsourcing. Stakeholder theory rec-
ognizes the importance of balancing the interests of all stakeholder groups. 
Agency theory recognizes that principal-agent relationships changes as a 
consequence of outsourcing and this will affect both organizational and per-
sonal relationships. In business, performance is always a matter of concern. 
Economic theories are addressing performance issues such as high economic 
benefits, low transaction costs, and effective contracts, but they are not di-
rectly addressing individual level performance. To understand the complexi-
ties of managing successful IT outsourcing relationships, and more specifi-
cally explore individual level attitudes, behavior, and performance in out-
sourcing arrangements, empirical research was needed.  
In the second phase, three exploratory case studies were conducted. In-depth 
interviews were conducted of a variety of stakeholders, e.g., managers from 
both sides of the relationship and transplants. Important issues of managing 
successful IT outsourcing relationships were found, as reported in chapter 3. 
The ability to handle transfer of employees was found critical to the relation-
ships studied. Transplants experienced radical changes in their careers as 
they got moved from client to vendor organizations. Finishing phase two, the 
researcher had confirmed that transplants were a significant stakeholder 
group affected by the outsourcing arrangement. Interviews also indicated 
occupational stress among transplants, which brought the research to its next 
phase. 
Thus, the confirmatory survey conducted in the third phase, and reported in 
chapters 4 – 6, was based on findings from both previous phases. 103 IT 
employees transferred from client to vendor in a particular IT outsourcing 
arrangment participated in the survey. Role stress was identified as prevalent 
among transplants, and found to affect task performance. Three outsourcing 
arrangement stressors influenced their perception of role stress. Theoretical 
and managerial implications of this study are reported below. 
7.3.1 Theoretical implications 
During the past decade, the majority of research has looked into why com-
panies outsource. More recently researchers have looked into the IT out-
sourcing relationship itself, investigating how different contractual structures 
and non-contractual aspects of the relationship influence outsourcing suc-
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cess. More recent literature has looked at the vendor’s ability to deliver value 
to their client companies. This research draws on prior work to identify pre-
dictors of transplants’ work outcome. This research of role stress of trans-
planted IT workers in outsourcing arrangements has incorporated two under-
lying goals. The first goal was to examine influences of role stress on facets 
of effectiveness (measured as task performance). The second objective of 
this research was to identify IT outsourcing arrangement stressors that influ-
ence the transplanted IT worker.  
IT outsourcing research has previously paid very little attention to individu-
als affected by outsourcing. This research found role stress as prevalent 
among transplants of IT outsourcing. In turn, perceived role stress was found 
to influence transplants’ work outcome measured as task performance. Task 
performance was found to be positively influenced by role conflict and nega-
tively affected by role ambiguity. Role stress has previously not been re-
searched in the field of IS management. Two dimensions of role stress, con-
flict and ambiguity were hypothesized to have a negative relationship with 
task performance. As expected, the path from role ambiguity to task per-
formance was negative, meaning higher levels of role ambiguity decreased 
task performance. Contrary to what was hypothesized, the path from role 
conflict to task performance was positive, meaning a higher level of role 
conflict was associated with higher levels of task performance. Alternative 
explanations were sought, using regression with task performance, role con-
flict, non-linear and interaction predictors. Alternative perspectives were 
examined, such as a variant of the Yerkes-Dodson Law, a three-phase model 
known as the General Adaptation Syndrome, and a moderator influence. The 
non-linear models of Yerkes-Dodson and General Adaptation Syndrome 
were found not significant. But, the interaction effect of role conflict and 
client managerial persistent expectations on task performance was found 
significant. Role conflict has a positive relationship with task performance 
when client managerial persistent expectations are at a “high” level. As such, 
transplants face fewer dysfunctional consequences of role conflict when 
client managerial persistent expectation is high. Prior research has not re-
ported such effects.  
Lee and Kim (1999) investigated outsourcing partnership based on a social, 
rather than an economic perspective, and they found factors such as partici-
pation, communication, information sharing, top management support, age 
of relationship, and mutual dependencies, as factors influencing the partner-
ship quality. This research indicates that individual level role stress is influ-
encing individual level task performance. In turn, it might influence the part-
nership quality and the success of the outsourcing arrangement.  
Three outsourcing environmental characteristics were found as stressors 
affecting the level of perceived role stress among transplants. The literature 
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review of IT outsourcing theories suggested three outsourcing characteristics 
to be studied as potential stressors. Complementary core competencies were 
found to have a significant negative impact on role ambiguity. A clear dis-
tinction of competencies, and division of labor, makes it easier for the trans-
plant to understand his or her new role, and thus role ambiguity was lowered. 
Likewise, the existence of outsourcing arrangement relational norms had a 
significant negative impact on role ambiguity. Clear definition of procedures 
and responsibilities of the relationship made it easier for the transplant to 
understand his role, and thus role ambiguity was lowered. As proposed, per-
sistence of client managerial expectations was found to have a positive im-
pact on role conflict. The higher perceived expectations the higher was per-
ception of role conflict. 
Fevre, Matheny, and Kolt (2003) recommended a research concentration on 
the individual interpretation of environmental stressors, and further, a re-
search on characteristics of environmental stressors associated with the ex-
perience of stress as eustress or distress. This research has studied an indi-
vidual interpretation of outsourcing arrangement stressors, and also the un-
explored moderator effect of role stress on task performance. 
7.3.2 Managerial implications 
Although the context, pattern of results, and method limit the extent to which 
generalizations can be drawn from this research, some tentative recommen-
dations should be acknowledged. When transplants experience stress, they 
interpret environmental stimuli individually based on their own experience 
and preferences. Transplants are in this research recognized as an important 
stakeholder group that is affected by, and affects the IT outsourcing ar-
rangement.  
Firstly, when employees can be supported to make positive interpretations of 
the outsourcing arrangement, support should be given. This may necessitate 
investments in coaching and personnel development. Second, when demand 
and resources can be modified to reduce stressors identified by employees as 
distress, then management should seek to address these stressors. 
The following are remedies for managers in dealing with issues of role stress 
and work outcomes among transplants of IT outsourcing: 
• Develop detailed procedural guidelines for handling different out-
sourcing relationship situations. Relational norms will increase 
transplants’ role clarity, reduce role ambiguity, and this will in turn 
enhance his/her task performance. 
• Reduce client managerial persistent expectations. Although less 
likely to affect task performance directly, this option is likely to af-
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fect transplants’ role conflict. In the long term, role conflict will af-
fect work outcome. 
• Increase the complementary core competencies of client and vendor 
organizations. Complementary core competences are likely to re-
duce transplants role ambiguity, and they will have greater latitude 
in task performance. 
Based on a role stress analysis in IT outsourcing arrangements, this research 
suggests that each of the preceding options is plausible because (1) reduction 
in role ambiguity invariably increases task performance, (2) reduction of 
client managerial persistent expectations helps reduce role conflict and in-
crease work outcomes, and (3) an enhanced understanding of outsourcing 
parties’ complementary core competencies is likely to decrease the level of 
role ambiguity, and in turn increase task performance. 
Finally, management must not seek to manage stress to an optimal level 
much less induce stress in their employees, as part of any endeavor to in-
crease performance. Common management practice assumes that a reason-
able amount of pressure, anxiety, or fear in the environment leads to higher 
performance among employees than if stress is not present (Fevre et al., 
2003). The study has neither been on what is “good stress” or “bad stress”, 
neither has it been on how managers attempt to maintain stress at optimal 
levels. There is no convincing evidence, neither in the rigorous literature on 
stress nor in this research. 
7.3.3 Conclusions 
The objective of this study has been to add to the collective understanding of 
managing successful IT outsourcing relationships, specifically by focusing 
on transplants’ role stress and task performance. Accordingly, this study (1) 
brought to the surface three potentially salient outsourcing arrangement 
stressors (complementary core competence, client managerial persistent 
expectation, and relational norms); (2) applied these outsourcing arrange-
ment stressors as antecedents to the attitudinal and subjective individual 
perception of role stress; and (3) investigated the individual transplant’s 
experience of role stress as leading to higher or lower task performance. The 
researcher believes that each of these points represents a significant contri-
bution to our collective understanding of transplants’ situation in IT out-
sourcing arrangements. 
The findings of this research are applicable to most IT outsourcing relation-
ships where transfer of human (and physical) assets is a part of the outsourc-
ing arrangement. Findings may also be relevant for other types of outsourc-
ing where transfer of human assets is present. 
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Appendix A – Review of IT outsourcing based research 
 
Title/ authors Research method Scope of the research Key conclusions/ findings 
“Determinants of information 
technology outsourcing: a 
cross-sectional analysis” (Loh 
& Venkatraman, 1992a) 
Survey of 57 US firms Degree of IT outsourcing 
explained by cost structures 
and economic performance 
The degree of IT outsourcing is positively related to both 
business and IT cost structures, and negatively related to 
IT performance. 
“Diffusion of information 
technology outsourcing: influ-
ence sources and the Kodak 
effect” (Loh & Venkatraman, 
1992b) 
Survey of 60 IT outsourc-
ing contracts 
Influence sources in the 
diffusion of IT outsourcing 
Adoption of IT outsourcing is motivated more by inter-
nal influence than by external influence amongst the user 
organizations. 
“The etiology of information 
systems outsourcing” (Ang, 
1993) 
Survey of 226 US banks Development of a theoretical 
model of IS outsourcing 
synthesizing economic, 
managerial-behavioral, and 
institutional factors 
The study found that external production cost advan-
tages in the service provider markets motivates outsourc-
ing of IS in both large and small banks. Large banks 
were affected by internal institutional influences of 
unbundling support services, while small banks were 
affected by the level of transaction cost present in out-
sourcing arrangements, as well as the external institu-
tional influences. 
“The information systems 
outsourcing bandwagon” 
(Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993) 
Case studies of 14 compa-
nies that faced outsourcing 
decisions 
Outcome and scope of out-
sourcing decisions 
Practical advice for negotiating contracts and suggests 
that IT outsourcing does not always lead to cost reduc-
tions. 
“Strategic outsourcing” (Quinn 
& Hilmer, 1994) 
Conceptual, supported by 
several business examples 
Ways to determine core 
competencies and which 
activities are better per-
formed externally. 
Companies can substantially leverage their resources by: 
1) developing a few well-selected core competencies of 
significance to customers, 2) focusing investment and 
management attention on them, and 3) strategically 
outsource many other activities. 
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Title/ authors Research method Scope of the research Key conclusions/ findings 
“How to manage an IT out-
sourcing alliance” (McFarlan 
& Nolan, 1995) 
Case research When to outsource and how 
to structure and manage the 
relationship 
What determines success or failure is managing the 
relationship less as a contract and more as a strategic 
alliance. 
“Financial and strategic moti-
vations behind IS outsourcing” 
(McLellan et al., 1995) 
Seven case studies in the 
banking industry 
Why and how managers 
outsource IS functions con-
sidered ‘core’ to the success 
of the business 
Firms were undertaking outsourcing to change organiza-
tional boundaries, to restructure, to mitigate technologi-
cal risks and uncertainty, to access emerging technology, 
to manage IS department, and to business and IT strat-
egy. 
“Decision to outsource infor-
mation systems functions: 
testing a strategy-theoretic 
discrepancy model” (Teng, 
Cheon, & Grover, 1995) 
Sample of 188 companies Decision to outsource infor-
mation systems 
Decision to outsource is based on gap between actual 
and desired level of IS resource performance; manifested 
in the form of gaps in information quality and IS support 
quality. 
“IT outsourcing relationships: 
an exploratory study of inter-
organizational control mecha-
nisms” (Davis, 1996) 
Exploratory case studies 
into two IT outsourcing 
relationships — 
Xerox/EDS, Kodak/IBM 
Governance control mecha-
nisms when firms were 
interested in developing a 
partnership model 
Three governance control mechanisms — price, author-
ity, and trust — appear when companies are forming 
partnership with their IT vendors. 
“The risks of outsourcing IT” 
(Earl, 1996) 
Unspecified methodology, 
based on discussions with 
senior executives and IT 
managers 
Limits to IT outsourcing Identifies 11 risks in outsourcing: weak management, 
inexperienced staff, business uncertainty, outdated tech-
nology skills, endemic uncertainty, hidden costs, lack of 
organizational learning, loss of innovation capacity, 
dangers of an eternal triangle, technological indivisibil-
ity, and fuzzy focus. 
“The effect of service quality 
and partnership on the out-
sourcing of information sys-
tems functions” (Grover, 
Cheon, & Teng, 1996) 
Survey of 188 IS executives Relationship between IT 
outsourcing and its success. 
Outsourcing success is found to be highly related to the 
degree of outsourcing of two IT functions, systems 
operations and telecommunications.  
“The value of selective sourc-
ing” (Lacity et al., 1996) 
Conceptual Sourcing scope, financial
outcome 
 A framework to clarify sourcing options and aid manag-
ers in deciding which IT functions to contract out and 
which to retain in-house. 
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Title/ authors Research method Scope of the research Key conclusions/ findings 
“Strategic response to institu-
tional influences on informa-
tion systems outsourcing” (Ang 
& Cummings, 1997) 
Survey of 226 US banks Critical contingencies arising 
from competition that mod-
erate institutional influences 
on information systems 
outsourcing 
The propensity of banks to conform to or resist institu-
tional pressures (on IS outsourcing) depends on the 
nature of institutional pressures, perceived gain in pro-
duction economics, financial capacity to resist influ-
ences, and transaction cost considerations. 
“Transformation of the IT 
function at British Petroleum” 
(Cross, Earl, & Sampler, 1997) 
Longitudinal single case 
study, unspecified method-
ology 
Transformation of the IT 
organization 
A model of the transformed IT organization comprising 
seven components of transformation organized around 
purpose, process and people. 
“Research report: diffusion of 
information systems outsourc-
ing: a reevaluation of influence 
sources” (Hu, Saunders, & 
Gebelt, 1997) 
Survey of 175 firms Sources of influence in the 
adaptation of IS outsourcing 
The combined effects of external media, vendor pres-
sure, and internal communications at the personal level 
among managers, significantly influence the decision to 
adopt IS outsourcing. 
“Achieving success in informa-
tion systems outsourcing” 
(Saunders, Gebelt, & Hu, 
1997) 
Interviews of 34 managers 
who signed or administered 
their firms outsourcing 
contracts 
Determinants of successful 
outsourcing 
Primary reasons for outsourcing were technological 
considerations, cost savings, strategic considerations. 
Tight contracts were written for over three-fourth of 
companies reporting success. 
“Production and transaction 
economies and IS outsourcing: 
a study of the US banking 
industry” (Ang & Straub, 
1998) 
Survey of 243 US banks Influence of production 
costs, transaction costs, and 
financial slack on outsourc-
ing decisions 
Banks were strongly influenced by production cost 
advantages in their decision to outsource. Transaction 
economies were much less of a determinant while finan-
cial slack was not significant explanatory. 
“Game theory and IS outsourc-
ing contracts” (Elitzur & 
Wensley, 1998) 
Conceptual, using game 
theory 
Identify critical issues nego-
tiating outsourcing contracts 
Six critical issues are identified as: transfer of assets, risk 
sharing, technology upgrade, duration of contract, rela-
tionship management, and calculation of fee. 
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Title/ authors Research method Scope of the research Key conclusions/ findings 
“Towards a theoretically-based 
contingency model of informa-
tion systems outsourcing” 
(Grover, Teng, & Cheon, 1998) 
Conceptual Using resource-based theory 
and resource-dependence 
theory from the field of 
strategic management, and 
transaction cost theory and 
agency theory from econom-
ics, they suggests implica-
tions for outsourcing re-
search and practices 
The phenomenon of IT outsourcing should be studied in 
an integrative manner. 
“An empirical investigation of 
information technology sourc-
ing practices: lessons from 
experience” (Lacity & Will-
cocks, 1998) 
61 US & UK IT sourcing 
decisions 
Management of computing 
and IS, measuring IS suc-
cess, contract, strategic 
alliances, outsourcing of IS 
First, selective outsourcing decisions had higher success 
rates than total outsourcing or total in-sourcing deci-
sions. Second, senior executives and IT manager who 
made decisions together had higher success rates than 
either stakeholder group acting alone. Third, organiza-
tions that invited both internal and external bids had 
higher success rates than organizations that merely 
compared external bids with current IT costs. Forth, 
short-term contracts achieved higher success rates than 
long-term contracts. Fifth, detailed fee-for-service con-
tracts had higher success rates than other types of fee-
for-service contracts. 
“Relationships in IT outsourc-
ing: an exploratory research 
study of a conceptual frame-
work” (Kern, 1999) 
Survey of top 400 UK 
organizations, in-depth 
interviews in five case 
study organizations 
Conceptual framework of IT 
outsourcing relationship 
A multi-paradigmatic framework providing a compre-
hensive understanding of outsourcing relationships in 
terms of intent, contract, structure, interactions, behav-
ior, and efficiency-outcome. 
“Effect of partnership quality 
on is outsourcing success: 
conceptual framework and 
empirical validation” (Lee & 
Kim, 1999) 
Survey of 74 outsourcing 
relationships 
Investigating outsourcing 
partnership based on a social, 
rather than an economic, 
perspective. 
Result indicates that partnership quality may serve as a 
key predictor of outsourcing success. Partnership quality 
was found to be positively influenced by factors such as 
participation, communication, information sharing, and 
top management support, and negatively affected by age 
of relationship and mutual dependency. 
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Title/ authors Research method Scope of the research Key conclusions/ findings 
“Strategic outsourcing: lever-
aging knowledge capabilities” 
(Quinn, 1999) 
Conceptual, using concept 
of core competencies and 
business examples 
Designing core competence 
strategy 
Outsourcing for short-term cost-cutting does not yield 
nearly as much as outsourcing for longer-term knowl-
edge-based system or strategic benefits. Developing 
best-in-the-world capabilities is crucial in designing a 
core competency strategy. Unless the company is best-
in-the-world at an activity, it is someone else's core 
competency. 
“IT outsourcing in insurance 
services: risk, creative con-
tracting and business advan-
tage” (Willcocks & Lacity, 
1999) 
Single case study Risks in IT outsourcing The case illustrates 10 major risk areas in IT outsourcing 
arrangements. Through awareness of risks and careful 
handling, the company studied was found to be achiev-
ing business advantage from a total outsourcing strategy.
“Modelling the price, perform-
ance, and contract characteris-
tics of IT outsourcing” 
(Domberger, Fernandez, & 
Fiebig, 2000) 
Analysis of 48 contracts for 
IT support and maintenance
Modelling the price, per-
formance and contract char-
acteristics that are relevant to 
IT outsourcing. 
The study suggests that first-term contracts were more 
expensive than repeat contracts, possibly due to the 
higher risk and uncertainty often associated with newly 
awarded contracts. 
“Making more by doing less: 
an analysis of outsourcing and 
its effects on firm perform-
ance” (Gilley & Rasheed, 
2000) 
Survey of 94 top executives 
in manufacturing firms 
The study attempted to de-
termine the performance 
implications of outsourcing 
strategies. 
Although no direct effect of outsourcing on performance 
was detected, outsourcing interacted with firm strategy 
and environmental dynamism to predict performance.  
”IT outsourcing: frameworks 
for conceptualizing practice 
and perception” (Hancox & 
Hackney, 2000) 
Semi structured interviews 
with IT mangers from 13 
public sector organizations 
and 7 local authorities in 
UK 
Assess usefulness of four 
conceptual frameworks — 
core competencies, transac-
tion cost economics, agency 
theory, and partnership — in 
an exploratory study of 
practice and perception of 
outsourcing 
The study suggests that core competencies may not be a 
major issue in respect of ITO. Elements of TCE could be 
found. In terms of agency, the participants demonstrated 
some neutrality where they indicated that there was little 
perceived client conflict in contracting relations. Recog-
nition of partnership was more usually found in public 
sector organizations, as local authorities had more addi-
tional constraints. 
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Title/ authors Research method Scope of the research Key conclusions/ findings 
“The myths and realities of 
information technology in-
sourcing” (Hirschheim & 
Lacity, 2000) 
14 case studies Generate insights into best 
sourcing practices by com-
paring successes and failures 
Four archetypes of insourcing: 1) senior executives 
enable internal IT managers to cut costs, 2) IT managers 
terminate failing outsourcing contracts, 3) IT managers 
defend insourcing, and 4) senior executives confirm the 
value of IT. 
“Contract, control and ‘presen-
tiation’ in IT outsourcing: 
research in thirteen UK organi-
zations” (Kern & Willcocks, 
2000) 
Findings from 13 UK-based 
organizations 
The role of the outsourcing 
contract and its purpose for 
ensuring control over the 
client’s outsourcing destiny 
The contract has a legal function; the contract attempts 
to presentiate service levels; the contract assures client 
control over the outsourcing venture. 
“Developing a framework for 
analyzing IS sourcing” (King 
& Malhotra, 2000) 
Conceptual Developing a framework for 
the consideration of internal 
markets as an alternative to 
IS outsourcing. 
Identifies short term operational impacts (efficiencies, 
cost savings, service levels) mid term tactical impacts 
(performance, control, risk sharing), and long term 
strategic impacts (core competencies, learning compe-
tencies) that should be addressed both in research and 
practitioners’ decision to outsource. 
“Relationships in IT outsourc-
ing: a stakeholder perspective” 
(Lacity & Willcocks, 2000a) 
Conceptual Customer-supplier relation-
ships 
An IT outsourcing relationship framework, that focuses 
on three key elements: 1) relationship stakeholders, 2) 
relationship types, and 3) six relationship phases and 
their related activities. 
“Survey of IT outsourcing 
experience in US and UK 
organizations” (Lacity & Will-
cocks, 2000b) 
Survey of 101 UK & US 
CIOs 
Current market practices and 
experience 
IT outsourcing continue to grow and evolve. Benefits of 
selective sourcing are: cost reduction, re-focus of in-
house staff, improved IT flexibility, better quality ser-
vices, access to scarce IT resources. Downside of selec-
tive sourcing includes: increased transaction costs, po-
tential lack of integration, cooperation, and coordination 
among multiple sources. 
“Outsourcing innovation: the 
new engine of growth” (Quinn, 
2000) 
Conceptual, using concept 
of core competencies and 
business examples 
How do you stay ahead, 
when everyone around is 
innovating? 
Higher innovation return can accrue from outsourcing. 
Innovation calls for the complex knowledge that only a 
broad network of specialists can offer — resource limits, 
specialist talents, multiple risks, attracting talent, speed. 
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Title/ authors Research method Scope of the research Key conclusions/ findings 
“Place, space and knowledge 
work: a study of outsourced 
computer system administra-
tors” (Schultze & Boland, 
2000) 
Ethnographic fieldwork Work practice of a group of 
outsourced computer sys-
tems administrators — the 
struggle to negotiate the 
place-space duality 
The contractor’s writing served to create an informa-
tional body that removed them from the confines of a 
particular place and technology. Allowing their “real” 
bodies to move on to newer technologies, responsibili-
ties and organizations. The idealized place they yearned 
for was one that gave them security and safety through 
mobility and independence. 
“On the performance of tech-
nology-sourcing partnership: 
the interaction between partner 
interdependence and technol-
ogy attributes” (Steensma & 
Corley, 2000) 
Survey of 95 sourcing 
arrangements 
Technology attributes, or-
ganizational interdepend-
ence, sourcing performance 
Using a knowledge-based perspective, a contingency 
model suggests that the imitability, uniqueness, and 
uncertainty with a technology interact with partner inter-
dependence to influence sourcing outcomes (perform-
ance). 
“Work outcomes and job de-
sign for contract versus perma-
nent information systems 
professionals on software 
development teams” (Ang & 
Slaugther, 2001) 
Empirical Contract vs. permanent IS 
professionals 
Work attitudes of contract professionals are more favor-
able than permanent professionals. Nonetheless, the 
contractors are perceived to exhibit lower in-role and 
extra-role behaviors and lower performance. In-depth 
interviews suggest that these results can be attributed to 
how organizations assign jobs to the two groups of 
professionals. 
“Outsourcing information 
systems: drawing lessons from 
a banking case study” 
(Baldwin, Irani, & Love, 2001) 
Single banking case study  Decision to insource or 
outsource IT/IS 
Identifies motives for outsourcing decision to be strate-
gic and organizational, political, technical, and eco-
nomic. 
“The hidden costs of IT out-
sourcing” (Barthélemy, 2001) 
Survey of 50 companies Identifying costs that manag-
ers can’t pinpoint 
Hidden costs are identified as: vendor search and con-
tracting, transitioning to the vendor, managing the effort, 
transitioning after outsourcing (switching or reintegrat-
ing). 
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Title/ authors Research method Scope of the research Key conclusions/ findings 
“Exploring the supply-side of 
IT outsourcing: evaluating the 
emerging role of application 
service providers” (Currie & 
Seltsikas, 2001) 
Initial survey of 250 SMEs 
and case study among 28 
ASPs 
Exploring the supply-side of 
IT outsourcing; a comparison 
of traditional outsourcing 
and application outsourcing 
ITO is moving into a industry centric wave. A shift from 
traditional one-to-one outsourcing relationship to a one-
to-many relationship where an ASP provides an out-
sourcing solution to several clients remotely over the 
Internet or a VPN. 
“The impact of the client-
vendor relationship on infor-
mation systems outsourcing 
success” (Goles, 2001) 
Survey Ascertain the components of 
an effective relationship, and 
explore the link between that 
relationship and outsourcing 
success or failure 
A set of constructs that comprise a successful relation-
ship was identified and tested. The study demonstrated 
that customers and vendors have different expectations 
for each party’s responsibilities and behaviors. It also 
showed that each party measures success differently. 
“Global information technol-
ogy outsourcing” (Lacity & 
Willcocks, 2001) 
Case studies How to gain business advan-
tage 
Organizations must develop a comprehensive outsourc-
ing strategy in order to achieve more than modest im-
provement of service and cost reduction. IT functions 
must develop a set of core capabilities that must be 
insourced.  
“The impact of knowledge 
sharing, organizational capabil-
ity and partnership quality on 
IS outsourcing success” (Lee, 
2001) 
Survey of 223 IS managers 
in Korea 
Relationship between knowl-
edge sharing and outsourcing 
success 
Knowledge sharing is one of the major predictors for 
outsourcing success. Organizational capacity to learn or 
acquire the needed knowledge from other organizations 
is a key source of successful knowledge sharing. Part-
nership quality is a significant intervening factor be-
tween knowledge sharing and outsourcing success. 
“Culture, power and politics in 
ICT outsourcing in higher 
education institutions” (Allen, 
Kern, & Mattison, 2002) 
Three British higher educa-
tion institution (HEI) case 
studies 
The impact of culture, organ-
izational power and politics 
in outsourcing 
Outsourcing represented a potential threat to academic 
culture. It was the outcome of intra-HEI power struggles, 
and it was also caused by departments increasing their 
fight to retain control over ICT. The ITO arrangements 
were highly politicised processes. Outsourcing service 
providers was used as change agents. 
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Title/ authors Research method Scope of the research Key conclusions/ findings 
“Information technology out-
sourcing in Australia” 
(Beamount & Costa, 2002) 
Six exploratory interviews, 
survey of 277 informants 
Identify reasons for out-
sourcing, and factors that 
contribute to success 
Three most important factors for outsourcing were iden-
tified as: access to skills, improved service quality, and 
managers’ ability to focus on core business activities. 
Factors most associated with success were cultural 
match and nature of contractual arrangement. 
“Norm development in out-
sourcing relationship” (Kern & 
Blois, 2002) 
Single case study, BP Ex-
ploration 
The role of norms within 
networks 
The need for establishing norms of behavior that was 
appropriate for the outsourcing consortium arrangement 
was not recognized by the parties involved. The failure 
of the consortium was the issue of “norms”. 
“Exploring relationships in 
information technology out-
sourcing: the interaction ap-
proach” (Kern & Willcocks, 
2002) 
Exploratory research into 
12 organizations 
Håkansson’s (1982) interac-
tion model applied on IT 
outsourcing relationships. 
Key elements are the interac-
tion process, the parties 
involved, the environment, 
and the atmosphere. 
The research identified certain factors in IT outsourcing 
relationships not captured satisfactory by the interaction 
approach, namely the centrality of the contract, the 
importance of formal processes, and the hidden cost of 
relationship management. 
“The winners curse in IT out-
sourcing: strategies for avoid-
ing relational trauma” (Kern, 
Willcocks, & van Heck, 2002) 
Conceptual, re-analyzing 
longitudinal case research 
database of 85 IT outsourc-
ing arrangements 
Identifying the right supplier 
and contract bid 
The Winners’ Curse occurs when the winner of an auc-
tion or bidding event systematically bids above the 
actual value of the objects or service and thereby sys-
tematically losses. The experience places considerable 
pressure on an outsourcing venture and relationship to 
the point where re-negotiation or early termination be-
comes the only option. 
“Do make or buy decisions 
matter? The influence of or-
ganizational governance on 
technological performance” 
(Leiblein et al., 2002) 
Sample of 714 production 
decisions 
Relationship between out-
sourcing decisions (govern-
ance choice) and technologi-
cal performance 
Neither outsourcing nor internalization per se results in 
superior performance. Rather, a firm’s technological 
performance is contingent upon the alignment between 
firms’ governance decisions and the degree of contrac-
tual hazards. 
 143
Title/ authors Research method Scope of the research Key conclusions/ findings 
“Making the HR outsourcing 
decision” (Adler, 2003) 
Extensive literature review 
and a single case study 
What and when to outsource 
HR services 
Six factors can help companies determine which HR 
process to outsource and which to retain: dependency 
risks, spillover risks, trust, relative proficiency, strategic 
capabilities, and commitment versus flexibility. 
“The information technology 
outsourcing risk: a transaction 
cost and agency theory-based 
perspective” (Bahli & Rivard, 
2003) 
Conceptual, using prior 
research as well as transac-
tion cost and agency theory 
Conceptualization of IT 
outsourcing risk 
A framework for conceptualization and measurement of 
risk applied to IT outsourcing — scenarios, likelihood or 
risk factors occurring, risk mitigation mechanisms, and 
the consequences. 
“The hard and soft sides of IT 
outsourcing management” 
(Barthélemy, 2003a) 
In-depth study of 50 IT 
outsourcing cases 
The impact of hard (contract) 
and soft (trust) sides of IT 
outsourcing outcomes 
Simple IT outsourcing may be managed with hard side 
only and complex IT outsourcing with soft side only. 
Simultaneously used, trust can take over from contract 
when the limits of the contract have been reached. IT 
outsourcing efforts managed through ‘neither hard nor 
soft side’ are doomed to fail. 
“The seven deadly sins of 
outsourcing” (Barthélemy, 
2003b) 
Conceptual, based on in-
depth analysis of 91 out-
sourcing efforts 
Lessons learned from failed 
outsourcing 
Reasons why outsourcing fail: 1) outsourcing activities 
that should not be outsourced, 2) selecting the wrong 
vendor, 3) writing a poor contract, 4) overlooking per-
sonnel issues, 5) losing control over the outsourced 
activity, 6) overlooking the hidden costs of outsourcing, 
7) failing to plan an exit strategy. 
“Portfolios of Control in Out-
sourced Software Development 
Projects” (Choudhury & Sab-
herwal, 2003) 
Five case studies Control in outsourced infor-
mation system development 
projects 
Portfolios of control are dominated by outcome controls, 
especially at the start of the project. Behavior controls 
are often added later in the project, as are controls aimed 
to encourage and enable vendor self control. Clan con-
trols are used when the client and the vendor share goals. 
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Title/ authors Research method Scope of the research Key conclusions/ findings 
”When subordinates become IT 
contractors: persistent manage-
rial expectations in IT out-
sourcing” (Ho et al., 2003) 
Mixed-method: 147 survi-
vors of a single government 
IT organization 
Persistence of managerial 
expectations in an IT out-
sourcing context where the 
traditional relationship be-
tween supervisor and subor-
dinates changes to one of 
client-manager and contrac-
tor (client-vendor perspec-
tive) 
Findings show that role overload, the presence of strong 
ties between manager and contractor, and the lack of 
prior outsourcing experience increased the persistence of 
managerial expectations. In turn persistence of expecta-
tions had a distinctive positive influence on managerial 
perceptions of contractor performance. 
“Management control systems 
and trust in outsourcing rela-
tionships” (Langfield-Smith & 
Smith, 2003) 
Single case study Examine how control mecha-
nisms and trust are used to 
achieve control of out-
sourced IT operations 
Characteristics of the transaction, environment and 
parties, can be used in the design of control systems and 
trust in outsourcing relationships 
“From the vendor’s perspec-
tive: exploring the value 
proposition in information 
technology outsourcing” 
(Levina & Ross, 2003) 
28 interviews from a single 
long-term client-vendor 
case study 
Vendors’ ability to deliver 
economic and management 
benefits to their clients 
Vendor's efficiency is based on the economic benefits 
derived from the ability to develop a complementary set 
of core competencies. This ability, in turn, is based on 
the centralization of decision rights, and shared with 
clients through formal and informal relationship man-
agement structures. 
“What will it take China to 
become a competitive force in 
offshore outsourcing? An 
analysis of the role of transac-
tion costs in supplier selection” 
(Qu & Brocklehurst, 2003) 
Conceptual, outlining a 
framework for analyzing 
transaction costs 
Uses the framework for 
pinpointing where China is 
unable to compete in the 
supply of IT outsourcing 
Transaction costs are almost as significant as production 
costs when it comes to offshore outsourcing. The paper 
concludes with a review of the policy implications for 
the Chinese Government.  
“A transaction cost model for 
IT outsourcing” (Aubert, Ri-
vard, & Patry, 2004) 
Survey of 335 firms Relying on TCE, the paper 
proposes and tests an ex-
planatory model of IT out-
sourcing behavior. 
Uncertainty is the major deterrent to outsourcing; firms 
seem to outsource more readily activities having low 
uncertainty. While the level of technical skills is the 
most important reason to outsource. 
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Title/ authors Research method Scope of the research Key conclusions/ findings 
“An empirical investigation of 
IT outsourcing versus quasi-
outsourcing in France and 
Germany” (Barthélemy & 
Geyer, 2004) 
Survey; 160 senior IT 
executives in Germany and 
France 
Determinants of the out-
sourcing versus quasi-
outsourcing decisions. 
Quasi-outsourcing was introduced as firms setting up 
their own IT subsidiary. Findings shows that the deci-
sion to quasi-outsource is strongly influenced by IT 
activity asset-specificity, size of IT department, internal 
organization of IT, and institutional environment (e.g., 
Mitbestimmung in Germany). 
“IT outsourcing success: a 
psychological contract perspec-
tive” (Koh et al., 2004) 
Sequential qualitative-
quantitative approach of IT 
outsourcing project manag-
ers in Singapore (15 inter-
views and sample of 370 
project mangers) 
Critical customer-supplier 
obligations in IT outsourcing 
relationships and the impact 
of fulfilling these obligations 
on outsourcing success 
Results showed the existence of a psychological contract 
between customers and suppliers. Outsourcing success 
showed a significant positive relationship with five 
supplier and four customer obligations. Supplier obliga-
tions were: clear authority structures, taking charge, 
effective human capital management, effective knowl-
edge management, effective knowledge transfer, and 
building effective inter-organizational teams. Customer 
obligations were: clear specifications, prompt payment, 
close project monitoring, and project ownership. 
“Trust-building mechanisms 
utilized in outsourced IS de-
velopment projects: a case 
study” (Lander, Purvis, 
McCray, & Leigh, 2004) 
Single in-depth case study Describe trust-building 
mechanisms used between 
different stakeholders over 
the course of a ERP imple-
mentation project. 
The results indicate that the various stakeholders did not 
encounter previously identified stages of building trust. 
Significant differences were found in the use of trust-
building mechanisms among top-level managers, project 
team members, users, and outsourcers. 
“IT outsourcing strategies: 
universalistic, contingency, and 
configurational explanations of 
success” (Lee, Miranda, & 
Kim, 2004) 
311 firms in South Korea Exploring the effects of IT 
outsourcing strategies on 
outsourcing success 
Findings indicate superiority of configurational approach 
over universalistic and contingency perspectives ex-
plaining outsourcing success. 
“Transformational outsourc-
ing” (Linder, 2004)  
20 case studies Outsourcing as a means of 
achieving radical organiza-
tional change 
Four varieties of transformational outsourcing are rapid 
startup, pathway to growth, change catalyst, and radical 
renewal. 
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Title/ authors Research method Scope of the research Key conclusions/ findings 
“Preparing for utility comput-
ing: The role of IT architecture 
and relationship management” 
(Ross & Westerman, 2004) 
Outsourcing experiences of 
eleven firms 
Explore the potential impact 
of utility computing on 
firm’s outsourcing practices 
Utility computing will shift firm’s objectives for out-
sourcing from a cost emphasis to an emphasis on strate-
gic agility. Vendor relationship management and archi-
tecture design capabilities will continue to play key 
roles, as firms seek the benefits from utility computing. 
“Taking the measure of out-
sourcing providers” (Feeny et 
al., 2005) 
Multiple research bases; 
longitudinal studies of IT, 
business process, applica-
tion, and off-shore out-
sourcing arrangements. 
Develop a framework for 
helping client companies 
evaluate BPO suppliers 
BPO suppliers possess delivery, transformation, and 
relationship competencies. Twelve supplier capabilities 
were identified. To ensure performance, client must 
identify which competencies to asses, evaluate supplier 
strengths, and remain involved in the business processes.
“Financial performance, CEO 
compensation, and large-scale 
information technology out-
sourcing decisions” (Hall & 
Liedtka, 2005) 
Public available data for 51 
firms outsourcing all or a 
large portion of their IT 
function during 1993 – 
2001 
The extent to which financial 
factors and managerial 
(CEO) self-interest influence 
the decision to outsource 
CEOs make irreversible large-scale IT outsourcing 
decisions due to factors that include firm financial des-
peration, firm cash needs, and the desire to maximize 
personal compensation.  
“The impact of IS sourcing 
type on service quality and 
maintenance efforts” (Park & 
Kim, 2005) 
Survey; 107 responses from 
28 organizations 
Effects of IS sourcing on 
service quality and mainte-
nance 
Outsourced systems seemed to entail a higher level of 
service quality than insourced systems. The sourcing 
type did not influence the maintenance efforts. System 
type and age influenced the service quality and main-
tainers effort.  
“IS outsourcing management 
competence dimensions: in-
strument development and 
relationship exploration” (Shi, 
Kunnathur, & Ragu-Nathan, 
2005) 
Large scale survey; 205 IS 
executives 
Theoretical development and 
empirical testing of IS out-
sourcing management com-
petence 
Three second-order IS outsourcing management compe-
tence factors — informed buying, contract management, 
and relationship management — capture necessary 
organizational capabilities to plan and execute various IS 
outsourcing activities for both economic and intellectual 
benefits. 
Note: The review included the following major IS journals from year 2000, to the most current volume available by November, 2005; 
European Journal of Information Systems, Information & Management, Information Systems Research, Journal of Information Technol-
ogy, Journal of Management Information Systems, MIS Quarterly, and MIT Sloan Management Review. Promising articles were fol-
lowed back to their origin, whether based in articles, books, or dissertations. 
Appendix B – Case study client interview protocol 
e.g., SAS manager 
 
1. Could we begin by talking about your involvement in the outsourcing 
venture? 
2. What is your understanding of why your company actually out-
sourced? What arrangements was SAS locking for? What functions 
were outsourced, and what functions were kept in-house? 
3. How did your company go about selecting CSC? Why CSC? 
4. How is the contract structured? What are the costs? How long is the 
contract? What role does the contract have in the relationship? 
5. How many people were transferred? And how did you handle this 
transfer? What kind of resources and knowledge did your company 
kept in-house? 
6. What are the most important stakeholders involved in the outsourc-
ing? And what are the main activities and goals of each group? 
7. What kind of performance, outcomes and benefits do each stakeholder 
group expect from the outsourcing arrangement? And what personal, 
technological or situational factors influence their expectations? Role 
overload, strength of ties, trust in outsourcer, outsourcing experience? 
8. How do you manage or interact with other stakeholders? And how 
does your organization pay attention to key stakeholder relationships? 
How do stakeholders influence the outsourcing venture? 
9. How did you handle the transition period? How did you find the ven-
dor handled the transition period? What problems, issues or conflicts 
did you encounter? 
10. What role do you play in managing the relationship? Could you de-
scribe the state of the relationship with SAS? Governance structures? 
11. How do you perceive the vendor’s operations? Has CSC been able to 
provide you with value added benefits? Examples? Are you achieving  
12. your expectations and outsourcing intentions? Why not? 
13. What are the upcoming challenges for you and the relationship? 
14. Has your company an exit strategy? 
15. Are there issues we missed that you wish to bring up? 
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Appendix C – Case study vendor interview protocol 
e.g., CSC manager 
 
1. Could we begin by talking about your involvement in the SAS ac-
count?  
2. What is your understanding of why SAS actually outsourced? What 
arrangements was SAS locking for? What was outsourced? 
3. How did SAS go about bidding? Who were you competing against? 
Why was CSC selected? 
4. How is the contract structured? What is the size of the deal? How long 
is the contract? 
5. How many people were transferred? And how did you handle this 
transfer? What kind of resources and knowledge did your company 
get from SAS? 
6. What are the most important stakeholders involved in the outsourc-
ing? And what are the main activities and goals of each group? 
7. What kind of performance, outcomes and benefits does each stake-
holder group expect from the outsourcing arrangement? And what 
personal, technological or situational factors influence their expecta-
tions? Role overload, strength of ties, trust in outsourcer, outsourcing 
experience? 
8. How do you manage or interact with other stakeholders? And how 
does your organization pay attention to key stakeholder relationships? 
How do stakeholders influence the outsourcing venture? 
9. Could you describe the transitioning of SAS IT function? What prob-
lems, issues or conflicts did you encounter? 
10. What role do you play in managing the relationship? Could you de-
scribe the state of the relationship with SAS? Governance structures? 
11. Has CSC been able to provide SAS with any value added benefits? 
Examples? 
12. What are the upcoming challenges for you and the relationship? 
13. Are there issues we missed that you wish to bring up? 
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Appendix D – Questionnaire items 
 
Construct Item Statistics 
Comple-
mentary 
core com-
petencies 
1. I contribute different capabilities to [client company] 
2. I have complementary strengths that are useful to [cli-
ent company] 
3. I have separate abilities that, when combined with [cli-
ent company’s] capabilities, enable them to achieve 
goals beyond their individual reach 
4. I have the capability to envisioning [client company’s] 
business processes which technology makes possible 
Alpha = 0.735 
Mean = 5.364 
S.D. = 1.035 
Client 
managerial 
persistent 
expecta-
tions 
1. Be more willing to work extra hours 
2. Perform my job more reliably 
3. Volunteer to do more tasks over and above the service 
level agreement 
4. Invest more in improving current skills to serve them 
better 
5. Be more willing to put in a full day’s work for a full 
day’s pay 
6. Suggest more initiatives on technology issues to the 
[client company] 
Alpha = 0.878 
Mean = 4.033 
S.D. = 1.446 
Relational 
norms 
1. Flexibility in response to requests for changes is a 
characteristic of this relationship 
2. The parties expects to be able to make adjustments in 
the ongoing relationship to cope with changing circum-
stances 
3. When some unexpected situation arises, the parties 
would rather work out a new deal than hold each other 
to the original terms (item deleted) 
4. The terms of an ongoing transaction are not renegoti-
able under any circumstances (r) (item deleted) 
5. In this relationship, it is expected that any information 
that might help the other party will be provided to them 
6. Exchange of information in this relationship takes place 
frequently and informally, and not only in accordance 
with a specified agreement 
7. It is expected that parties will provide appropriate in-
formation if it can help the other party 
8. It is expected that we keep each other informed about 
events or changes that may affect the other party 
9. Problems that arise in the course of this relationship are 
treated by the parties as joint rather than individual re-
sponsibilities 
10. The parties are committed to improvements that may 
benefit the relationship as a whole, and not only the in-
dividual parties 
11. The parties in this relationship do not mind owing each 
other favors 
12. An important feature of this relationship is that neither 
party would do something damaging to the other party 
Alpha = 0.885 
Mean = 4.393 
S.D. = 1.022 
Role con- 1. I receive assignments without the manpower necessary Alpha = 0.795 
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flict to complete the task 
2. I have to circumvent rules or policies to complete as-
signments 
3. I receive incomplete requests from two or more people 
4. I am often given assignments without adequate re-
sources and materials to execute them  
5. I work on unnecessary tasks for [client company] (item 
deleted) 
6. I have to work under vague directives or orders 
Mean = 4.135 
S.D. = 1.262 
Role ambi-
guity 
1. I feel certain about how much authority I have (r) 
2. I know what my responsibilities are (r) 
3. I know exactly what is expected of me (r) 
4. I have just the right amount of work to do (r) 
5. I know exactly what is expected of me (r) 
6. Expectation of what has to be done is clear (r) 
7. I perform work that conforms with my values (r) 
Alpha = 0.842 
Mean = 3.624 
S.D. = 1.141 
Task per-
formance 
1. I try to work as hard as possible 
2. The quality of my work is top-notch 
3. I intentionally expend a great deal of effort carrying out 
my job 
4. I often put extra effort in carrying out my job 
5. I almost always perform better than an acceptable level 
6. I often perform better than expected from me 
Alpha = 0.898 
Mean = 5.263 
S.D. = 0.966 
Note: All measures employed a seven-point Likert scale from “1“ to “7 .”  
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Appendix E – Weights and loadings of measures 
 
Construct Items Weight Loadings Standard 
err. 
t-value 
CCC1 0.3455 0.7797 0.0827 9.4317 
CCC2 0.2481 0.5696 0.1509 3.7759 
CCC3 0.3820 0.8717 0.0778 11.2041 
Complementary 
core competen-
cies 
CCC4 0.3304 0.7758 0.0972 7.9776 
PME1 0.2361 0.8559 0.1102 7.7646 
PME2 0.2517 0.7799 0.1910 4.0829 
PME3 0.2003 0.8267 0.1262 6.5501 
PME4 0.1509 0.7344 0.1287 5.7060 
PME5 0.2460 0.8157 0.1350 6.0403 
Client managerial 
persistent expec-
tations 
PME6 0.1767 0.7048 0.1242 5.6763 
FLE1 0.1360 0.7498 0.0635 11.7992 
FLE2 0.1626 0.7317 0.0923 7.9287 
INF1 0.1491 0.8116 0.0448 18.1175 
INF2 0.0164 0.2951 0.1458 2.0246 
INF3 0.1714 0.8824 0.0537 15.3233 
INF4 0.1512 0.7395 0.0682 10.8468 
SOL1 0.1721 0.7814 0.0424 18.4173 
SOL2 0.1581 0.8135 0.0420 19.3844 
SOL3 0.0628 0.4780 0.1078 4.4356 
Relational norms 
SOL4 0.1424 0.7534 0.0517 14.5837 
CON1 0.2543 0.7286 0.1222 5.9642 
CON2 0.3128 0.7048 0.1124 6.2699 
CON3 0.3522 0.8137 0.1041 7.8195 
CON4 0.1202 0.6968 0.1452 4.7988 
Role conflict 
CON6 0.3113 0.7198 0.1003 7.1737 
AMB1 0.1766 0.6728 0.0688 10.0714 
AMB2 0.2490 0.8587 0.0368 23.3231 
AMB3 0.1080 0.4924 0.1107 4.4473 
AMB4 0.2054 0.6959 0.0627 11.0941 
AMB5 0.2373 0.8569 0.0351 24.3831 
AMB6 0.1367 0.6736 0.0910 7.4035 
Role ambiguity 
AMB7 0.2332 0.7538 0.0572 13.1687 
TAP1 0.1804 0.7398 0.0668 11.0704 
TAP2 0.1820 0.7882 0.0635 12.4205 
TAP3 0.2134 0.8366 0.0504 16.6007 
TAP4 0.2517 0.8920 0.0298 29.9377 
TAP5 0.2015 0.8598 0.0328 26.2352 
Task perform-
ance 
TAP6 0.1882 0.7801 0.0766 10.1782 
Note: Both standard errors and t-values are for loading, not weights. 
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Appendix F – Results from confirmatory factor analysis 
 
Construct Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 
CCC1 0.766 0.034 0.008 -0.090 0.060 0.236 
CCC2 0.427 0.336 0.200 0.076 -0.100 0.062 
CCC3 0.814 0.166 0.020 0.001 -0.003 0.266 
Complementary 
core competen-
cies 
CCC4 0.671 0.304 0.168 -0.079 -0.197 0.082 
PME1 0.142 0.837 0.003 0.051 0.023 0.073 
PME2 -0.024 0.725 0.176 0.097 -0.034 0.240 
PME3 -0.022 0.840 -0.088 0.056 0.047 0.055 
PME4 0.056 0.735 0.072 0.047 -0.024 0.025 
PME5 0.183 0.786 -0.174 0.183 -0.006 -0.014 
Client managerial 
persistent expec-
tations 
PME6 0.277 0.665 0.008 0.095 0.059 -0.039 
FLE1 0.133 -0.066 0.716 -0.030 -0.048 0.136 
FLE2 0.001 0.063 0.638 0.010 -0.021 0.113 
INF1 0.147 0.091 0.768 -0.033 -0.072 0.027 
INF2 -0.048 0.069 0.361 0.006 0.413 0.502 
INF3 -0.087 0.211 0.795 -0.137 -0.156 -0.077 
INF4 0.171 -0.095 0.732 0.048 0.008 -0.096 
SOL1 0.032 -0.094 0.759 -0.219 -0.216 -0.065 
SOL2 -0.027 0.083 0.804 -0.065 -0.092 0.002 
SOL3 0.023 -0.016 0.471 -0.324 -0.066 0.422 
Relational norms 
SOL4 0.031 -0.087 0.745 -0.108 -0.299 -0.184 
CON1 0.100 0.166 -0.019 0.743 -0.090 0.006 
CON2 -0.086 0.242 -0.112 0.501 0.413 0.076 
CON3 -0.186 0.200 -0.221 0.651 -0.024 0.006 
CON4 0.037 0.074 0.173 0.835 -0187 0.060 
Role conflict 
CON6 -0.011 0.112 -0.203 0.663 0.221 0.133 
AMB1 -0.015 -0.068 -0.390 0.316 0.206 -0.320 
AMB2 -0.044 -0.136 -0.361 0.276 0.451 -0.540 
AMB3 -0.133 -0.071 -0.217 0.412 0.267 -0.127 
AMB4 0.041 -0.037 -0.147 0.031 0.398 -0.633 
AMB5 -0.133 -0.075 -0.321 0.155 0.629 -0.499 
AMB6 0.052 -0.066 -0.151 0.536 0.384 -0.351 
Role ambiguity 
AMB7 -0.181 0.149 -0.418 0.144 0.374 -0.438 
TAP1 0.110 -0.060 0.259 0.086 0.199 0.709 
TAP2 0.008 0.084 -0.031 -0.013 -0.069 0.827 
TAP3 0.050 0.009 0.277 0.131 -0.109 0.775 
TAP4 0.237 0.002 0.298 0.119 -0.079 0.798 
TAP5 0.278 0.149 0.109 0.015 0.140 0.799 
Task perform-
ance 
TAP6 0.224 0.167 0.082 -0.139 0.017 0.723 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
Appendix G – Regression with task performance, role conflict, non-linear and interaction 
predictors 
 
 
 
 
 Model Summary 
Change Statistics 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 ,080(a) ,006 -,005  ,96908 ,006  ,583 1 90 ,447
2 ,236(b) ,056 ,035 ,95003 ,049 4,646 1 89 ,034
3 ,241(c) ,058 ,037 ,94873 ,052 4,903 1 89 ,029
4 ,295(d) ,087 ,056 ,93942 ,081 3,887 1 88 ,024
a  Predictors: (Constant), conflict 
b  Predictors: (Constant), conflict, sine-conflict 
c  Predictors: (Constant), conflict, u-shape-conflict 
d  Predictors: (Constant), conflict, expectation, conflict_x_expectation 
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 Coefficients(a) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients  
 
Model  B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 5,009 ,348  14,401 ,000
  Conflict ,061 ,008 ,080  ,764 ,447
2 (Constant) 4,649 ,380  12,247 ,000
  Conflict ,183 ,097 ,239 1,889 ,062
  Sine-conflict ,421 ,195 ,273 2,156 ,034
3 (Constant) 6,946 ,939  7,398 ,000
  Conflict -,961 ,468 -1,255 -2,052 ,043
  U-shape-conflict ,123 ,055 1,354 2,214 ,029
4 (Constant) 6,989 1,022  6,837 ,000
  Conflict -,526 ,246 -,686 -2,138 ,035
  Expectation -,439 ,239 -,657 -1,840 ,069
  Conflict_x_expectation ,129 ,054 1,257 2,381 ,019
a  Dependent Variable: performance 
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Appendix H – Pair wise comparison of group means 
 
 Group Statistics 
 
   N Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
competence Group A 69 5,4348 ,96697 ,11641
  Group B 23 5,1522 1,21716 ,25379
expectation Group A 69 4,0435 1,48595 ,17889
  Group B 23 4,0000 1,35121 ,28175
relnorm Group A 69 4,3942 1,02008 ,12280
  Group B 23 4,3913 1,05223 ,21941
conflict Group A 69 4,1072 1,32691 ,15974
  Group B 23 4,2174 1,06671 ,22242
ambiguity Group A 69 3,4990 1,11430 ,13415
  Group B 23 4,0000 1,16457 ,24283
performance Group A 69 5,2802 1,01560 ,12226
  Group B 23 5,2101 ,82146 ,17129
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